Talk:IP Editing: Privacy Enhancement and Abuse Mitigation

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This page is to collect feedback for the privacy enhancement for unregistered users project.
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Brief thoughts[edit]

Making anonymous users actually anonymous is a good idea, but will definitely have an impact on our anti-abuse workflow regardless of how it is rolled out. Don't be afraid to develop and test models, so we can see what actual impact proposed solutions will have rather than endlessly opining about hypotheticals. – Ajraddatz (talk) 23:15, 31 July 2019 (UTC)

While I'm nearby, some other thoughts: with how dynamic most IPs are, particularly those associated with mobile device connections, CU and anti-abuse tools are far more unreliable than they have been in the past. Cookie blocks were introduced some time ago to help address this problem, but it would be very, very useful to modernize our anti-abuse capacity as part of this project. Stewards and CUs need more data points to be able to work effectively, and giving us access to things like email address or cookies (or, if not the actual data itself, then a representation that would allow us to compare between users / anons) would be incredibly useful if anti-abuse tools were also built around that. – Ajraddatz (talk) 23:19, 31 July 2019 (UTC)
Butting into your thoughts I disagree on the cookie block bit. Cookie blocks are pretty useless and anyone who is over 10 or under 90 knows how to clear cookies or just use incognito mode on your phone. It's why the Washington Post has shifted away from cookies when determining your article views: everyone was just reading WaPo articles in incognito mode so they could get unlimited articles a month for free. Giving us email access among other things would be helpful as well, but I'm skeptical of cookies being that useful. TonyBallioni (talk) 23:26, 31 July 2019 (UTC)
Yes, they aren't super useful, but it's one more data point that we don't have. I'm also not very technically-minded, but I know that other companies are using more intrusive methods to monitor who is accessing their site, and we should consider whatever they are doing so long as we handle that data responsibly. – Ajraddatz (talk) 23:34, 31 July 2019 (UTC)
Yeah, I agree with you. The current CU tool isn't exactly great and building pretty much any enhancement there would be useful. Any additional intrusion would likely be balanced by the fact that it'd be significantly more difficult for us to release any private information. TonyBallioni (talk) 23:45, 31 July 2019 (UTC)

Need of tools for abuse mitigation[edit]

Besides the increment of harassment and vandalism that such a change would yield (as written above), there are needs to mitigate attacks that are basic for the good health of the projects, and their participants. The two things must go together, otherwise it seems that WMF wants to open the doors to vandalism and harassment, which will bring strong reactions from the different projects.

To fight vandalism and harassment from LTAs (malevolent users that keep coming back), keeping IPs information more time is a valuable resource (more than the canonical 3 months) - even if we limit their access to few trusted users, in order to ensure that we can trace serious abusers identifying abuses (thinking about like child pornography or defamation). It would also be useful to have User Agent and IP-oriented filters. It seems to go in the opposite direction of enhancing privacy for the IPs, but not necessarily. CUs and sysops should be still able to check the IP address behind an edit, like every other website manager, or to block IP ranges. This can be masked, but an unique string must be permanently attached to each IP. Tools should also allow to do stuff like: "block all the IPs from the /16 range of the IP behind that edit".

Instead of having sysops and CUs accessing IPs, the alternative would be delegating the access to tools, so that they can filter basing on the devices, the editing style, and the IP range of a malevolent user. If this is not possible, I fear that we must continue using good old human intelligence. Ruthven (msg) 07:26, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

  • Yeah, if the current tools stay the same, but we get pseudo usernames instead of IPs, it's going to be unfortunate for projects that are too small for their own checkusers. You're essentially just taking away the ability to range block in its entirety. GMGtalk 17:53, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

Another option (and the only sensible one) is making those new automatically generated names MAC-address based UUIDs. Some imgboards (like 4chan) use them so you can see if some person with the same IP is trying pose as multiple users (the first part of the user ID will be similar with the same IP). --Pudeo (talk) 18:17, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

@Ruthven: I wholeheartedly agree that it is important to make sure we make absolutely sure that any work done here does not negatively impact the health of our projects. Trust me, we do not want to open doors to vandalism or harassment - but the very opposite. We are also going to be taking this project as an opportunity to explore improvements we can make to our existing anti-vandalism tools (CheckUser is high on the list). There are some great ideas on this talk page for that - exactly the kind of feedback we are looking for. Thank you for your comments. I appreciate it. -- NKohli (WMF) (talk) 19:39, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

Musings[edit]

Generally a good idea, especially from a CU perspective as this would make accidental or even intentional breaches of the privacy policy much more difficult.

The difficulty will be from non-CUs who of course make up the overwhelming majority of users who provide anti-abuse volunteer efforts. This would make range blocks effectively only available to CUs (if at all) and there needs to be a lot of thought given on how we can mitigate the difficulties this will bring. I'd be happy to talk to anyone offline if that's easier (or here). Just shoot me an email or ping me. TonyBallioni (talk) 23:22, 31 July 2019 (UTC)

  • Adding to this, I'd recommend that you extend the scope of your research (WMF) to focus on admins and non-admin vandalfighters rather than CUs and stewards. Those are the people that will be hit hardest by this, as they do the bulk of the anti-abuse work and won't have access to the tools needed to access data once the public-facing info is more anonymized. – Ajraddatz (talk) 23:36, 31 July 2019 (UTC)
Agreed. I could not imagine how hard it would be to manage ranges and anti-vandalism/LTA work without being able to see the IP's. Vermont (talk) 23:39, 31 July 2019 (UTC)
I think that's an overreaction (Vermont, not ajr). I agree with Ajraddatz's point that it likely won't impact CUs and stewards too much (other than making the CU stats go through the roof) but there are likely technical means to address your concerns, and if you express them here, the WMF can help take them into account. TonyBallioni (talk) 23:45, 31 July 2019 (UTC)
I'd have complications identifying LTA's without being able to WHOIS IP's, although range blocks would still be possible if we still made it able to put IP ranges in Special:Contribs without showing the actual IP's. (Ex: Anonymous user XXXXX/24) Vermont (talk) 02:10, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
IMO blocking "Anonymous user XXXXX/24" would be something of a shotgun blast in the dark, since you have no idea who else that might affect or whether there is any reason to think all 255 other names are actually related. Anomie (talk) 21:19, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
My biggest concern is dealing with spam. There is a lot of xwiki IP spam that flies under the radar, under the guise of references (see the SW wiki debacle) and not being able to search ranges for these types of edits will really hamper the ability for folks like me to combat this. Praxidicae (talk) 23:42, 31 July 2019 (UTC)
Yep. What's deeply concerning to me is that often the fact that even knowing that something was going on with a range starts with a non-CU or non-Admin noticing peculiar behavior from similar IPs. Unless we expect CUs or some new CU-lite user group to just routinely range-check every remotely suspicious edit, a lot more of this is going to slip by than already does. I would rather the Foundation focus on improve our ability to deal with dynamic IPs, which is deficient enough already. Specifically we need a much easier way to communicate with IP ranges, like being able to create a talk page for X:X:X:X::0/64. We need to be able to search deleted contributions of an IP range. And it would be helpful if we could look at a list of revisions, whether from a history page or somewhere else, and see the range of each editor instead of individual IPs (I'm aware that this is hard because the smallest meaningful subnet is different for different ISPs). This would be helpful not only for catching vandalism but also for preventing overreactions. I have recently noted on enwiki that several individuals on different subnets of the same network can appear to be one person able to hop across the entire network. It's actually a huge pain sometimes to sort out how many subnets are involved and how to block without collateral, and admins sometimes get it wrong. Someguy1221 (talk) 02:27, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
Someguy's concern is more or less mine. In quite a few cases, starting toward noticing that something odd was going on just started with noticing a pattern in the vandals I was seeing pop up. That can help identify everything from proxy abuse to dynamic IP hoppers. Additionally, seeing the IP and being able to WHOIS it allows placement of specific block notices, such as the "school block" templates that are especially designed for when one is blocking school IPs and large numbers of students may be affected. Without being able to see IPs, admins will have no idea that anonymous abuse is coming from a range for which a range block should even be considered, and checkusers cannot look at every instance of run-of-the-mill vandalism or spamming to find out. This would severely impact our ability to address abuse from those who know how to IP hop. Seraphimblade (talk) 04:50, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
  • As a "non-admin user", I think this is a very bad idea. You will not be able to see which vandalisms have been accomplished by the same IP. Identifying sock-puppets will be a lot more difficult. Right now, geolocation of suspicious IP helps a lot. You will not be able to see which edits are coming from a proxy server. And remember that the vast majority of users are not admins. Given the current scope of vandalism and sockpuppetry, I think this "enhancement" will be a disaster. My very best wishes (talk) 18:25, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

Unique, automatically-generated, human-readable usernames[edit]

Sounds good[edit]

I proposed this in 2013 Wikipedia:en:User:Sphilbrick/User_naming_convention_proposal At the time I wrote that, I did not focus on the issue of privacy, but I did identify several problems that this approach would address, so while this particular approach may be motivated by privacy issues, if implemented correctly, it will simultaneously solve some other problems.--Sphilbrick (talk) 12:41, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

Sorry but I don't like your idea. It has a lot of problems but I'll just mention one: nobody is going to remember their own username if it's a seemingly random string of characters. -kyykaarme (talk) 20:02, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
I think you are misunderstanding the issue. This no particular need to remember your username — the entire point of this is to assign generated username for people who choose not to login. If you make your first edit without logging in you will be assigned a name. If at some later point in time to make another edit the system will keep track of you and will assign the same name you won't need to remember it. Secondly, it's not all that hard. It's a string that includes the date you first edited followed by a relatively short sequence, probably a number between one and a couple hundred. My specifics key can be made a little easier now because I originally wrote it before unified login track of the language. In summary, you don't need to remember your assigned username but if you want to it's easy.--Sphilbrick (talk) 21:17, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

IP Encryption?[edit]

On the thought of what text string should be presented instead of an IP address, the idea of presenting an encrypted IP address of some sort springs to mind. It's similar to how password checking works - a password is entered and encrypted, and then compared to a stored encrypted version, without the unencrypted version being stored. In the case of IP addresses, as long as a unique encryption algorithm is used, I'm thinking an encrypted IP address could be shown wherever a plain IP address currently is. That should still work for, say, checkuser checks where the checkuser can see that a registered account and an unregistered editor do or do not share the same encrypted IP without being able to see the plain IP, but with privacy protection in that you can't determine location information from it. And, given that there's no longer any private location information, maybe checkusers could then even be allowed to link registered accounts to encrypted IPs, where they're currently forbidden from doing so. You wouldn't be able to do range checks and range blocks from an encrypted IP with current tools, but presumably tools could be developed to, say, "Show contributions made by the /xx range in which the IP associated with this encrypted IP lies", or "Range block the /xx range associated with this encrypted IP". Anyway, it's early where I am and I haven't been up long and I might be talking nonsense - or I might be teaching Grandma to suck eggs. But I thought I'd offer my thoughts. Boing! said Zebedee (talk) 10:08, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

We'd rather hear something we're aware of ten times than miss important input because someone figured we'd already thought about it. (: /Johan (WMF) (talk) 10:13, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
Definitely an idea worth exploring. The problem with encryption is, what if the WMF is hacked and the key is stolen? Then an attacker can decrypt the IPs. On the other hand, if you perform a one-way hash on the IP, like is best practice with passwords, how do the checkusers get the IPs back? Also, hashes of IPs could be precomputed, so you'd need a salt, but then that needs to be kept secret... Basically, good crypto is hard, and if checkusers/WMF have a backdoor, then so does everyone. BethNaught (talk) 11:50, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
@BethNaught: One option would be to store the IP but only display the one-way hash. But this could eventually be broken. GoldenRing (talk) 12:13, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
I see two problems with this, one particular to this scheme and one that's been mentioned several times before:
  • Firstly, it's a privacy-protecting as your encryption is strong. Once the encryption is broken, it will reveal all IP addresses ever recorded using it. The encryption could be broken by (a) newly discovered vulnerabilities in the encryption scheme used (or old vulnerabilities if the choice is made poorly); (b) someone leaking the encryption key; (c) someone stealing the encryption key; or (d) someone breaking the encryption (brute force attacks etc). Only the first of these can avoided indefinitely, if you happen to choose a perfect encryption scheme with no implementation bugs. All of the rest will happen eventually; all you can do is make them as unlikely and as far-in-the-future as possible. Perhaps you could find ways of changing the key over time, though any scheme I can think of has enormous drawbacks; principally, that anyone who refers to an IP by the encrypted text on-wiki would expect that text to remain constant, so that others will understand in the future what they were talking about.
  • Secondly, WHOIS information is useful. When I'm dealing with an IP, my response will be quite different depending on whether WHOIS says it's a school, a university college, a business, a public library or a consumer ISP. One potential way around this would be to record edits against a CIDR range instead of an individual IP; this would allow us to WHOIS an IP edit and see where it came from but it would make it impossible to conclusively tie an individual edit to an individual editor. It might also make dealing with IP-hopping editors on dynamic addresses easier. But I'm sure others will think of problems with this scheme.
Overall, I have some sympathy for the suggestion above that we just turn off IP editing. I'm not really convinced by the argument that this would make dealing with vandals much harder; for anyone who really wants to avoid this sort of scrutiny, creating an account is already an option and if that makes it so much harder to handle them, it's hard to believe that the determined vandals are not doing this already. On the other hand, the bar of creating an account (as low as it may be) would deter some of the drive-by vandalism we get; it's hard to think that much of what I refer to as the "Welsh school lunchtime" contingent could be bothered creating an account to change the name of their head teacher to something endlessly amusing. GoldenRing (talk) 12:13, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

This type of encryption scheme would be unworkable with regard to rangeblocks, for several reasons. Firstly, ISPs are inconsistent with how they both report and assign the subnets from a given allocation. A user could be confined to a private subnet that is not even listed on the WHOIS data, or he could be roaming over a shared pool that is somewhere between the largest and smallest networks listed on WHOIS. A Comcast-USA customer can be blocked with zero collateral, while it is impossible to block a T-Mobile-USA customer without also blocking 15-20 million other customers, and in either case you need to either see who is on the range or simply know about the ISP to configure the block correctly. If they are just going to hand us the ISP information, including location, then there was no point to the fancy encryption scheme to begin with. And if they are going to keep that a secret but let us see everyone on the same /XX range where XX can be anything, privacy is also out the window, because some of those people are not going to be shy about where they are. And if you think you can get around this by having some internal software automatically find the smallest range that catches all of someone's secret IPs, that is even worse. You could have the software report how many people share the range it's chosen, but you're taking a sledgehammer to a problem that could be excised with a scalpel. That is, if someone vandalizes Wikipedia from their home computer, and then they switch to their neighbor's wifi to vandalize it again, and you include both IPs to have some secret serverside thing make a rangeblock, congratulations, you've just blocked all of Chicago. But if you'd known the actual IPs, you could have just blocked the vandal. And regardless, even under that scheme where even the admin never knows what the IPs were, privacy is still out the window because when you do take out an entire city or country, a bunch of people are going to file unblock requests, and unless WMF is going to have us handle those blind, we're probably going to know which block caught them, and boom goes the privacy. In brief, there are a lot of very clever ways to mask IP addresses, but we already have an excellent one deployed - registration. Future technology developments should focus on abuse mitigation, not abuse facilitation. Someguy1221 (talk) 23:41, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

Synthetic user names[edit]

I written about this before, but can't quite remember where.

This can be done simply by using the existing IP address and do a modulus division. The remainder can then be used for lookup in a hashed name table. Doing this with several base numbers will give several names, and joining them will then give a synthetic name. Instead of a cryptic 123.231.012.210 you will get something like “Colorful Moccasin” or perhaps “Hungry Crocodile”. To make the name recognizable as anonymous they should be prefixed with something like “Anonymous”, so full names would be “Anonymous Colorful Moccasin” and “Anonymous Hungry Crocodile”.

The synthetic name can be stored as a cookie on the machine, and as long as this exist the synthetic name is reused for editing from that machine. As long as the cookie exist the machine will be identified with the same synthetic name.

To avoid that two different users on the same IP address is given the same synthetic name the IP address should be merged with a slowly changing random number. It should still update faster than the lease time on the IP address. That will make the system generate new synthetic names for each anonymous machine over time.

A variation is to replace or augment the random number with a digest from the agents header fields. That will make a more machine specific synthetic name, but note that nothing stops someone from using the exact same machine, OS, and browser as someone else from within the same school, university, or company.

A very interesting, yet somewhat difficult solution, is to make a user specific fingerprint. It will be difficult to make it similar enough that the same user is assigned the same synthetic name for each session. It is although possible to measure a fingerprint to see if it is likely that two sessions belong to the same user. A fingerprint will typically be w:keystroke dynamics, which will be collected in the browser and transferred to the server as content of a cookie. A user will then slowly over time establish a stable fingerprint. — Jeblad 14:39, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

This doesn’t address long-term abusers who use the “private” mode in browsers, or may delete cookies manually. These concerns are expressed on this talk: so many times (and by different authors) that I won’t bother to find a specific link for Jeblad. Moreover, some IP ranges are infested with physically distinct abusers, schools and cheap/leaky hostings serving as most known examples. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 16:35, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
A cookie can be used to maintain the same pseudonym on a laptop or similar device, it can not be used for abuse mitigation. [Said slightly different; you can maintain trustworthy information about a good editor on the editors device, but you can not maintain the same trustworty information about a bad editor on his device.] That is actually a faulty assumption made by developers of the present “cookie ban approach” aka Community health initiative/Partial blocks. I have made a note at Community health initiative/Partial blocks#User specific blocks won't work alone. I have also made a whole bunch of comments at Talk:Community health initiative/Blocking tools and improvements, they should be pretty informative why you can't use a cookie to maintain a block. — Jeblad 17:32, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

Regarding the automatically generated handles[edit]

> > Q: If we don’t see IP addresses, what would we see instead when edits are made by unregistered users?

> A: Instead of IP addresses, users will be able to see a unique, automatically-generated, human-readable username. This can look something like “Anonymous 12345”, for example.

I don't like this handle, would suggest

  • If random, make it non numeric, ie 'Mooing lemur' or 'Flying eggs' or another nickname that is more readable.
  • Anything customizable and marked as non-registered could also work if they store it in a cookie.

Thanks and regards, --Gryllida 00:00, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

Assign unregistered log ins a guest name[edit]

I have raised this issue a number of times, so I'm pleased something is now being done. It's quite unusual for a website to intentionally publicly reveal people's IP address, and to do so without giving users a full and appropriate explanation of the consequences of having their IP address revealed to everyone permanently.

Each unregistered log in can be assigned a guest name and number that is associated with that IP address. The guest name being selected randomly. So an IP address, such as 172.16.254.1, could become, for example, Guest NW567, and each use of 172.16.254.1 would be shown as Guest NW567. SilkTork (talk) 09:23, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

We could create a new user field - GuestUser, to run alongside User. This would immediately identify the user as someone who has intentionally not created an account, and such users would have the same limited access as IP users. Where an IP address is known to belong to a school or library, this could be identified as GuestUserLibrary and GuestUserSchool. SilkTork (talk) 09:33, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
Great idea. Perhaps we can add country code as well GuestUserUk, GuestUserUs etc. followed by Com, Edu, Lib, Xxx whatever so we have an idea where Nomen Nescio hails from.
Greetings & salutations, Klaas `Z4␟` V:  10:11, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
@SilkTork: sure, but it is also quite unusual for a website to intentionally allow anyone to edit.
Also, people do get warned that their edits are associated with their IP address ("Saving the change you are previewing will record your IP address in this page's public edit history"). I can agree that that warning could (or even should) be more elaborate, but it is there. --Dirk Beetstra T C (en: U, T) 10:22, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

L10n/i18n[edit]

Now I know I'm getting way ahead, but remember that MediaWiki is proud of its internationalisation and localisation, supporting hundreds of languages. The specific suggestions above are only starting points, I know, but any final solution will at least need to be:

  1. language-neutral and script-neutral or localised before it's deployed;
  2. gender-neutral (if we need to ask for gender preferences we defeat the purpose of non-registration);
  3. and yet sufficiently stable to not break signatures, SUL and so on.

There is no way we're going to have a sufficiently advanced dictionary to support a string of the kind "Anonymous <adjective> <noun>" in 400 languages, so we can discard that option outright. We could use the "User" namespace translation plus a number (and then format the number according to each language's convention), but this would already break (3): changing translation would be impossible because we'd need to rename the user across all wikis.

So in practice there aren't many options: we'll probably need the username to be just a number, or some neutral Unicode character plus a number, although the display might be different (cf. #IP address attribution is just rubbish). This is what StackExchange does, unsurprisingly, although they prefix the number with "user" because they're basically English-only. Nemo 16:24, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

We don't localize user names, or demand that user names must be localizable, so a claim we must localize anonymous (or pseudonymous) user names is invalid, at least for now and the foreseeable future. I'm not even sure it would be possible as user names are often constructed from real names, and we can not and should not try to localize or demand that real names should be localizable. We can although create a subsystem for transliteration that can handle real names and pseudonyms.
If we want to create synthetic names, and make them translatable (which would be contrary to present handling of pseudonyms) then we can use existing translated sets of terms. Note that we don't have to translate "Anonymous <adjective> <noun>" in 400 languages as the previous participant argue, it would create a problem, but translate "<adjective>" and "<noun>" in 400 languages, which would create a much simpler problem. This neglects problems with languages that has changes in grammatical case given adjective or noun, but I'm not sure we must (or need to) support this.
In short; I believe this is a constructed problem, and it is an attempt to escalate non-existing problems to keep the current system. — Jeblad 12:16, 16 August 2019 (UTC)

Premise of the idea[edit]

Since this point has apparently not been considered, what about the people who don't mind seeing their IP address broadcast? The right of privacy is a right, not an obligation. Jo-Jo Eumerus (talk, contributions) 18:15, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

@Jo-Jo Eumerus: Once IP addresses are no longer shown by default for anonymous users, I imagine we could remove the IP address pattern from the username blacklist. Then you could just set your username to your IP address if you really wanted to. The only reason we don't allow that currently is because it confuses people into thinking that a logged-in editor is a logged-out editor (which would no longer be an issue). Ryan Kaldari (WMF) (talk) 19:24, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
I don't think that would work, as we have far too many existing edits attributed to IPs for it to make sense for some to suddenly be registerable. Note the description of this project specifically says that existing edits aren't going to be reattributed, which makes sense since replacing signatures in talk page histories would be far too disruptive. Anomie (talk) 21:18, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

:::Huh? How do we know that forcing people to register accounts - which that would require - isn't going to cause problems with participation? To say nothing that IPs are not fixed... Jo-Jo Eumerus (talk, contributions) 21:25, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

I can't think of a non-wiki website that displays the IP of contributors. I suspect that some forums still do, but I haven't encountered it for years. Bitter Oil (talk) 21:30, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
That's because there's hardly a blog or a forum nowadays that does not require registration. Kudpung (talk) 19:52, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

Simpler solution - turn off IP editing[edit]

All of the privacy concerns identified here could be addressed by disallowing anonymous editing. In 2019, registering an account (with no requirement for email or any other kind of validation) is a ridiculously low bar. There would be substantial cost savings, since all of the design, specification, and creation of software necessitated by this "enhancement" would be eliminated. More to the point, Wikipedia volunteer administrators would not experience a substantial shift in their decades long practice. All of this seems obvious, but someone had to say it. Bitter Oil (talk) 18:34, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

As someone who has spent a lot of time blocking autoconfirmed vandalsocks, I have to also say that blocking new accounts is like playing Whac-A-Mole. There are good reasons for keeping unregistered users on IP addresses - namely being able to effectively block them. zzuuzz (talk) 18:47, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
If anyonymous editing were just turned off, or changes were sufficiently disruptive, I could forsee that on EnWiki the practice of warning vandals before blocking would be abandoned under a deluge of vandalism. Sentimentally, I would support a zero-tolerance approach to vandalism, but in reality this would breed even more trigger-happy admins, further reducing the wiki's welcomingness and diversity. BethNaught (talk) 19:14, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
I think the WMF is telling us that they are going to hide IP addresses. Leaving things as is does not seem to be an option. Turning off IP editing is much less work to accomplish the same goals. Perhaps they could use the budget for this project to work on better tools for admins instead. Bitter Oil (talk) 20:27, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
Your edit summary is unappreciated. I know very well that the WMF can play games, but I also know that the community is a match for them. Whether the WMF is being deceptive or not with this initiative, we have an opportunity to steer the direction or even stop it. As to whether they are being deceptive, I am not going to engage in any drama-mongering at this stage.
Ironically, if it hadn't been for the edit summary, I would have been sympathetic towards your comment. BethNaught (talk) 20:41, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
Community consultations don't have sections called "implementation plans" and don't say things like "We'd like to figure out sensible early steps that a development team could work on soon" and don't have the "Director of Engineering" fielding questions. It isn't drama-mongering to point out this is a done deal. Accepting that will greatly reduce the drama potential. Bitter Oil (talk) 21:21, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
I can really see where this looks like a done deal. It looks like that to me too. The phab ticket looks like a developed plan to implement it, the research paper looks like a prepared justification, it appears input is mostly being solicited on how to implement it - and not if it should be implemented, and it looks like this has been discussed privately for at least a year if not longer. Even as someone that thinks that this could be implementable with lots of hard work, a few to several years down the line - that's how this appears. SQLQuery me! 02:09, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
Of course, the drawback of "accepting something to avoid drama" is that the accepted thing may be a bad one. And turning off IP editing is likely going to be bad, since it will reduce participation, and we don't know what the impact will be. Jo-Jo Eumerus (talk, contributions) 21:34, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Turning off IP editing is an awful idea that goes against Wikimedia's ethos of "anyone can contribute". We already have so many editor retention problems across the spectrum that adding another bar to initial participation would severely exacerbate our biggest problem. — Bilorv (talk) 18:44, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • I support this proposal. Speaking as an EnWiki admin, vandals seem much more likely to operate from unregistered accounts than registered ones. Requiring people to take the simple step of registering an account will considerably thin out the amount of vandalism volunteer admins need to respond to, for almost zero loss to content improvements. As noted above, it would also be simple and very low cost to implement. Nick-D (talk) 02:06, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
  • While the concern of barring new editors further is valid (there are people who prefer not to have an account tied to their edits), considering most people already make accounts for social media and other websites, it won't be a barrier to most. Thus, the removal of anon editing may be the right choice.
Additionally, just hiding IP addresses will hurt our current system (at least, on the English Wikipedia) - for instance, marking shared IPs or finding proxies will be exponentially more difficult as we will only be able to find them based on behavioral evidence, which is subjective and not as good as a "whois" search that can provide a definitive answer.
Both of these do provide a good reason to remove anon editing, but there is the spirit of Wikipedia at stake here as well. Ultimately it will be up to those who created said spirit to decide if it will change. Kirbanzo (talk) 14:13, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

Make registration compulsory[edit]

Feel it is better to make registration compulsory further no email or verification is required for anyone wishing to edit this project and anyone can do it within a minute rather than this. Further vandalism from an account is easy to detect and total privacy is there. Pharaoh of the Wizards (talk) 11:51, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

Never ever. Fundamentally anti-wiki. Winged Blades of Godric (talk) 12:16, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
It could be an automatic registration, with automatic username, linked to IP address, which is used every time this IP address uses WP without registration. This way, the IP is protected the same way a registered user is, and these accounts are managed with the same tools than registered users. No big changes, but the IP are protected. --Jean-Christophe BENOIST (talk) 12:35, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
How do we determine sock-hops or do range block and all that ..... Winged Blades of Godric (talk) 13:14, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
Maybe a smart algorithm can generate username from which we cannot infer IP, but that are close together when they are in the same IP range.. Feasible for IPV4 IMO but hard for IPV6.. --Jean-Christophe BENOIST (talk) 08:25, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
For example, if we use "WhoIs" on an IPV4 or V6, it gives us the CIDR/Range of the IP network. The algorithm could generate a random ID for this network. Then, the weak bits (the place in the network) can also be obfuscated in a deterministic way (hash for example). For example, WhoIs 92.154.22.48 => 92.154.22.0/24 => AEXFUU4XAB. 48 => EFFC8. Username => AEXFUU4XAB-EFFC8. MediaWiki retains of course a private table which can do the reverse. --Jean-Christophe BENOIST (talk) 08:42, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
I agree that compulsory registration goes against the wiki way, and I think that the value of allowing anonymous and easy contribution has been discussed often over Wikip/media's existence. The idea that Jean-Christophe puts forward is one possible solution, though it would still make identifying contributions from a range very difficult. A compromise might be to strongly encourage account creation, through a pop-up message when saving an edit while logged out that says "hey, this will make your IP address visible, are you sure you want that?" That combined with making the account creation process easier (for example, a check to confirm username availability before pressing the register button would be nice) might be the right balance between privacy and maintaining our anti-abuse systems. – Ajraddatz (talk) 12:55, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

Wake up folks, it's 2019. People have no problem registering for Instagram, Telegram, Facebook, etc. Registering an account is a very low bar to participation. Make up a username, solve a captcha, you're done. All the concerns expressed here about privacy and access to information are solved. This project is an unnecessary waste of resources. Bitter Oil (talk) 14:43, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

Sure but from an enwiki perspective (forgive me) it will result in a lot of backlogs, particularly at SPI. If I had to guess, a lot of IP edits are one off interested editors correcting a minor spelling error, adding a source, generally improving an article. So let's say someone finds a spelling error at Apple, they'd be forced to make an account to correct it. They come back 3 weeks later, can't remember the password, didn't register with an email, so they create another, then another, then another and it looks like sock puppetry. I don't see an issue for the most part with the current IP editing system and think that creating barriers to good faith editors (particularly those that work in anti-spam and anti-vandalism) is better for any project. The exception to this is the handful of sensitive IPs, like people editing accidentally (or intentionally) from their work address but that doesn't seem like a good reason to throw out the entire system. I would be really interested in a report on IP statistics before any serious changes are even proposed that outline the percentage of IP edits vs. account edits (if this already exists, my apologies.) Praxidicae (talk) 14:54, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • I think there are (at least) two objections to making registration compulsory. One is political, in that "the encyclopedia anyone can edit" is a key part of the Wikipedia proposition. OK, I know it's not literally anyone and never has been, but eliminating unregistered editing would be a big political move and I think many Wikipedia critics would see it as evidence of failure. The other objection is as Praxidicae suggests, that it prevents people who are predominantly readers from fixing typos, spelling and grammar errors casually in the course of their reading - and having to register an account to fix a typo you've just spotted would surely make it so that a lot of people wouldn't bother. Do we have any stats anywhere for the number of edits made that way? I suspect it's a lot. Instagram, Telegram, Facebook etc are all well and good, but people want the full social service from those and unregistered use of them doesn't make any real sense. Boing! said Zebedee (talk) 15:47, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
One would think that the quantity and quality of IP edits would be something well understood by the WMF, especially before proposing a project like this. But it is not. If you read the research report associated with this project, it states
A ​2007 study​, conducted by a Wikipedia user, indicated that about 80% of vandalism comes from unregistered users, but that vandalism represented only about 20% of total edits made byunregistered users.
But that 2007 study involved a total of 250 edits (of which 89 were from anonymous users). A tiny study over a decade ago is a very questionable basis for any assumptions. It seems to me that the idea of IP editing being beneficial is an ideological one, not an observed conclusion. Bitter Oil (talk) 16:05, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
The point discussed here is anonymous is not anonymous for an IP and only for a registered logged-in user.Pharaoh of the Wizards (talk) 20:12, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
I'd like to dispute People have no problem registering for Instagram, Telegram, Facebook, etc. on the grounds that a) they are social networks and not encyclopedias so not an apples to apples comparison and b) we have no evidence that Instagram, Telegram, Facebook et al would not receive more input if they allowed unregistered users. It's a quantitative judgment that is needed here. Jo-Jo Eumerus (talk, contributions) 20:20, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
I was not suggesting that the sites are the same, just pointing out registering for sites is something that people understand in 2019. This was not the case when Wikipedia began, but much has changed since then. I have no doubt that Instagram, Telegram, Facebook et al would receive more "input" if they allowed unregistered users but it would not be the kind of content that they want. Bitter Oil (talk) 21:38, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • You realize that compulsory registration will create exactly the same problems as masked IP editing, don't you? There's no difference in the impact of anti-vandal work, of identifying socks, of not being able to track edits by a specific IP or IP range whether the IP is masked or the potential editor has to create an account. The only difference is in the likelihood that someone will succeed in making the first edit without jumping through the "create an account" hoop. Risker (talk) 01:40, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
    I agree on that: registering an account only masks the IP (which can be done in other ways as well). This limits just the occasional vandalisms, for which CUs and other elaborate verification is pointless. That's true that there is a limit on the number of accounts that an IP can make, but I don't think that's sufficient to limit the attacks from LTAs. --Ruthven (msg) 14:03, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Requiring registration would be a negation of the entire point of the project. It would be completely unacceptable. --Yair rand (talk) 02:23, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Each site may separately decide whether to allow edits (or other activity) without registration. It is up to the whole Wikimedia people to decide on specifications of unregistered edits—where they are permitted—because fighting abuse requires coordination. Imagine editors’ IPs were hashed/encrypted on the site X, left open on the site Y, and hidden from the world on the site Z. Confusion and chaos among Wikimedia volunteers would arise from it. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 08:36, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
  • There seems to be at least two theories as to what would happen if we switch off IP editing and require everyone to create an account. The optimists think that none of the goodfaith edits will be lost and that many vandals will be deterred by this step. The pessimists fear that some readers will remain readers and not make those first edits as an IP that precede creating an account, and that the vandals and spammers will still be with us, but just a little harder to spot as they will now all create throwaway accounts. I'm very much with the pessimists, but willing to see a proper research project to test this out. But if it is true that IP editing is part of the "secret sauce" of this site and is one of the things that allowed us to see off rivals such as Citizendium, then it would be a mistake to lose it. WereSpielChequers (talk) 04:55, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
  • I remember a study being posted in en:WP:SIGNPOST maybe a year ago that found that a few registered editors were responsible for more than half the total edits, but that their edits were mostly WikiGnoming and the burden of content creation actually fell on IPs and accounts with a couple edits. The IPs' adding a sentence here and there well outweighed all the concerted content creation efforts such as FA/GA. DaßWölf 08:25, 10 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Re: the idea of IP editors willing to jump through more hoops to edit, the general UX wisdom in the e-commerce world is that hoops such as registration before the call to action can easily drive off the vast majority of the potential users. While WP's IP editors might be more "ideologically motivated" so to say, that sentiment can realistically take them only so far. DaßWölf 08:25, 10 August 2019 (UTC)


In my personal experience as a long-time volunteer and bureaucrat on he.ws, lots of our hard-to-detect minor typos and scanning errors are fixed by a random passer-by who came to read a text and encountered the typo in the middle of reading. This user will most definitely not bother to register (or log into their account even if the do have one already) just to fix that typo. The benefits of allowing anonymous editing far outweighs the cost of monitoring them.--Naḥum (talk) 16:31, 21 August 2019 (UTC)

identification from external web sites[edit]

Also did you consider openID login? Or with facebook, github, twitter, mastodon, or another external site?

Best regards, --Gryllida 00:01, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

Now, this is something that may make sense. --Dirk Beetstra T C (en: U, T) 06:12, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
I think that there were concerns about this sort of thing on the following fronts:
  1. Partnership with big corporate tech giants.
  2. Privacy/doxxing concerns about linking Wikipedia identities to real life identities
  3. Privacy concerns about the data the tech giants want back in such arrangements
  4. Our commitment to open source software
WereSpielChequers (talk) 05:03, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
The WMF already has partnerships with "big corporatetech giants". Google and Facebook and Amazon are big donors as well as big consumers of Wikipedia information. OAuth and OpenID are both open standards, by the way. I would be very interested in learning more about "data the tech giants want back in such arrangements". Bitter Oil (talk) 22:24, 8 August 2019 (UTC)


I support this. Autoblocks and IP blocks would still be a thing so "whack-a-mole" is not the case, and would make it a lot easier to identify who made what edits. Or...maybe all IP edits could be pending changes? Computer Fizz (talk) 18:25, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

IP editing is the opposite of anonymous[edit]

This has been well-known for a long time. When you edit under an account, you're as anonymous as you want to be, at least to the public face of Wikipedia (users with Checkuser have more visibility, but not a lot). When you edit logged out, your IP address is revealed every time you make an edit. If it's the goal of the WMF to better secure anonymous editors' IP addresses (which they should, we're years behind the times here) disabling IP editing is the simplest approach.

But we want people to be able to edit anonymously, without jumping through the hurdle of creating an account, right? It's one of our fundamental principles that anyone can edit. Well, that's easy too. The social network Whisper is designed to be fully anonymous, and they do something like this: when you install the app and make a first post, an account is automatically generated with a human-readable name (I'm pretty sure they just pick two random dictionary words and mash them together) and that account is linked to your device. No login, no choosing a name or generating a password, nothing to remember at all. Wikipedia should be easily able to do the same: when someone wants to edit but doesn't have an account, we just randomly make one up and assign it to them for that session. If they edit a bit and decide they want to keep that account (to use later, for posterity, whatever) we give them the option of actually creating a proper account under that name, or rename it to a different permanent name if they want (and the name is available). If not, when their session expires the account becomes inaccessible because there's no way to log in to it, pretty much the same as when a dynamic IP is reassigned. We of course log the IP address and make it available to checkusers for abuse management, the same way we log all account contributions now, but that log is effectively hidden to the vast majority of users and access is pretty tightly controlled.

Yes, it makes some forms of abuse detection marginally more difficult, but that is going to be a thing with IP addresses hidden no matter what way we do it. The "temporary" account's IP is still available to the software so we can still do things like autoblocking an account's underlying IP (so new "temporary" accounts can't be created for the duration of the block) and checkusers could still disable account creation on problematic IPs and ranges. Yeah it's some technical work but that seems to be why we're here. Ivanvector (talk) 16:13, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

This doesn't solve the problem that of 934 projects, only 36 have checkusers. GMGtalk 17:31, 22 August 2019 (UTC)
And that even on en-wiki, only a couple of dozen are Checkusers, and half are Arbs who rarely exercise it day to day. And they're busy with just the current style of sock investigations atm. Nosebagbear (talk) 18:09, 22 August 2019 (UTC)
Yes, it makes some forms of abuse detection marginally more difficult, but that is going to be a thing with IP addresses hidden no matter what way we do it. Or, speaking as a former enwiki checkuser, you're making that out to be a much bigger problem than it actually is. Ivanvector (talk) 13:39, 23 August 2019 (UTC)
Removing wholesale the ability for 96% of our projects to issue range blocks is hardly a trivial matter. GMGtalk 13:53, 23 August 2019 (UTC)

Administrator efficacy[edit]

I'm a cynic, but I'll try and approach this with an open mind. I have a few comments which I'll put in sections below. For those who haven't read the IP Masking Impact Report overleaf, whether you think it's a good idea or not, the report is worth a read. My general comment on the subject relates to this quote: "we should expect that masking will significantly disrupt workflows and general administrator efficacy.", and the comment on the project page which says, "a critical part of this work will be to ensure that our wikis still have access to the same (or better) level of anti-vandalism". If you know anything about enwiki, you'll know that we probably don't have the bandwidth for the extra abuse we'd be dealing with if we couldn't identify and target IP blocks. If anything we should be taking more action directed at ISPs instead of hiding them. I therefore wish this project luck, but hope that "no substantial change" will be seriously considered as a potential outcome for this project. zzuuzz (talk) 18:47, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

Joe jobs[edit]

"compensation could come in the form of greater reliance on administrator intuition with regards to behavioural evidence". I don't want to disparage admins, but this is an endless source of injustice on enwiki. We even have several vandals who specialise in "joe-jobs" (direct or indirect impersonation) in order to get other people blocked. In these cases the information we currently get from IP addresses is essential. zzuuzz (talk) 18:47, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

@Zzuuzz: I don't think that sentence is on the project page - I couldn't find where it's referred from. The aim of this project is not to create more burden for admins or checkusers at all. On the contrary, as part of this work we will be working on improving our anti-vandalism tools and making sure the admins feel empowered to protect the wikis. There are ways we can surface the information IP addresses provide without having to expose the actual IP address itself (it will still be stored in the database). -- NKohli (WMF) (talk) 21:27, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
Sorry for not being clear, that comes from page 21 of the IP Masking Impact Report in scenario A which talks about "increased CheckUser workloads", as opposed to scenario B which talks about much greater disruption. Anyway, I just want to point out that this a thing that admins often get wrong, and that lessening access to the information IP addresses provide will increase the likelihood of mistakes. zzuuzz (talk) 21:40, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

Links to the same IP[edit]

"it may be possible to automatically verify if two separate user accounts link to the same IP". I have some serious concerns about this in terms of both false positives and false negatives, but mainly I seem to recall that this has previously been flagged somewhere as a privacy problem. Stating that someone is on the same range, or even the same country, could reduce privacy. For "non-IP users", this information is currently restricted to checkusers, and it should remain equally private. zzuuzz (talk) 18:47, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

@Zzuuzz: we could achieve little with this concession. Think dynamic IPs and proxies. We are not living anymore in early 2000s where similar solutions—called “host cloak”—were deployed in some IRC networks. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 12:09, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
Oh I am thinking about dynamic IPs. Usually a vandal gets blocked - they clear the cookie and move to the next IP (a false negative match). There are some tools where all users using it go through 10.0.0.0/8 or some other IP like a large proxy (a false positive). My main concern on this point is really in terms of privacy - if one user on the range says they are editing from South Essex, then any user on the range can also probably be assumed to be editing from South Essex. If one user adds a load of inside information about a school, then a different user on the same IP might well go there. You could find out if someone is editing from Iran, or similar. Even if you limit this to the new "assigned username" users, you are probably creating a false impression of privacy. I can imagine this could be used for fishing expeditions if we're not careful. zzuuzz (talk) 12:35, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

Strong oppose[edit]

This is a terrible idea for many reasons, and is the kind of nonsense one would expect from WMF staff that are totally out of touch with regards to how these projects are run. In addition to the reasons pointed out above:

  1. IP addresses being public has provided public scrutiny and deterrence of COI editing and other abuse, see e.g. w:United States Congressional staff edits to Wikipedia.
  2. The ability to WHOIS IPs and be able to tell whether they are a school, a webhost, a dynamic residential IP and so forth is essential information in the fight against abuse.
  3. Being able to get a new identifier by clearing cookies is so utterly trivial to any experienced vandal. In fact it is a clear regression over the current system where one has to both clear cookies and get a new IP address (range).
  4. Range blocks become impossible.

This project should be immediately confined to the trash can and never brought up again. We need to make anti-abuse editing easier, not harder. MER-C (talk) 18:48, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

Hi MER-C. Please avoid calling this nonsense or saying that the WMF are out of touch. We have behavioural expectations on Meta, and I would appreciate it if would make an effort to frame your comments in a more positive and less attacking way. Your feedback on the specifics are appreciated, but can be made without the theatrics. Thanks, – Ajraddatz (talk) 18:57, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
Please avoid calling this nonsense or saying that the WMF are out of touch -- seriously? I am inclined to point at the en-wiki article about snowflakes but it might breach urbanity (which seems like the perpetuation of a colonial stereotype against rural folks), in light of it's political co-relations. Also, in my part of world accusing someone of indulging in theatrics is a clear-cut breach of social etiquette.Winged Blades of Godric (talk) 19:09, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
I understand that it is the wiki way to use strong and aggressive language to get your point across. I'm saying that it is unnecessary and unwelcome here. Please keep comments civil and respectful; your feedback will be considered without an abusive tone (what I meant by theatrics, apologies if you are actually concerned with my word choice). – Ajraddatz (talk) 19:24, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
These are unhelpful and poorly-phrased comments, which explicitly intend to have a chilling effect, and have partly succeeded]. Johnbod (talk) 02:59, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
The only intent is for people to contribute in a productive and civil manner, and that same standard applies to you. – Ajraddatz (talk) 03:19, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
There is a fine line between encouraging civility and suppressing dissent. Caution is in order from both sides. Cullen328 (talk) 23:45, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Agree with MER-C. They ought to spend more efforts to developing more anti-abuse features (as MER-C and DirkBeetsra has been pleading for years) rather than these. Winged Blades of Godric (talk) 19:09, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
  • I totally agree with MER-C. This is nonsense. I come from a small wiki whereby admin credibility is questionable. Restricting access to IP info to this small bunch of admins is much worse than the status quo. On one hand, no guarantee this small group of admin would fulfil anti-vandalism tasks. If only they have access, it's a unnecessary hurdle for non admins to help counter vandalism. On the other hand, when the small group goes rogue and abuses the private info, it's too hard to hold them accountable. Out of 300 wikipedias I'd say ~250 are small. Most non-wikipedia wikis are small too.--Roy17 (talk) 19:10, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
    • Replies to MER-C's comments:
      1. This project won't necessarily hide that information. IF we end up hiding IP addresses from administrators (which is a big "if"), we could probably still provide the ISP of the user based on their IP address.
      2. See answer to #1 above.
      3. As the FAQ says, the generated identifier may be associated "with a cookie, the user’s IP address, or both". If associating it with only a cookie is too easy to circumvent, we won't do it that way. In fact this could be an opportunity to make anonymous editors easier to track by making their identity more sticky than an IP address (which isn't very sticky these days due to mobile editing, VPNs, etc.). We just have to be careful about collateral damage on shared computers.
      4. As the FAQ says, "We hope to restrict IP address exposure to only those users who need to see it." If administrators need IP addresses in order to do range blocks, and there is no better way to do it (like automatically creating masked range blocks based on a set of users from the same ISP), then we won't be hiding IP addresses from administrators. We have no intentions of destroying the community's ability to fight vandalism.
    • Ryan Kaldari (WMF) (talk) 19:46, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
This does not address my first and foremost concern. The proposal harms the scrutiny of inappropriate edits by the public, and that scrutiny deters abuse. The Foundation knows, or should have known, about the Congressional IP editing scandals. Public interest journalism is not harassment.
> we could probably still provide the ISP of the user based on their IP address
Not sufficient. Geolocation is also necessary. Think Comcast or any large ISP. At this stage, you might as well publish the whole IP address. As for making identities more sticky - I'll believe it when I see it. The Foundation haven't even bothered to make available the entirety of the HTTP request headers to Checkusers, which they are sent automatically on every single page load. (In)actions speak louder than thought bubbles. MER-C (talk) 20:37, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
MER-C Those are good points we will need to take into consideration. Editing from Congressional IP addresses is mentioned in our research report, but it only discusses how administrators interact with that information, not the public. Are there any ways that we could retain some sort of public scrutiny (via something like ISP + state-level Geolocation) without revealing IP addresses to everyone (or exactly where a person is editing from)? In other words, do you think it is possible to improve anonymous editor privacy without losing public scrutiny or are they mutually exclusive in your opinion? Ryan Kaldari (WMF) (talk) 21:03, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
Mutually exclusive. State level is also not good enough - think California and its three large cities, or Guangdong. Also, good luck in getting the community to accept zombie cookies. MER-C (talk) 21:08, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
Also, if you disclose the ISP and geolocation, the whole change becomes unfit for your intended purpose - protecting from the danger of people being at risk of government persecution. The ISPs in third world dictatorships are always controlled by said dictatorships and keep extensive logs - and therefore the proposal is pointless. You cannot say we are going to publish all US IPs but hide all Russian ones because the public has a genuine interest in knowing whether our projects are being (clumsily) manipulated by state-sponsored disinformation troll farms. MER-C (talk) 11:10, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  1. There are IPs and IP ranges associated with long term abuse, sometimes sporadic, and therefore IP information must be retained indefinitely. w:Special:Contributions/195.171.136.42, w:Special:Contributions/122.166.47.217 come to memory. There are likely hundreds more. MER-C (talk) 20:51, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
    The WMF Security team also needs long-term information about certain abusive editors/hackers, so I imagine we will need to solve that one way or another, perhaps by flagging accounts for long-term tracking or something similar. Let me know if you have any ideas on that. Ryan Kaldari (WMF) (talk) 21:12, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
    VxFC was specifically relegated to WMF. What did you do? Winged Blades of Godric (talk) 05:48, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
    How am I supposed to tell whether there is an abuse pattern lasting years based on only 90 days of data? Look at the 195.171.136.42 link above: four spam links, then nine months of inactivity, then three spam links, then another six months of inactivity. If the person on the other end of this IP wanted any resemblance of cybersecurity, they would have updated their browser in the meantime = different user agent = different hashed identity. As for the solution, it is obvious - keep the current system. MER-C (talk) 09:13, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Doesn't sound like a good idea. If people are concerned about their privacy, they should become registered. I don't know if we warn ip editors their address will be visible, but if not we might consider that. Johnbod (talk) 02:59, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Attempting to edit while logged out is always met with "Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits." Though it seems like a lot of people just ignore this warning, based on how many emails oversight gets along the lines of, "I had no idea my IP address would be visible if I edited." If there is a concern about people doing this unknowingly, then just make the warning huge and intrusive. Someguy1221 (talk) 04:58, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
I endorse the idea of a click-through warning. It is both the easiest and the best solution to this "problem", if it really is a problem. Unregistered users can either affirmatively consent to public logging of their IP addresses, or register an account. Let's not pursue complex, expensive and divisive solutions when a very simple solution is readily available. Cullen328 (talk) 23:40, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
@Someguy1221: Attempting to edit while logged out is always met with a warning, BUT only when trying to edit enwiki. It is easy to Inadvertently edit other wikis without realizing you are not logged in. Ottawahitech (talk) 02:16, 16 August 2019 (UTC)
@Ottawahitech: That does not seem to be accurate. The message "anoneditwarning" displayed above the edit field is a standard part of MediaWiki, not an enwiki customization. It's possible that some wikis have disabled the message entirely, but that's the non-standard customization. Anomie (talk) 13:42, 16 August 2019 (UTC)
@Anomie:. Yes, you are correct. I don't know why I did not see it before. Sorry for the wild-goose chase.Ottawahitech (talk) 14:36, 17 August 2019 (UTC)
Just to add, though. Sometimes when I am logged in, something happens and I get logged-out without noticing. I don't know if it is a glitch that no longer happens, but I remember distinctly using HOTCAT (this happened years ago), and being logged out in the middle of an update. When I checked the history it clearly showed a HOTCAT update made by an IP, something that should never happen, I think? Ottawahitech (talk) 14:44, 17 August 2019 (UTC)
@Ottawahitech: It is possible that HotCat is or was coded in such a way that it would still make an edit if you became logged out. If it's still the case, that should be fixed in HotCat, for example by checking the user when (re-)fetching an edit token. Anomie (talk) 15:03, 17 August 2019 (UTC)
  • I concur with User:MER-C and everyone above. As a non-admin (and as someone who doesn’t want to be an admin) that assists in investigating sockpuppets and long-term abuse when needed, losing access to IP data (and consequently, WHOIS and geolocation information would absolutely cripple that work in investigating abuse, not to mention the invaluable work that the Open Proxies wikiproject does. Even in cases of simple vandalism, there have been times where I’ve reached out to the abuse contact listed on an IP’s WHOIS (mostly schools) to let network administrators know about the vandalism issue, which is invaluable for anti-vandalism efforts and stopping long-term abuse. I’m also concerned at the fact that non-administrators weren’t seemingly taken into account with the report, and I would vehemently urge the team involved to keep us plebs in mind going forward with any decisions made. OhKayeSierra (talk) 07:55, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  1. > we should expect a transitional period marked by reduced administrator efficacy
Translation: we are deliberately compromising the integrity of our projects and deliberately increasing administrator burnout. Let's say the WMF actually gets the implementation order correct and deploys the anti-abuse enhancements first. That leaves a change that in isolation should not be deployed ... in isolation and therefore should not be deployed.
  1. > We intend to implement some method to make the generated usernames at least partially persistent, for example, by associating them with a cookie, the user’s IP address, or both.
Say hi to zombie cookies and invasive web analytics, because that is the only way this will work in any acceptable manner. MER-C (talk) 09:28, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
I look forward to WMF enabling zombie cookies! Face-wink.svg Winged Blades of Godric (talk) 12:11, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • @MER-C: where can I voice my opposition to this wrecking privacy-above-all initiative? Many Wikimedia sites—such as en.Wikipedia and Commons—are already cluttered with dumb sock puppeteers; CheckUsers’ backlog is clogged due to scores of puppets produced by various morons handy enough to register multiple accounts. If, in addition, every random person had his/her IP range concealed, then the ruin would come to anti-vandal, anti-copyvio, and anti-pushing job. Does any mean exist yet to counteract this vandal-friendly infiltration into the Wikimedia government? Incnis Mrsi (talk) 11:55, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
    • You just did so. But I suspect that the outcome of this "consultation" is predetermined, and to stop it will require escalation to Board/Jimbo level (again). MER-C (talk) 12:15, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
      I am committed to oppose and expect to see instructions by MER-C. Thanks a lot for early comments, by the way. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 12:37, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
    To prove this isn’t a rant by yet another incompetent wiki user: I caught seven socks of the LTA Pakistanpedia, with my naked hands and IP-range tips. Two (previously unnoticed) copyvio files were deleted from Commons consequently. And it’s certainly not my unique achievement. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 14:21, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Hey WMF, we're not close at all to get rid of abuse, so you don't need to help abusers *so much*, leaving us fighting bots by hand is already enough! --Vituzzu (talk) 14:23, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • I have to agree that this would be a huge detriment to attempts to deal with abuse. The only exception would be if the IP address information was still available to experienced editors, which would mean the whole thing would become a bit pointless. I have generally supported the right of unregistered editors to edit but I think if making IP addresses accessible really is unacceptable then a better solution would be to require registration. Hut 8.5 19:04, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • If you want to hide IP's from edit histories because of privacy concerns then make it a requirement to register an account. I don't even want to think about how easy it would be for vandals to vandalize if this is going to be happen. WMF should try alone to fight against vandals for few weeks and then make that kind of proposals again. Stryn (talk) 04:48, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Very Strongly Oppose – For many, many reasons, including those listed at the top of this section and others brought up by other users above. As an experienced anti-vandalism user, I can personally attest that these changes will make fighting vandalism/abuse, much more difficult, especially when dealing with experienced LTAs/trolls. Anyone determined enough could easily find loopholes - in fact, vandals and LTAs will have much more options to vandalize and harass others while the anti-vandalism work of most other non-admin users would be effectively crippled. Any small benefits from these changes would be vastly outweighed by the downsides to this ill-conceived plan. If you want to be "anonymous" (not reveal your public info), you should sign up for an account, simple as that. The WMF has already screwed up badly on the execution of Fram's "partial Foundation Ban" (regardless of the merits); we do not need to see another WMF screw-up after the last public relations disaster. On the same topic, I also oppose making registration mandatory. We already have plenty of measures in place for dealing with IP/new account vandalism, and if someone wants to abuse one of the projects using their IPs, then they can suffer the consequences. Per @Incnis Mrsi:, I would also like to hear the opinions of other experienced anti-vandalism users and admins. Also, I think that it would be very beneficial if we keep all of our discussions in one thread. LightandDark2000 🌀 (talk) 18:15, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
  • What is not clear from this research is why it is necessary to do this in the first place. It couldn't be easier to create an account. Those that have a privacy or security issue are surely doing this already. So what is the great evil that is coming about from exposing IP addresses? What is badly needed much more than hiding IPs is some defence against problem editors who avoid scrutiny with dynamic IPs on mobile devices. We need a statement of the problem that is being fixed before discussing the fixes. SpinningSpark 21:54, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
    My understanding, from the first sentence of the page in question, is that the world is becoming more conscious. </s> Killiondude (talk) 05:06, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Agree with MER-C. Benjamin (talk) 05:03, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Yes, my first instinct was to think of how en:Church of Scientology editing on Wikipedia and en:United States Congressional staff edits to Wikipedia would have resolved (or not resolved) very differently had the general proposed changes here been in effect at those moments in time. I don't know how we can resolve what the WMF wants and how the WMF wikis are actually fighting vandalism and COI edits and so on. Killiondude (talk) 05:06, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
  • I also oppose in agreement with MER-C. Keeping track of IPs helps us spot COI and subtle vandalism, and gives us more tools for dealing with it. Obscuring it would be a boon to vandals and abusers. For the sake of irony, I submit "my" contributions on EN-WP as evidence. 168.244.4.53 02:59, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Agree with MER-C. If someone is worried about their privacy, they should create an account. It is really that simple! There is no problem to solve here. jni (talk) 05:20, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
  • actually the "w:CongressEdits." twitterbot was no deterrent, but rather was weaponized to broadcast personal information about senators , resulting in some jail time for a staffer. and was shut down at twitter. apparently your deterrence theory will need another example. Slowking4 (talk) 01:45, 9 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Strong oppose. This is absolutely non-sense you should not waste any resources on this. Don't fix it if there is nothing to fix. --2001:999:82:9855:DC90:883A:206A:2 14:47, 21 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Just for the record, yes, I would overall prefer the status quo and that the Foundation simply do nothing in this regard. If users are concerned about their privacy, then there is an easy currently-existing solution: register an account. For that matter, if they wish, they could register a new account consisting of entirely gibberish for each editing session, and then throw it away when they're done. There's nothing AFAIK in any local or global policies preventing them from doing so, so long as they're making productive contributions. The process takes a few seconds and doesn't even require an email address. I don't see that as an onerous burden for those concerned about privacy.
All in all, this seems like a lot of discussion about how to solve all these various problems when the easiest solutions seems to be not creating all these problem that need solving in the first place. GMGtalk 15:19, 21 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Please, do not hide IPs from registered users, because the hiding will make much harder war against vandalism. Раммон (talk) 08:40, 22 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Agree with MER-C. The current system is already good, why should we change it? Veracious (talk) 16:10, 23 August 2019 (UTC)

Possible positive comment[edit]

Okay, I get the freakout above, but I think we should look at what Ajraddatz has mentioned: this is a great opportunity to improve out existing systems for handling abuse, which currently aren't great. Yes, the change will necessitate change, but this can likely be compensated for if the WMF commits time and resources to improving and making better systems for handling abuse. We should be thinking what those improvements could be, and seeing if that could mitigate the unavoidable disruption from systems change. TonyBallioni (talk) 19:08, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

  • Speaking positively, here is one possible solution. All long-term good standing users (with 5,000+ edits, no blocks, no active sanctions, for example) should be able to obtain access to a small subset of admin. tools that would allow to identify and check the actual IP numbers behind the assigned names, pretty much as everyone can do this today. My very best wishes (talk) 19:23, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
    • That seems like a reasonable idea. Ryan Kaldari (WMF) (talk) 19:49, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
      • Ryan Kaldari (WMF) I'm going to have to vehemently disagree with you here. Across multiple projects there are even CUs who have abused the tools but just a random sampling of accounts on enwiki alone, I can give you at least 25 with more than 5000 edits who appeared to be "good faith, good standing" editors with well over the 5k mark that are community banned, socks and even one who is WMF banned. This is a horrible idea for a lot of reasons. Praxidicae (talk) 20:21, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
      • And I've blocked sockpuppets of thrice-banned users with those attributes, so I hope they won't be checking my address. Anyway, assuming this idea relates only to the new "assigned names", I think it raises some issues in terms of privacy expectations. Will non-checkusers forever be able to obtain their IP address, or does there come a point where the assigned username is converted into a real username with a different privacy policy. Is this covered by something akin to the checkuser policy with non-disclosure agreements? This could get confusing. zzuuzz (talk) 20:22, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
        • zzuuzz I think they were saying that any good standing user with 5k edits could access the ip of the *masked* user, not all users like a CU would, but I still stand by what I said earlier wrt it being a horrible idea. Praxidicae (talk) 20:24, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
          • @Praxidicae: That was my assumption as well. Which users, if any, do you think should have access to the IP addresses of anonymous editors? Ryan Kaldari (WMF) (talk) 20:33, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
          • @Zzuuzz: I imagine that anyone accessing such a tool would need to sign some sort of non-disclosure agreement, but that's more of a legal question I'm not qualified to answer. I also imagine that the IP addresses would only be available for a limited amount of time (e.g. 90 days) like in CheckUser. Ryan Kaldari (WMF) (talk) 20:34, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
            • Does that mean that if admins get access to more information than what's visible to everyone, all admins will have to sign an NDA or lose their admin rights? -kyykaarme (talk) 09:28, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
    I sincerely hope that My_very_best_wishes and Ryan_Kaldari_(WMF) are not influential enough to enforce this abomination, at least upon respectable Wikimedia sites. It would institutionalize ru.Wikipedia-style clean/unclean discrimination by visible state of Special:Log/block (note that not all accounts having no visible blocks were actually never blocked). Incnis Mrsi (talk) 12:27, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • What I have suggested is essentially keeping status quo (the current situation) with respect to observing actions of IPs by other contributors. Except that only experienced and well behaving contributors will have an access to the information about IP contributors. My very best wishes (talk) 01:49, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
  • The WMF is perfectly capable of improving our anti-abuse tools without doing something that is highly counterproductive like this proposal. MER-C (talk) 20:53, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
  • The problem with being nice about the proposal is that there is no conceivable way that it could work. Having public IP addresses allows identifying similar IPs, identifying possible organizational COI, checking the contributions from an IP range, and IP range blocks. No hint of a workable mechanism has been presented—that shows the low priority given to mitigating abuse. If we all politely chat about how nice privacy would be, there is a real risk that the project would focus on all the easy stuff (hiding IPs) with no wide appreciation for the problems until six months after a fait accompli implementation. Johnuniq (talk) 04:46, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Does that mean that if admins get access to more information than what's visible to everyone, all admins will have to sign an NDA or lose their admin rights? With that being said, I would very strongly oppose any expansion of administrators rights on any project, especially creating more rights to PII. Praxidicae (talk) 13:59, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

My views[edit]

Placeholder. I have to digest this and rationally give opinions. I will urge WMF to engage local communities, I didn't know this until I saw someone editing this when doing RC patrol. I didn't even see it in my homewiki village pump. I hope a mass message can be send to projects for such changes if they are to be implemented for early community comments. Thanks and appreciate it. --Cohaf (talk) 19:21, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

Hi Cohaf, this page is less than 24 hours old, when it was started as a draft – we're in the process of spreading the word and we'll be talking about this for quite some time. /Johan (WMF) (talk) 19:28, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
This crazy idea has long been discussed on phabricator. Several concerns were arisen, non of them was addressed.--Vituzzu (talk) 14:27, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
Wow, I hope all or most of the concerns on phab will be taken into consideration, thanks Vituzzu for the heads up that this isn't a draft started in less than 24 hours old' and was rather discussed elsewhere in many other tasks. I will give my comments in another section. Regards, --Cohaf (talk) 12:00, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
phab:T20981 and phab:T133452 mainly, but also mw:Requests for comment/Exposure of user IP addresses and this. This proposal comes out of the blue in relation to the amount of concerns expressed over more than ten years. --Vituzzu (talk) 19:59, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
Cohaf, yes, of course, the discussion is much older – this has been a perennial debate as long a I've been around the Wikimedia movement. We link to some of the previous discussions on the project page. This particular page, however, inviting to comments, is new. Danny has written an account of the project so far in a comment further down. /Johan (WMF) (talk) 11:47, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
This is going out in Tech News later today. /Johan (WMF) (talk) 11:49, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
@Cohaf: Thanks for posting a notice of this discussion on the Simple English wikipedia. And to WMF staff: if you are truly interested in getting feedback from ALL contributors you have to spend some effort figuring out how to introduce such discussions to the masses, not just insiders who spend enormous amounts of time finding out where the action is. I am not even sure you have an interestin my views on this topic. BTW this is not my first attempt to participate in a Metawiki discussion. Ottawahitech (talk) 21:17, 15 August 2019 (UTC)

Full support[edit]

We already see a lot of dynamic IP, meaning it is hard for our admin to keep track of the vandals edits. I perceive we are already losing the grip today on IP-edits in general. If we instead go according to this proposal and allocate an automatic generated username to these edits it gives us new opportunities to track vandals and bad edits. We can then evolve the "automatic username generator" to be intelligent (AI) and recognize a user using different Ip addresses.Yger (talk) 19:31, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

I agree as far as that the “IP masking project” should only be realized if it will make acting against abusers and vandals easier and more effective than it is today! For every user! --Gretarsson (talk) 12:07, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

Clarify FAQ entry about legal motivation[edit]

The current FAQ includes this question: "Is this project the result of a particular law being passed?" I think the answer is "no" but as it's currently written that is not clear. Can the answer please be rewritten so it clearly answers the question? Thanks! ElKevbo (talk) 20:17, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

@ElKevbo: Like most answers to legal questions, I imagine the answer is vague on purpose :) I will say though that this project isn't specific to any particular legal jurisdiction. Whatever is implemented will be implemented worldwide. Ryan Kaldari (WMF) (talk) 20:44, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
Perhaps it might be better to remove the question than to pose it but then not answer it...? ElKevbo (talk) 20:59, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
@ElKevbo: I clarified. Thanks for the catch. -- NKohli (WMF) (talk) 21:21, 1 August 2019 (UTC)
Fantastic. Thanks so much! ElKevbo (talk) 01:32, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

Making a userright[edit]

Much concern has been raised about the impact these changes will have on editors working in antivandalism. To remedy this, why not make a userright 'seeIP' which trusted users can apply for? – Teratix 23:57, 1 August 2019 (UTC)

Something like that would need to be done. I'd argue that the trusted right would also need to make IPs visible by default, otherwise it would be very hard to see ranges and draw connections by a cursory examination. – Ajraddatz (talk) 00:00, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
Such “right” should be governed by policy and countered by responsibility. In absence of policy the current “no privacy for unregistered” rule will be replaced with arbitrary treatment. Moreover, if IP data were leaked to a third-party site, then how would be possible to determine who of hundreds users is responsible for the leak? Should the software make extraction of an IP a logged action much like the present CheckUser tool? Incnis Mrsi (talk) 19:00, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

Why bother?[edit]

I honestly don't know why this would be considered an issue that needs solving. The "motivation" is stated to be privacy, but the example given is only applicable to an extremely narrow case. We already have oversight teams that exist largely to deal with those cases, and they seem to be doing that just fine. Keep in mind this is only an "issue" in the first place when someone ignores the warning that their IP address will be published with their edit. As an enwiki oversighter for the last seven years, I can say that it is actually extraordinarily rare to receive a request to hide an IP by an unregistered user (i.e. no account, rather than logged out) that contains a legitimate privacy concern (although we routinely oversight these on request anyway). By "legitimate privacy concern" I mean that someone might actually figure out that a specific person made a specific edit. Far more often we are getting requests from people who don't know how the internet works and are paranoid that having their IP address publicized will somehow get their computer hacked. And actually, in many of the cases where the geolocation+interest gives away the identity of the editor, the interest alone actually already gave it away.

Looking at what IP obfuscation would make harder, though, there's a lot to lose. I have already mentioned how difficult it can be to spot IP-hopping vandals in the first place, and how oftentimes it comes from admins or even non-admins who weren't even looking for it, just happened to notice. That's gone unless we routinely checkuser every unregistered editor. I've encountered disruptive editors whose IP is so dynamic I'm fairly certain they've managed to make thousands of non-constructive edits and never even knew that people were leaving them messages. I've found such users that have gone on doing this for months or years without being noticed, simply because they never stuck around one article long enough. Editors who are truly intent on disruption will find ways around any system meant to keep them out, but some ISPs simply make it stupidly easy to avoid scrutiny, and bad actors can exploit them without even trying. To give an example, take someone whose IP changes every few minutes, and delights in wrongly changing birthdates on biography articles. If you see someone do that once, it could have been meant in good faith, so you revert and give a level-1 warning. You see no further edits from the IP. But if you were to search the range and notice that this person has wrongly changed the birthdates on over 500 biographies over the last year, you have found a significant problem. Many of those were not even reverted. With IP masking, it looks like 500 different people changes the birthdates on 500 different articles, indistinguishable from the other thousands of people changing thousands of other articles.

So anyway, I think that's what you get left with if this plan goes into place as described, even if every admin plus some registered users get a right to see IP addresses. Essentially a tiny handful of unregistered users whose privacy was actually at risk but could not be bothered to register an account now have some privacy; while on the other side of things many prolific vandals have an even easier time going unnoticed.

There are a few versions of this I can think of that I would be okay with, but they are quite far from what's implied in the vague proposal. If the mask (which admins+others could see through) was actually the smallest IP range in the registry (plus a random index), fine; same with the mask being ISP+geolocation; although either admittedly defeats the goal. Or if the IP address of unregistered users was treated as a private-but-not-really piece of information, where essentially everyone with extended-confirmed automatically sees them, fine. If there is a truly deep concern about privacy, the answer is to either A) Make the logged-out-edit warning so obnoxious that no one can claim they didn't see it; or B) just put an end to unregistered editing. Someguy1221 (talk) 05:37, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

Well said. OhKayeSierra (talk) 07:23, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
That's a good point about IP hoppers who change birthdates. I monitor some error tracking categories and frequently see IP hoppers who delight in changing numbers in infoboxes—some specialize in DoB while others change the height and/or weight. I only see cases where the IP accidentally broke the template so it is a big problem. It is important that similar IPs can be noticed, and contributions from an IP range can be checked, and IP ranges can be blocked. Johnuniq (talk) 07:35, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
I agree with what's said above. As a former checkuser and ombudsman I'm sensitive to the privacy question, but there's already a solution for that: register an account. A fairly high level of disruption is contemplated in order to solve a narrow use case. I think a likely outcome, if the proposal doesn't shift to address it, will be ever-harsher restrictions of new user editing, and quicker recourse to checkuser requests in order to find bad-hand accounts. Long-term, that's going to be bad for new user recruitment and editor retention. Mackensen (talk) 12:57, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
Well said. --Vituzzu (talk) 14:14, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
As an Administrator from Japanese Wikipedia, I wholeheartedly agree to Someguy1221's and Mackensen's points. We have prominent warning messages when unregistered users edit. We have an alternative for users who do not prefer disclosing IP address (registering an account). When a person prefers privacy but is unwilling to register an account, they are just contradicting themselves. If we want to talk about abuse mitigation, then the proposal on hiding IP address must be dropped first.--ネイ (talk) 15:34, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
Editors who say that are generally trying to avoid scrutiny rather than maintain privacy. SpinningSpark 21:57, 4 August 2019 (UTC)

Who are "we"?[edit]

"We believe..." In whose voice is this written? Andy Mabbett (Pigsonthewing); Talk to Andy; Andy's edits 09:37, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

The team at the Wikimedia Foundation working on the project. /Johan (WMF) (talk) 10:10, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
I counted something like five different "we" in the initial paragraph, so I've clarified it. It would be useful to know whether each time "Wikimedia Foundation" is the subject that's actually a decision of the entity itself (a board-sanctioned goal, maybe in the annual goal?) or something else. Nemo 13:59, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
DannyH (WMF) wrote a bit about this in a comment here: Talk:IP Editing: Privacy Enhancement and Abuse Mitigation#"IP address masking product development meetings last year"?. /Johan (WMF) (talk) 11:52, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
Thank you, that was useful. Nemo 16:02, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

Open proxies[edit]

I'm still a cynic, but in the spirit of being open minded I offer this niche topic in case it's informative. I hope we can all agree that it's important to identify if an IP is an open proxy. We actually use a wider definition in our policies, which is "open or anonymising proxy". I'd like to just discuss a few issues involved with this. Obviously most of the time we need the IP address to identify an open proxy. One might think that the WMF could implement some sort of check, similar to various other blacklists, which says whether an IP is an open proxy. I've always said, and continue to say, that these lists (though sometimes useful) are often unreliable and there is no substitute for a human when doing this task.

  • Access to the IP gives us access to open ports, which is a common indicator for an open proxy. For certain types of proxy it is the only way to verify the proxy and which IP should be blocked.
  • Access to the IP gives us access to other IPs in the range. This is most useful for identifying web hosts. I've actually been dealing with a few abusive NordVPN proxies recently. These are often identified by following a simple formula: Put the IP address in your address bar, subtract 1 from the final digit, and hit enter. This is generally the only way to distinguish NordVPN, and something a non-human is very unlikely to do.
  • Access to the IP allows us to search Google for the IP address - this is probably one of the best indicators we have, especially when it comes to transient proxies such as zombies and dynamic VPNs.
  • Access to the IP gives us access to various blacklists. Blacklists will often disagree with each other, and many will be unreliable, but it is all useful information to factor in.
  • Access to the IP tells us the geolocation. If the same user is editing from two different countries, then one of them is probably open (or anonymising).
  • Access to the IP tells us (through WHOIS) about the owner of the IP - whether it's a hosting company, or a cloud company, or an anonymising proxy service (as well as being dynamic, residential, etc).
  • Access to the IP gives us rDNS information, which might eventually resolve to unblock-wikipedia.com (or similar).

One could argue that checking proxies is a very technical subject which most admins won't do, but it is an important thing that some users do do. If we are hiding IP addresses from regular users, then we will either lose the ability to check for open proxies. or have to rely on checks being done by software, which are going to be sub-optimal. zzuuzz (talk) 12:43, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

This is a serious concern that would need to be addressed before rolling this out. There is a fair amount that could be done via automated tools that is not currently being done (for instance, WHOIS searches, see: local and global), but as Zzuuzz mentions above, a lot of open proxy detection involves work that really should be performed by a human. SQLQuery me! 01:54, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
@Zzuuzz: Procseebot does blocks of IP addresses from open proxies. In University of Virginia/Automatic Detection of Online Abuse our university team reported that Procseebot does most of the blocks on English Wikipedia. Everything you are saying is correct but I am not clear that you have seen what a huge influence and culture change Procseebot is bringing. You understand the issues in this space and I hope you are part of any future discussion. Blue Rasberry (talk) 21:11, 9 August 2019 (UTC)
@Bluerasberry: ProcseeBot is indeed a blocking legend, and I've no doubt it's made a significant impact (and - WMF - I'm not sure what will happen if its semi-inactive owner retires). However, don't overestimate what it does. ProcseeBot has blocked around 3 million IPs in all of history. In one day I once blocked a /12 range, which is over 1 million IP addresses. I've blocked many other ranges containing hundreds of thousands of addresses each, and there are other admins who have blocked lots more similar ranges. See what User:SQL says about this below. For example we are currently blocking almost all of Amazon, Microsoft, and Google's cloud offerings, among many others. I don't know how many millions that is, but it's a lot. ProcseeBot doesn't block ranges. It doesn't block a lot of open proxies but only checks one particular subset of open proxies - HTTP proxies, and it doesn't even block all of them. Nor does it include VPNs, CGI proxies, Web hosts, VPSs, compute hosts, or any other proxies. -- zzuuzz (talk) 00:07, 10 August 2019 (UTC)
To illustrate Zzuuzz's point, here's a list of all active ipblocks on enwiki, broke out by admin, with all ranges totalled up. SQLQuery me! 14:28, 11 August 2019 (UTC)

What's an acceptable trade-off (if 1 at all)?[edit]

Everything we've already seen indicates a drop in combating disruptive edits and, especially, sockpuppets.

The WMF team proposing it is advocating the privacy aiding benefits, and has even noted at least some loss in site-protection ability.

Which makes me think, what level of anti-vandal/sock protection would I be willing to trade in return for individuals gaining some data security which they can both already avoid and are well aware of.

I'm inclined to think, not much. None of the methods the WMF has yet proposed (cookie-tracking etc) would actually work for any remotely capable individual, or would avoid shrinking the number of individuals who can handle rangeblocks etc. Given the marginal gains, I don't think I'd be willing to accept more than 2% of a handicap (in terms of edits made by vandals and socks before being stopped). If that can't be guaranteed, I don't want us heading further down this road at which point it will become harder to stop it due to what's already been committed - a variation of a sunk cost fallacy. Nosebagbear (talk) 13:51, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

I certainly hope, and am assuming good faith on the WMF's part, that they are exercising good project management and will abandon the project if it becomes obvious that no solution will adequately maintain or enhance the anti-abuse workflow that the volunteers use. But I understand your skepticism, and hopefully our collective participation here will hold them to account in a way that prevents this from delivering a really negative product. – Ajraddatz (talk) 17:04, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

Oppose[edit]

There's far too many sections on this page, which is why I'm creating yet another. Hopefully, this plan will never be implemented. If it is, hopefully I will no longer be editing en.wiki. As a CU, all I see is (a) complexity and (b) making my job much harder than it already is. As others have also said, I don't see the need for it. I don't see how the present system punishes IPs except when they merit punishment. Finally, although I know it's a complete pipe dream, I too believe in forced registration. And it doesn't change the rather tired and inaccurate mantra "the encyclopedia that anyone can edit". Anyone still can edit (except in all the places where they can't) with the incredibly low bar of registration, which doesn't mean they are not anonymous, just more accountable (excuse the pun).--Bbb23 (talk) 17:43, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

I endorse Bbb23's analysis. I have been an administrator on English Wikipedia for two years and Bbb23 has been an administrator there for seven years. He is very productive and highly respected for his constant work to defend the encyclopedia from vandals, trolls, spammers and kooks. Please pay very close attention to what he says. Cullen328 (talk) 23:08, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
I also agree with the above (also as an EnWiki admin since 2007). Nick-D (talk) 02:11, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
  • support Bbb23 and agreement from me as well Ched (talk) 20:40, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Totally agree. Kudpung (talk) 21:00, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
  • I agree with Bbb23. The work of checkusers is relentless, unglamorous, thankless, and absolutely crucial. I firmly oppose anything which makes their job harder. --BrownHairedGirl (talk) 21:24, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Oppose The direction of this text is en:not even wrong - there are fundamental misconceptions here because this originates in the absence of understanding Wikipedia community culture. I support the development of this discussion but this particular proposal needs to be deconstructured into its many unrelated controversial parts and handle one part at a time. I agree that discussion is worthwhile but simplify it so that more Wikimedia Foundation people can understand the topic as well as Wikimedia community members. Blue Rasberry (talk) 21:17, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

It is voluntary and it is disclosed that the IP address will be visible to anyone anon making an edit.[edit]

  • You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to a user name, among other benefits.
  • You are not logged in. Saving the change you are previewing will record your IP address in this page's public edit history. Please log in or sign up to have your edit associated with a user name, among other benefits.

It is voluntary and anyone editing clearly knows that there IP address will be publicly visible is displayed to them and is told to them twice before their edit is saved. Feel either we should leave as it is or make registration compulsory.Pharaoh of the Wizards (talk) 18:03, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

A big part of the problem is that good faith readers who want to make an edit to Wikipedia often believe falsely that unregistered editing is more "anonymous" than editing with an account. We perpetuate that by casually referring to IP editors as "anonymous editors". We should stop talking that way. The fact is that editing with an account and not disclosing personal information is by far the most anonymous way to edit. The notices quoted immediately above should be edited to clarify that fact. In my opinion, IP editors should affirmatively have to click a box saying "I agree to having my IP address recorded in this page's public history" before their edit goes through. Cullen328 (talk) 22:57, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
We had a session a few years ago on enwiki where we went around replacing most instances of "anonymous" with "unregistered" or similar, especially in the interface and templates. It's not really used in any public-facing places any more. There's only so much you can do to stop the locals using the language. Maybe these messages should be moved (or duplicated) closer to the "Publish" button. At the moment they're stuck at the top of the page where no one looks. zzuuzz (talk) 23:14, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
Thank you, Zzuuzz. That is why I carefully chose the word "casually". What do you think about the concept of an affirmative click-through warning for IP editors? Cullen328 (talk) 23:53, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
It doesn't strike me as particularly unreasonable, though I can think of two issues: if you're ticking that box, there will be an imperative to have another box agreeing to copyright, or T&Cs. And it will be annoying if you have to tick it for every edit. zzuuzz (talk) 00:13, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
I think it's possible to cover the bases without making it too long that people universally ignore it. Checking the box could also place a cookie that prevents it from appearing again until the cookie expires or is deleted. Concept notice:
By checking this box you agree to the following:
  1. Your IP address will be published with your edit, which may reveal your location or other personal information. (You may register an account to avoid this.)
  2. You may not copy text from other websites, or commit other copyright violations.
  3. You agree to all other requirements of the terms of use. [No one will actually read it, but it just seems so ordinary to include it.]
Part of the reason I framed it this way is that it occurs to me, we make it very clear that if you edit Wikipedia without an account, your IP address will be published. But a lot of the same people who freak out that their IP address has been published don't really know what it is or how it works. Rather than provide a long explanation that gets ignored, we can just plop down the worst likely outcome. Someone who is totally clueless about how the internet works still won't understand it, but at least they should understand along the lines of "something something privacy", which I think is good enough - the goal is just to make sure people know that editing Wikipedia is not necessarily anonymous. Someguy1221 (talk) 00:39, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
IMO length and wording are only likely to be a minor part of the problem. The bigger issue is that people have been trained over many years to ignore boiler plate. I find it doubtful that ticking will make much difference. It will be the case that most people's sole task will be box hunting and as for the text it will still be the case of, sure whatever DGAF, that is until they do after they've submitted and later find out they revealed something they didn't expect to. I mean even if you posted something completely ridiculously like 'by submitting you agree that we hunt down and permanently keep and redistribute any content including photos and videos you have submitted anywhere on the Internet including all social media and chat apps regardless of any privacy settings' and that's the only thing we show the number of people you will get who idea don't submit and maybe make a freak out post somewhere or do submit and tell us haha funny joke will be small because very few read it. This doesn't mean that such proposals are useless but simply we shouldn't overestimate the effect they will have on people not realising what they are doing and being annoyed when they find out. Nil Einne (talk) 04:55, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
However, if someone clicks a graphically bold and large and briefly and clearly worded disclaimer, they have no basis for complaining later about their IP address being logged. If we lose a few typo corrections while also continuing to effectively block and deter endless legions of vandals, trolls and spammers, then I see that as a net benefit for the encylopedia. Cullen328 (talk) 06:35, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
Support This actually sounds like a reasonable idea, unlike the original proposal of making it as hard as possible to stop vandals. The relevant part should probably be red for danger, so it has more chance of being noticed the first time by people who don't read everything in detail. It could even flash mildly for a moment when the box is ticked, but that's probably going too far. Cyp (talk) 07:35, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
I agree with Cullen328 that the term “anonymous editor” is harmful. Historical engine developers probably thought of anonymous ≝ ¬named definition, but with respect to Internet privacy this terminology is stupid. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 08:47, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
  • This is the best solution on this page. Add a checkbox below the minor edit one that says "I consent to having my IP address published alongside this edit, and acknowledge this may reveal my location or other personal information. (Please register an account to avoid this.)". The "Publish Changes" button is disabled unless this checkbox is checked. MER-C (talk) 16:03, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
  • We should display the actual IP address in the message, as many readers won't have a clue what it is. Ideally there would also be a link to show the sort of information that this would reveal, and to show edits recently made by this IP. There should also be the opportunity to log in or create a username at any stage in the edit process without having to start again from scratch. At the moment if I have previewed changes and then click on log in, I get a popup saying I am leaving the site. AlasdairW (talk) 22:29, 21 August 2019 (UTC)

Complete anonymous editing is not a right[edit]

If there is no law requiring WMF to hide the IP addresses of anonymous editors, then why do it? Furnishing some mark of identification -- such as an IP address -- ensures responsibility. Allowing complete anonymous editing opens the gates to all of the vandals & trolls, & will drive away all of the volunteers who handle these destructive edits. But if the Foundation insists on going this route, I invite them to take on the duty of finding & undoing them. Because the rest of us will shut down our accounts & move on to another hobby. -- Llywrch (talk) 22:18, 2 August 2019 (UTC)

Anybody editing with an account is completely anonymous to the public unless they choose not to be. 2A01:E35:39AE:B540:BD22:78D9:FBE5:D3B9 12:16, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
Sorry, but it is pretty clear that willfully publishing the IP address is problematic, see for example Fieldfisher: Can a dynamic IP address constitute personal data? (English). Note also Hva er en personopplysning? (Norwegian) and Dynamiske IP-adresser skal regnes som personopplysninger (Norwegian). The last one points to Court of Justice of the European Union – PRESS RELEASE No112/16: The operator of a website mayhave a legitimate interest in storing certain personal data relating tovisitors to that website in order to protect itself against cyberattacks [1] (English). This refers to “Directive 95/46” aka w:Data Protection Directive [2]
In my opinion; we have a legitimate right to keep the IP address of editing users to prevent vandalism, and to give authorized users access to that information, provided they are identified and their activity tracked. We are not allowed to publish the IP address of editing users, whether they are good editors or vandals. — Jeblad 10:40, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

Thoughts based on history and experience as a CheckUser and Oversighter[edit]

Some points that I'm not sure have been covered anywhere yet:

  • Back in the really, really, really old days, we did not show full IP addresses; the last 3 characters were always shown as "XXX". This was long enough ago that IPv6 wasn't in use by publicly available ISPs. I remember having a one-on-one discussion with someone who was a developer back at that time, and this was just not carried forward when MediaWiki underwent a huge rewrite. I don't see why a [partial] solution like that would be out of consideration.
  • I cannot speak for other projects, but on English Wikipedia someone who accidentally edits as an IP (including a new user who didn't realize their IP would show) can request that the IP be suppressed. I've been an oversighter for almost 10 years now, and my estimate is that such requests account for 3-5% of suppressions on our project. The policy was initially restricted to existing accounts that "accidentally" edited logged out, which tells us something about how effective the current editnotice really is; that is, even very experienced editors miss it, so it's no surprise that an inexperienced non-registered user would. As an experiment, I'd suggest that experienced editors log out, clear their cookies, and then go to an article and open the editing interface; even when you know that notice should be there, it's hard to spot. I will note as an aside that French Wikipedia has a much better editnotice with buttons to either create an account or proceed to edit; it's big and obvious. I noticed varying results on the dozen or so random projects I checked; some had an editnotice and others didn't, and of course if editing with VE, editnotices are usually a pain regardless.
  • Having to create an account whose name and password you'll remember when all you want to do is fix a typo will usually mean that the typo doesn't get fixed and the editor never tries again. Keep in mind that a startling percentage of experienced editors made their first edit before registering an account, and many of them started by fixing a minor typo or making a minor fix.
  • Privacy is a real issue, especially now that more and more people are using IPv6, and now that (some) ISPs are being much more precise in their geolocation. For many years, my (dynamic) IP could geolocate anywhere within two of Canada's largest provinces, and was usually hundreds of miles from my town. Now my IP geolocates to my actual town, and it is possible to find online the list that would tell you exactly which substation the IP has been assigned from; most of these substations handle IPs for no more than 0.5 km2.
  • A non-negligible percentage of existing range blocks are probably inappropriate. For example, range blocks of [highly dynamic] large mobile IP ranges frequently have a lot of collateral damage, and fairly often don't block the problem editor. Tools can be built (and I think were built at one time) that helped admins figure out what kind of impact a range block could have, and these should be built and used regardless of whether or not it's decided to mask IPs.
  • Should masking of IPs proceed, I would strongly urge that it be applied "going forward"; i.e., don't go back and mask IPs that have been used in the past. The impact to the database would be astronomical.
  • Edit filters could play an even larger role in identifying "frequent flyers" and return vandals.

There are advantages to doing this - most particularly, allowing non-registered users to make their first edits without revealing information that is considered private in almost all other contexts; there are also disadvantages, most importantly the impact on vandal-fighting and probably an increase in demand for checkuser activity. Some projects may need to reconsider their CU policies, particularly those that are quite restrictive at present. We would need more stewards to assist in blocking and carrying out CU on smaller projects, and those smaller projects may need some other assistance as well.

I think before a final decision is made here, it's essential that we know what tools need to be made in order to help editors and admins still identify problem editing patterns before they have to request a checkuser - and those tools should already be designed and tested on multiple projects (including large projects) to ensure they're fit for purpose. (They'll be useful regardless, even if we don't decide to mask IPs). I think checkuser tools need to be beefed up to provide more information and be easier to use and more flexible. I think if we don't proceed to mask IPs somehow or other, we need to rethink our policies and practices with respect to VPNs and certain types of proxy, and trial lifting the pretty much automated blocks of them to really understand whether or not we're solving any problems. (A lot of experienced editors, including this writer, often use VPNs for security/privacy reasons, as much for other sites as for Wikipedia.) It is good to start this discussion and to look at all of the risks and benefits, and to develop tools that can help vandal fighters and non-CUs in identifying and managing vandals/spambots/etc. which will be valuable regardless of what the final decision may be. Risker (talk) 05:03, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

At one project (nowiki) nearly all range blocks are inappropriate. Often whole IP ranges for one of the major mobile providers are blocked, and it seems impossible to get the offending admin to moderate the blocks. The common argument is that he must block whole IP ranges to stop the (single) vandal. — Jeblad 16:15, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

Sure, let's do this[edit]

I support this idea. In my head, a possible implementation would look like this:

  • We display some other kind of unique ID for anonymous users (similar to the animal names for anonymous users in Google Docs ('anonymous capybara' ftw!)).
  • We make sure that for static IPs, said ID also remains static, and that it can be associated with additional custom information.
  • A small group of users still gets access to the IPs as necessary to fight vandalism.
  • Maybe we make some additional information available together with the IDs for a larger group of users, such as country of origin and ISP.
  • (add more requirements, as necessary)

I'd be happy to discuss this in more detail to see which other obstacles need to be overcome to get this to work without unintentionally 'opening the floodgates' for vandalism. I had also already indicated that my day job is EU data protection and IT law with a focus on online advertising, so I could also bring in some of my professional expertice, if needed.

Also, you should definitely talk to Seewolf – he runs the spam filters on German Wikipedia. --Gnom (talk) Let's make Wikipedia green! 10:45, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

How about blocks of dynamic IPs, how about IPv6 /64 blocks, how about open proxies and anonymizers… ? It is easy to see that the user has only a book knowledge of IP addresses, nor is much interested in addressing grievances expressed above. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 11:26, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
Also look at the “small group of users” insight – what a damn saint simplicity. How does the author expect the proposal to be supported by users who are manifestly to be excluded from the group? While Incnis_Mrsi, PlyrStar93, LightandDark2000, Krassotkin, Tractopelle-jaune, MCC214, Well-Informed Optimist and other seasoned anti-vandal fighters (trusted by me) are not admitted into the “small group”, I automatically rally against the proposal perceiving it as an outrageous affront to the volunteers, regardless of any possibly positive aspects. And if Gnom tried to please the anti-abuse community, then the group would become far from small. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 11:54, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
Correct me if I'm wrong, but from what I've seen so far, this sounds like a completely anonymous editing program with a very few being able to access any IP information at all. Assuming I'm reading this correctly, I Strongly Oppose this proposal on such grounds. Only registered users should be able to enjoy "fully anon" editing rights - if you're not going to log in and use an account to edit, you risk exposing your IP - that in itself should not change. Any small benefits (if any, at all) would be vastly outweighed by the negative effects such changes would cause. Not to mention that this "exclusive right" thing reeks of elitism, and we don't need more elitism on the Wikimedia Projects than we already have. LightandDark2000 🌀 (talk) 18:02, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
@Incnis Mrsi: I won't respond because of the tone of your reply.
@LightandDark2000: I don't understand why we should require users that aren't logged in to leave their IP addresses for everyone to see. In other words: Why should only logged-in users enjoy anonymity? --Gnom (talk) Let's make Wikipedia green! 22:24, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
Because there is no magic that can avoid perpetual abuse if the ability to check contributions from IP ranges and to block IP ranges is removed. Networking is old science: there are IP addresses and there are cookies of different flavors. Wikimedia will never want aggressive tracking so incognito mode or clearing cookies will defeat any conceivable substitute for the current system. These techniques are widely known, particularly among the kind of people that are amused by being disruptive. Johnuniq (talk) 03:20, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
@Johnuniq, what are we losing if an anonymous user is displayed as "anonymous user #123456" instead of "192.765.876"? —Gnom (talk) Let's make Wikipedia green! 18:24, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
The ability to see if two anonymous users are sharing the same IP range. For example, earlier today on Meta there were three anonymous users creating talk pages and mass pinging admins. I was able to quickly identify the fact that they belonged to the same range and block that range, but not before another IP from that range was used. Without seeing the IP, it would make it nearly impossible to draw that connection and the abuse would have continued with the only way to stop it being the CheckUser tool or whack-a-mole with each new IP. – Ajraddatz (talk) 18:50, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
Well as someone who performs such patrols, you should be given the right to see IP addresses. Easy. —Gnom (talk) Let's make Wikipedia green! 22:11, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
Hundreds of editors at the English Wikipedia check for bad edits and are sufficiently experienced to notice shifting IPs. They can take action and easily get resolution when the IP ranges are obvious. For example, if ten anonymous users add spam external links there will be no indication of the source. Wikipedia works by empowering its good users and relying on a handful of people trusted to take half an hour to translate anonymous names into IP ranges would not work. Johnuniq (talk) 22:35, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
This ^. It's not just about the ability, but it's about how easily the ability fits within a workflow. SRG is perpetually backlogged in the IP blocking section because the tool to check global contribs of IPs is often offline, and when it is online it is incredibly slow (up to a few minutes to complete actions). When dealing with volunteers, the processes need to be fast enough to not represent an excessive burden that would cause people to go and do something else. And global IP and range contribs is an entirely different issue that this privacy initiative would impact... – Ajraddatz (talk) 23:13, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
Everybody (including triply banned users, agents of organized crime or government services) may be promoted to ones who “performs such patrols”. Imagine that, meanwhile, important information is hidden from the world (i.e. from a default user). What does Gnom propose doesn’t make sense – fortunately it’s pretty evident by now. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 08:46, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

Snaevar's comment[edit]

I have give this some thought. Vandal fighters do not need the IP's to be publicly available, but I do not see a way around letting admins and others with block rights seeing IP's. I have never been only an rollbacker, that right has for me always been bundled with other rights, so I will leave that group up to others to discuss.

  • It would be ideal that the same IP would get the same id everytime and it would be consistent across all projects, just like SUL (Single user login) is with accounts. Vandal fighters do need to know if the editor is making similar abuse edits on other wikis. Global user contributions is used on several projects for that purpose and it would still work with consistant ids. Some of the abuse edits I have found where found using this check.
  • Based on abuse on is.wikipedia and having consistent ids for IP editors, IP information is only needed for IP hopping (and range blocks due to those) and schools. Schools on that project are not fully blocked, logged in users are allowed to edit from those IP's.
  • If the IP´s where to be hidden to the level that only checkusers (mentioned as CU hereafter) can see them, then it would cause long term request increase for checkusers. The statement on the content page connected to this talk page about an short term increase in CU is unfounded and compleatly untrue. The number of CU's performed by global CU would at the least be the same as the number of global blocks and probably higher than that. That's because we need IP information on crosswiki vandals, which are also the ones that get globally blocked, to prevent future abuse. On top of those are CU's in cases which I don't encounter, but others do.

The type of CU's for IP's would be different than the ordinary CU we have today, as those would be requests to see if there is any blocks on other WMF wikis within the same allocatable range (like stalktoy does currently) and whether other IP's within that range are in use. That information is not as clear cut as the CU's performed today and there still would be an need to look over that data further in an behavorial analysis to see if those are the same editor. CU's could also choose to do that behavorial analysis themselves, but the requesters of CU's have had that job for some time now, and I can't imagine that the CU's would like that to change.

There is an major need for blocking IP hoppers right away. We can't just wait around for CU to give IP information. That would easily result in 50 edits from an single abuser, based on experience waiting that long, and on an wiki like my homewiki, where users like to keep the edit history clean would be compleatly out of order. Additionally, an smaller wiki, like the one I am on, tends to use RecentChanges, still, and that becomes increasingly difficult with such an massive spam flow. In comparision, the edit numbers are typically, between 100-150 a day, so 50 edits is a big deal in comparision.

Vandal tools

I have liked Phlanx since I discovered it, but it is hardcoded for ShoutWiki. Blacklists on WMF wikis are more complicated than they need to be. Admins, regardless of their technical know how, are fully aware when their basic tools are not enough. In the case of an non-technical admin, the complexity of the blacklist prevents them to use them when they should. This is an problem on smaller wikis, which tend to have fewer technical admins.

Other things I can think of are simple link placements, like phab:T150590. Sure, it does not directly improve the abuse tools, but it does help with the workflow, which is also important.--Snaevar (talk) 12:10, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

Oppose[edit]

Just to make it clear I had made this a separate section. No discussion for community in the early phrases in Phab makes me a little sore. Per Vituzzu in the section above of mine, this is a crazy idea. I always know Wikipedia as the open encyclopedia which everyone will edit, anon also. From my experiences, it doesn't deter anons from editing. Take Simple Wikipedia for example, we have very productive anon editors and quite a lot of fine articles are from them. I don't see anons being deterred from editing and the edit notice is so obvious (I see it when I am accidentally logged out for instances). For those who doesn't want to create an account, I don't think so that their privacy will be compromised that much. If they are so, we have stewards, oversighters as well as admins who are willing to make that supression fast. I find my supression requests are often handled immediately when it comes to logged out editing. I will say I also at times made logged out edits (which are in compliance of socking policies) when I am in places that are unsafe to log in / just simply caught in system lags - I am fine with them. I know it may be because I am from a country with the densest population 5.6k in 700+square kilometers and there's isn't a way to find me that easily. However, the deal isn't great. I just cannot see how this will enhance privacy. In fact, if you want to reduce privacy concerns, it's to remove the cookie that is tracking every of my edits (which is what CUers use) and get flagged out everytime I did a virus scan with AVG as privacy concerns. Privacy enhancements and abuse mitigation are terms on polar opposites and on different tangential planes, you can't have both together. We are facing constant abuse everyday, and as SWMT members, we are almost on the frontline daily. When tools such as guc breakdown, or any other xtools that are not working, we are plain helpless. We need more aid to recognize vandals, and with ID being masked, it will makes existing tools to be depreciated or needs upgrading which will almost forever be later than these new rollouts. I will say this will open the Pandora Box for more Abuse not less. However, if the foundation wishes to push through, here are some suggestions. First, extensive community consultation needs to be taken, and I expect no less than 1 year with almost every community having someone represented, although flawed in some ways and not the most perfect, something like the vote to start the GS group will be ideal. Second, I expect that some trusted members in the community to be still able to see the information, we have already backlog at SRCU, I hope it will not be only stewards able to see the information, that will overburden them too much (can we have a way to really stop spambots?). For individual projects, if administrators are allowed access (and Edit Filer Manager) will be good. For those who are afraid that there will be sysop abuse, we can have something like OC for CU/OS. For crosswiki, I hope that GRs will be able to have the right to see IPs crosswiki, if you don't trust GRs, then at least GS. All in all, Oppose Oppose. --Cohaf (talk) 12:18, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

It is said that this is only a rough proposal telling the community what WMF is going to do in following years. There's no plan yet. It is also promised that "we will not be making any firm decisions about this project until we have gathered input from the communities". From my perspective, WMF is determined to hide IPs at some point in the future, though the timeline is totally unclear. With the discussion goes deep, we could probably find solutions to concerns you mentioned above. Of course it is impossible to hide IPs on the basis of current user group settings and counter-vandalism tools.--Tiger (talk) 07:36, 24 August 2019 (UTC)

Non existent problem[edit]

Hi, I can read. The message above the text input box is high lighted and reads 'Warning: You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you log in or create an account, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.' Which is a very clear warning. If I didn't want the IP of my device exposed, I would have logged in, though It can have some merit to encrypt the IP address before exposing. 87.212.10.251 13:48, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

I agree that this is not a problem for users who intentionally edit without an account (the warning is visible and sufficient); however, people who inadvertently edit while logged out may easily miss the warning and unintentionally reveal information that can break their anonymity. IP encryption does seem to be one good approach to addressing the problem while retaining the ability to track IP address information for anti-vandalism purposes. 24.151.50.175 15:36, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

IP address attribution[edit]

Is this compatible with the CC-licensing?[edit]

The reason all editors are recorded is to provide the necessary attribution wrt to CC BY-SA, is it not? I'm not a copyright lawyer but if IP addresses (that clearly can identify a person making an edit) are replaced with random strings, I fail to see how anyone reusing material successfully would be able to fulfill the "BY" part of the license... Regards SoWhy 19:42, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

IP addresses are not tied to a specific editor either, so it's a moot point. Whether it's an IP address or a randomized name tied to said address, the effect is the same. — The Hand That Feeds You:Bite 20:39, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
It would be logical to change IP edits to CC0 instead of CC-BY-SA. You can then add "If you want your edits to be attributed, please create an account and choose a username for that attribution to be made to". Attribution to a pseudonym makes sense, but there is a paradox in combining attribution and anonymity. WereSpielChequers (talk) 05:30, 7 August 2019 (UTC)

IP address attribution is just rubbish[edit]

In my opinion, the most important thing is to stop using IP addresses as attribution for anonymous edits. An IP address is a terrible user identifier, because they have a many-to-many relationship with users. Some IP addresses have multiple users, and pretty much all users have multiple IP addresses. Some users migrate from one IP address to another on a timescale of minutes, as they move from one cell to another. Among other problems, this breaks user talk page notification, making it nearly impossible to contact them.

The IP address is confusing to non-technical users -- a constantly-changing bunch of numbers. As long as we treat the IP address as a username, the IP address will be sprayed all over discussion pages, in signatures and replies. Using IP addresses for attribution prevents the smallest move towards privacy. We can't even hide them from Google. They are stuck in the discussion pages, archived and searchable forever.

The minimum change that we can make here is to stop using the user's IP address as a username. Instead, we will use an identifier linked to a cookie. This will greatly improve the stability of anonymous usernames, as seen in history and discussion pages. The argument against it is that technically-competent vandals will clear their cookies -- but surely such vandals are already creating throwaway accounts? We can rate-limit anonymous session creation just as we currently rate-limit account creation.

If we stop using IP addresses as attribution, then we'll be able to control who gets to see them. I would be fine with allowing all logged-in users to see the IP addresses of anonymous users, and to search for such contributions by IP range. It would be a big enhancement to privacy to just get the IP addresses out of the search engines and the talk pages, and to implement expiry, so that anonymous IP addresses are deleted after three months, as for CheckUser data.

This is a summary of the position I put forward when I was privately consulted on this initiative. It is my personal opinion. -- Tim Starling (WMF) (talk) 11:36, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

Thanks for your summary. After reading it I feel a bit positive about this proposal. It's true that leaving a message for IP's is almost useless, because they will change, and later someone else, an innocent person using the same IP, will see all the warnings. Stryn (talk) 11:55, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
Totally agree. Use real pseudonyms, and give the user some way to assign pseudonym edits to a real account. IP addresses as as so-called “anonymous edits” are plain nonsense. Local law in Norway may be interpreted to allow IP addresses as pseudonyms, but I doubt it was the intention. It says “the author is entitled to be named as good practice indicates, if naming is practically possible” (opphaveren [har] krav på å bli navngitt slik som god skikk tilsier såfremt navngivelse er praktisk mulig[3]) — Jeblad 15:33, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
Note that I only partly agree to “we will use an identifier linked to a cookie” as I don't believe this is feasible for anyone but good behaving anonymous editors. It will not solve the vandalism-fighting problem, but Tims post is not about vandalism-fighting – it is about attribution. — Jeblad 12:23, 16 August 2019 (UTC)
Masking IPs is one thing but if "anonymous" edits are tracked with a cookie that links the edits together even if the user changes IP address (does the coookie follow to a different network, too?), then don't we risk linking edits that should not be linked for privacy reasons? What if a good faith editor purposefully wants to split their edit history by getting a new IP, but the cookie links their "anonymous" edits together? There could be cases where even a registered user's anonymity is at risk, if they accidentally log out and make an edit that is easily linked to them, and then don't realize that a cookie is now connecting all their edits, even if they switch to a different IP. -kyykaarme (talk) 22:12, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
I agree with Tim that "IP address attribution is just rubbish". (Particularly with IPv6!) As discussed at mw:Requests_for_comment/Exposure_of_user_IP_addresses there better ways. Nemo 15:45, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
Some thoughts on this
What if a good faith editor purposefully wants to split their edit history by getting a new IP, but the cookie links their "anonymous" edits together?
They would use the "private browsing" feature in their browser. That would isolate the cookie. That's much easier than changing IP addresses. Also, the edit page warns anon users about their IP being recorded - in the future, the edit page can just show the anon user ID that will be recorded (along with a warning that some group of users will still be able to see the IP, at least for a while - I'd assume this would use the checkuser data, which is purged after 90 days iirc).
There could be cases where even a registered user's anonymity is at risk, if they accidentally log out and make an edit that is easily linked to them, and then don't realize that a cookie is now connecting all their edits, even if they switch to a different IP.
I think that's already the case - the session ID persists even after logout, I think -- but I may be wrong about this. In any case, fingerprinting techniques make it pretty easy to track individuals, if some one puts their mind to it. WMF has the theoretical ability in any case. The difference is what information is made available to other users.
Overall, I agree with Tim: we should stop using IPs as user names. To preserve vandal fighting abilities, the IP addresses of anonymous users should be accessible to a restricted user groups for a limited time. Probably not all users, but at least admins. Perhaps some new group that can be used to give some non-admins the right as well. (This is my professional opinion, but doesn't reflect any official stance of the WMF) -- DKinzler (WMF) (talk) 12:26, 8 August 2019 (UTC)
Nitpicking: IPv6 is often setup so that a single home connection keeps the same block of addresses (usually /64 or something like that). In that way IPv6 addresses are at least as attributable as static IPs. If there's only one person using that connection in that home, that person is all but deanonymised to any organisation that can correlate the first digits of IPv6 with their own access/user/shopping, etc. logs. Daß Wölf (talk) 07:23, 19 August 2019 (UTC)
DKinzler (WMF), I understand where you're coming from, one thing however: I'm not sure that the privacy protection issue is more important than addressing vandalism (much of which is impulsive/spontaneous rather than intelligent), sophisticated disruptive editing, PoV pushing, paid editing, and vote stacking, all which which are far more sinister and can go undetected for years, and which pose an enormous burden on our small teams of dedicated unpaid maintenance workers and admins. Whichever, this entire issue requires first-hand, empirical experience from the people at the WMF charged with this proposal. A few solid hours at each of New Page Review, Articles for Creation, and Pending Changes is needed, together with a first-hand feeling for the challenges our Check Users are faced with nowadays (e.g. the 90 day limitation, among others).
Secondly, while the creation of a new user group who can view the IP addresses might sound feasible to the WMF, in actual fact our en.Wiki is growing increasingly hostile to the creation of even more user rights and with it, the increased bureaucracy. Also, our admins are probably not favourable to their remit being increased with additional tasks.
As I've said already, the only real and practical solution is to require registration from everyone. The Wikipedia would still be The encyclopedia anyone can edit - if they first register then comply with our policies and guidelines. That old mantra was created in the days nearly a generation ago when no one realised the global size and impact Wikipedia would have today and when new users were urgently needed to grow the corpus and the content of its stubs. It was a great mistake not doing it in the first place, but there are a lot of people who still ideologically interpret the semantics of that slogan very fiercely and it might not be easy to convince the community that now is the time for change to registration for everyone. With good arguments, it should be tried first, before any top-down technical solutions are imposed on the volunteer communities under the guise of privacy. The WMF alone, whatever their opinion, would not be entitled to make such a decision against registration - it would be a local en.Wiki policy.Kudpung (talk) 03:09, 12 August 2019 (UTC)
Hi Kudpung! Privacy protection isn't more important than vandal fighting - nobody proposed to make vandal fighting impossible to satisfy the desire privacy. The question is how we can have a maximum of privacy while keeping vandal fighting as easy as possible. I hear you about the burden of admins and editors - both Tim and myself had been active Wikipedia admins for a long time before we became hired staff (though admittedly, our experience may be dated).
As I understand Tim's proposal, it would provide anonymity against the public, while still providing access to anon's IPs to any user group that the local community thinks should have it. It could be granted per default to admins, or to autoconfirmed users, or to all users, at the community's discretion. So basically, it would mean that anon's can't see other anon's IPs, but vandal fighters still could (at least for 90 days, but that period could be adjusted as well). In contrast, forcing people to create an account would potentially lead to a flood of fake accounts, with no way to block IPs (or IP ranges) from creating more (at least not without the involvement of people with checkuser rights).
These are considerations from the technical side - I won't go into whether it would generally be good or bad to require editors to register, as I'm not an active editor any more. -- DKinzler (WMF) (talk) 10:39, 13 August 2019 (UTC)
DKinzler (WMF): This is the best response a staffer has provided to anything on this page so far, thank you. First, I think that 90 days is not long enough, and I'm not sure anything is long enough. The most subtle vandals are often able to go years without being detected. Being able to look at all of the thousands of edits they have made, ever, is tremendously useful for figuring out which subtle vandalisms never got reverted. Obviously this is a limit that checkusers have to put up with regarding registered users, and must allow some people to slip by, but this would just allow even more bad editors and bad edits to slip by. Now, I am pleased that at least some of the people inside this proposal would be okay with local communities deciding who gets to see the masking information, but I honestly wonder if you would actually be making the privacy problem worse. Right now we have an issue with people who either A) ignore the warning; or B) don't know what an IP address is (; and small subset C) people who know exactly what it is, but after getting upset at being reverted want the evidence deleted). Anyway, the people in either group then freak out when they notice their IP address is in a bunch of places (and/or find out what it is), and worry about privacy. If you mask IPs, those people probably won't realize. They will think they are anonymous when they are not, and they may say/reveal things with that false sense of security that they would not otherwise. It brings to mind some recommendations for your team: A) Just do nothing. Absolutely nothing; B) If you ignore "A", keep IP data for masked users for a timescale of years, at least, if not simply forever. If they want more privacy register an account; C) the mask should not be a completely random thing, but rather should be partially connected to ISP/subnet/geography even after the underlying data is removed. That way we can still search the range for years-old vandalism after a pattern has been established, such as realizing that every edit to articles on mountains from a specific mobile provider in a specific city was subtle vandalism. Even if it's a busy range with many users, you can search the contribs and find those, and I have done it myself; D) The IP user should not realize that their IP is masked. Since so many ISPs have very rapidly changing IPs now, this would have to be tracked with a cookie or else each edit seems like it's coming from a new user. But basically, the server gets any request for a page that contains revision-author data from a user with an anonymous-editing cookie, it should remember which edits that user is responsible for, and make sure that those edits have the IP unmasked. This avoids the problem of people thinking they are more anonymous than they really are. They can still ignore warnings and not know what an IP is, but that issue already exists anyway, and this won't make it worse. This does nothing for people who don't allow cookies. Someguy1221 (talk) 23:39, 13 August 2019 (UTC)
@DKinzler (WMF): On the “fingerprinting techniques make it pretty easy to track individuals”; when people on- and off-wiki talk about fingerprinting they are refering to several different techniques. We should perhaps be clearer on what is fingerprinting the user, the device/browser, and the content. I know I am slightly sloppy myself when referring to “fingerprinting”. There are also several different techniques for fingerprinting the user, but most references about use on text-based systems like Wikipedia discuss w:keystroke dynamics. Even for keystroke dynamics there are different algorithms available. Some articles seems to imply that current implementations of non-cooperative user fingerprinting works well enough to create privacy problems. Used together with other techniques, like browser fingerprinting it seems likely we would be able to track anonymous users. — Jeblad 17:00, 16 August 2019 (UTC)
@Jeblad: Why are you even mentioning "keystroke dynamics"? That's just ridiculous in the context of this proposal. Bitter Oil (talk) 22:03, 16 August 2019 (UTC)
Thank you for your friendly reply. If you look at the first line of my post you see I mention “DKinzler (WMF)”, and then I quote what he said. The rest of my post follows from that. Keystroke dynamics is one of several techniques to track users and thereby do abuse mitigation. I believe that is one of the two core problems the subject page tries to address. — Jeblad 23:08, 16 August 2019 (UTC)
Analysis of keystroke dynamics is one of several things that could be done to "fingerprint" users but won't be done for pragmatic reasons. This proposal isn't really about "abuse mitigation". It's about hiding IP addresses. That in itself is creating the need for anti-vandal tools which, if provided, will leave the community only slightly less able to deal with vandalism. I'm sorry of that sounds cynical or if my response seemed unfriendly, but I see no reason to pretend that this is anything other than a discussion of how to hide IPs while causing the least harm to the community. Bitter Oil (talk) 02:08, 18 August 2019 (UTC)
If you go to the top of the page you find the title. It reads “Privacy Enhancement and Abuse Mitigation” (my emphasis). You can enhance privacy by hiding the IP addresses, but then you make the current techniques for abuse mitigation difficult. Somehow you need to figure out where are the vandalism done, who can you trust and who do you distrust. The current tools are not very good, and it is not very difficult to make better tools. A lot of the people arguing on this page seems to assume the current tools are flawless and excelent, but they are not. They give a false impression of assurance and more often than not they fail badly. — Jeblad 09:22, 18 August 2019 (UTC)
@DKinzler (WMF): You say that "forcing people to create an account would potentially lead to a flood of fake accounts". Any account created is a real account. I believe you are using "fake accounts" to mean accounts created by vandals. Have you taken a look at the account creation logs on English Wikipedia? Hundreds, if not thousands, of accounts are created every day. Many of these accounts are never used to edit. I have never seen a credible explanation for this phenomenon. Perhaps analysis of the current situation should be done before embarking on this project. Bitter Oil (talk) 22:39, 16 August 2019 (UTC)
A very interesting research topic, indeed, but I'm pretty sure it is way outside the scope for this proposal. — Jeblad 23:11, 16 August 2019 (UTC)
It is outside of the scope of the project, but it should not be. We don't seem to know why so many accounts are created but never used. We don't seem to know if IP edits are a net benefit or a net detriment. These are really basic things to understand before you start talking about changing how things work with IP editors and creation of pseudo accounts. Bitter Oil (talk) 02:19, 18 August 2019 (UTC)
  • I dispute the idea that anyone technically adept enough to avoid cookie/session tagging would also make multiple accounts. Just an incognito mode would be enough to stop the cookie method and is very easy, whereas more effort must be utilised to make accounts. Additionally, some individuals set their systems to block all cookies anyway - they'd trip over session-rate limits. Nosebagbear (talk)
  • @DKinzler (WMF): I think as has been mentioned below, there'd probably be room for compromise if viewing was attached to an automatic right - I think only seeing at autoconfirmed would be definitely agreed and probably at ext-confirmed (plus the user can see their own, so they're aware others can). But that would need to be granted as a basis before any progression - I would really not want the project to go "okay people are happier now, let's progress" then get to the end and T&S have talked to you and changed it to admins-only. Nosebagbear (talk) 08:36, 19 August 2019 (UTC)

What about third-party edit-tracking?[edit]

One of the most valuable third-party tools for Wikipedia is the Twitter bots which monitor edits from within parliaments and governments to Wikipedia pages.

These bots include:

The code to do this is open-source, at https://github.com/edsu/anon

As far as I can see, this proposal will break these very valuable tools. Has anyone even notified the developers and bot-owners? --BrownHairedGirl (talk) 21:36, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

Hi BrownHairedGirl, yes, these accounts are common in a number of languages and we're aware of how they work. This is in the very early stages and we are inviting the communities to give feedback because we genuinely don't have a plan for where to draw the line and what will happen. They have not specifically been notified, because nothing has been decided and this will take quite some time to figure out. /Johan (WMF) (talk) 23:36, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
@Johan (WMF), I am glad you are aware of them. Thanks for confirming that.
However, as a matter of principle I would very strongly urge you to notify all stakeholders at this preliminary stage, rather than waiting until you have made a decision which would effect them.
May I ask whether the WMF has done any research to map out:
  1. How many external projects use the IP data?
  2. How the IP data is used on-wiki by people without checkuser authority?
It seems to me that both groups are likely to be extensive, and that hiding the IP addresses will mean that #1 causes a big loss of functionality, and #2 both dumps a lot of extra burden on checkusers such as User:Bbb23 and significantly reduces the ability of the community as a whole to analyse the activities of anonymous IPs.
If such a map exist, it needs to be shared.
If it doesn't exist, it needs to be made. Soon. --BrownHairedGirl (talk) 23:49, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
Characteristically, none of the items is related to editing from within any body in the United States of America. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 07:57, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
Personally, I would be fine with extending these facilities to also track logged-in edits. We could apply a change tag to all the edits that come from certain configured ranges, so that such edits would be tagged in Recent Changes whether or not the user is logged in. The Twitter bots could then query the change tags instead of filtering all edits by IP range. But I gather this is not a very popular position. -- Tim Starling (WMF) (talk) 10:59, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
In some countries it may not be legal at all to publish the IP addresses, they are viewed as information that can identify a person. Either the user chose to self-identify, or you should provide real anonymity. Tagging a person with location, even if it is just something that resembles an IP address, could be a breach of current law. I have always found WMFs policy on this very strange.
A very real example: Some years back w:Norwegian Police Security Service pushed very hard to get the IP address of a person that published internal information. That stopped abruptly when that person by accident logged in so-called anonymously. Later I've asked w:Norwegian Data Protection Authority about use of IP addresses, and they told me that it was okey if the use of IP addresses was rooted in a real need and internal use. We publish the IP address openly. Real need? Internal use? Err… — Jeblad 15:24, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
As noted at #IP address attribution is just rubbish by Tim, changing the display name (ex rev_user_text, now actor_name) does not automatically imply that the IP address it would be hidden from everybody except checkusers, only that it would not be irreversibly propagated everywhere as it is now. Between the privacy currently given to registered users and the total lack of privacy for unregistered users, we have a sea of options.
It should also be said that this kind of transparency only targets the least harmful individuals, those who don't know what they're doing. It also doesn't work as deterrent, because if a person knew their IP address can be attributed to their employer they would register. Nemo 16:00, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

So much for geolocation benefits[edit]

I tried to fill out the survey, but it only asked if I were going to Wikimania. Is the survey messed up, or did someone provide the wrong link?


Geolocation has numerous benefits. Often if I'm answering a question at the Reference Desk (w:en:WP:RD), I'll check the individual's location. My answer may vary significantly based on the individual's location: should I use US or metric units, how should I refer to a situation in a specific country (if you're a Briton, I won't bother explaining something about UK politics), how do I compare X and Y (if you're asking about US politics, my answer won't refer to the Japanese Diet if you're in India, and I won't mention the Lob Sakha if you're in Japan), in what manner do I respond linguistically (if your English is broken, I may respond with an autotranslated message matching the primary language of the country in which you're located, as well as with an English message), and probably more. Vaguely the same on a more local level: if it looks like the geolocation is reasonably accurate (in a precise location that doesn't look like these poor people's situation), I may use a more geo-refined answer.

Much of the above pertains to non-reference as well. In particular, it's relevant when dealing with problematic individuals, e.g. if we have a batch of problematic IPs all located in the same area, or if we have IPs belonging to ISPs in separate continents. You shouldn't need advanced rights just to participate in this kind of area. Nyttend (talk) 21:42, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

Great idea![edit]

The vandals and block evaders will love it!Dlohcierekim (talk) 22:36, 3 August 2019 (UTC)

From the main page, "It is important to note that a critical part of this work will be to ensure that our wikis still have access to the same (or better) level of anti-vandalism tooling.." -- zzuuzz (talk) 22:47, 3 August 2019 (UTC)
What “the same (or better) level of anti-vandalism tooling” actually means? It reads like a phrase devoid of any specific sense. In many cases what seems to be good for a top manager is bad for an employee (and vice versa), what is good for en.Wikipedian establishment is bad for Solomon203 (and vice versa), etc. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 09:09, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
“the same (or better) level of anti-vandalism tooling” actually means? I don't have all the answers to the details of this, and nor probably does anyone else at this time, but one thing it definitely means is "the same (or better) level of anti-vandalism tooling”. And that doesn't seem too ambiguous. -- zzuuzz (talk) 09:56, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
Any mass activity is regulated by certain trade-offs. Imagine the amount of vandalism wouldn’t increase (making large parts of the establishment happy), but—to compensate for the new cumbersome IP management system—en.Wikipedia would obtain dozens of Solomon203s instead on one. With the narrow respect to vandalism, “the same (or better)…” eh? But not a thing deemed an acceptable cost (for the dubious benefit of increased privacy) by a reasonable observer. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 10:07, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
My imagination may be deficient, but I cannot imagine the amount of vandalism wouldn't increase. I just can't see it. As a former en.Wikipedia admin, I appreciated the help of non-admins in pointing out clusters of IPs which make the same type of vandalism edits. (I think I've come across a date-of-birth vandal IP cluster on en.Wikipedia recently, without the admin bit.) Now, for IP6, there's a point to reducing the display (and talk page) to /64, but that's a completely different issue. The lower bits seem to depend on the internal clock and | phase of the moon. — Arthur Rubin T C (en: U, T) 12:46, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
I would read “the same or better level” as “the same or better probability of detection and probability of action, given an abuse attempt”. Pretty well-defined metrics. The real problem on Wikipedia is the response time given an incident, which is pretty low. (The most effective counter measure is to make vandalism more visible. Highlight the changes for 24 hours, and then all vandalism will be removed promptly.) — Jeblad 15:10, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

"IP address masking product development meetings last year"?[edit]

@Ryan Kaldari (WMF): On July 18 on [` phabricator], tstarlings asked

As discussed in the IP address masking product development meetings last year with @kaldari and @DannyH, I don't think it is appropriate to change actor names to a hashed IP address, as you propose for phase II, when we can't practically change the IP addresses in page content, for example in talk page signatures.

So there were development meetings in 2018 about something that according to the August 1st announcement "is currently in very early phases of discussions". It might be useful if the minutes of those meetings were made available so that editors can see what has already been discussed, debated, and proposed. Thanks. Bitter Oil (talk) 03:44, 4 August 2019 (UTC)

@Tim Starling (WMF), Ryan Kaldari (WMF), Johan (WMF), NKohli (WMF), DannyH (WMF), MER-C, Risker, Pigsonthewing, and Bitter Oil: Ideas and suggestions are fine, but this proposal is one on which the volunteer editors and admins who do the actual work and who have the best empirical experience at vandalism combat, should have the final say if-and-what solutions would be appropriate. In view of sunk cost, it's essential to inform the community/ies of a cost/benefit/user time study before any of the donations generated by community volunteers' work are allocated to this development. Kudpung (talk) 05:33, 4 August 2019 (UTC)

Hi @Bitter Oil: and @Kudpung: We've been thinking about this problem for a while. Ryan and I had meetings with people from the Technology and Community Engagement departments in the summer of 2018 to talk about whether going forward with this project was even possible, from a technical and social/cultural point of view. Tim made a proposal for how the back-end change could work, and we talked about what the general impact could be. We needed to talk to the WMF executive team about whether this was a good idea or not, and it took several months to get to a go/no-go decision. Once the decision was made to go forward, we added it to the annual plan for a product team to work on in the new fiscal year, which started last month (July 2019).
We did reach some conclusions during those summer 2018 meetings that are discussed on the project page here. One was that changing the IP addresses in signatures on every revision of every existing talk page would be completely infeasible, as Tim says on that ticket. Another was that before we make any real plans, we needed to evaluate the use of IP addresses in anti-vandalism/sockpuppet workflows (which Claudia posted at Research:IP masking impact report), and then talk with the community about our ideas. I wouldn't call those meetings "product development meetings", because there wasn't a product team involved, and we were just exploring the possibilities.
I agree that talking to the community is absolutely essential, and we posted this page as soon as we could. Claudia did the pre-research in May and June, and wrote the research report in July, so that we could post it here when we made the first announcement. The Anti-Harassment Tools team has been working on this for about a month so far, and what you see on the page is as far as we've got, besides some initial technical thought-experiments on that Phabricator ticket. I understand the desire for the WMF to be completely transparent on the initial discussions of a project, but we talk about possible projects all the time, and most of them don't go beyond the discussion stage. We don't want to waste the communities' time on half-baked ideas that we're not sure we believe in ourselves yet. On this project, we wanted to do the preliminary research and have a team in place, so that we were prepared enough to know what we're talking about when we started talking with the community. -- DannyH (WMF) (talk) 18:27, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
Some questions that might help with understanding from the community side: What has executive signed off on? From the perspective of whoever approved this, is the intent to protect the privacy of anonymous users, or to fundamentally restructure how we allow contributions and respond to abuse? What sort of resources do you have available to revamp/change/expand anti-abuse tools to the extent necessary to compensate for this change (which would be very significant)? – Ajraddatz (talk) 18:53, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
Ajraddatz: The execs signed off on protecting the privacy of anonymous users, and in order to do that, making sure that we can improve/build anti-abuse tools to compensate for the change. We expressed very clearly at all levels that this is a very big project with very big risks, and it requires a serious investment in a product team dedicated to the problem full-time. We can't deploy a quick change that puts the wikis at risk of being completely overrun with vandals and bad actors; it has to be approached with caution, and deep partnership with the communities. -- DannyH (WMF) (talk) 19:14, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
Perfect, thanks for the clarification. – Ajraddatz (talk) 19:32, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
Thanks, DannyH (WMF). Your answer allays my concerns. As long as you were just exploring the possibilities and that your talks were not detracting from actual urgent software development work, that's perfectly fine. I hope that the WMF does not ignore the fact however, that a great many volunteers are also very competent at coming up with ideas too - especially in the areas of control over vandalism and new content. Their disadvantage is they are not funded to have meetings in an office and discuss them. I hope this current discussion will eventually record a consensus for the best way the community would like to go. Kudpung (talk) 18:57, 4 August 2019 (UTC)

Mitigation and damage control[edit]

Please ensure that all the risks associated with this proposal are thoroughly investigated, documented, and disclosed, and damage control procedures are in place before any implementation on a project that has not expressly requested it, such request following an RfC with a clear consensus at the project and full disclosure of the risk. This looks like playing with fire. At this stage I am not even slightly convinced that this is useful or desirable, but as I am not well versed in the technology or the work that is likely to be affected, I accept that I cannot produce any objective objections of my own to add to what has been said already by those who as far as I know do the work and understand the technology. · · · Peter (Southwood) (talk): 09:10, 4 August 2019 (UTC)

The current proposal cites a research from 2007 – who may suspect it is founded on any kind of thorough consideration after that? If one to play with fire here further, then s/he would actually play with dead horses. Drop it, Pbsouthwood – incompetence of this specific “pro-privacy” démarche already became evident to the Wikimedia public. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 09:33, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
Incnis Mrsi, To a large degree, that is my point. As to whether the horse is dead, I cannot say. Perhaps it is an undead horse. · · · Peter (Southwood) (talk): 11:01, 4 August 2019 (UTC)
With respect to the research that was done in 2007, this study should be repeated. The original study took less than one working day, and was completely done "by hand" - that is, each individual edit was reviewed and analysed. I'd suggest that the reviews be done for edits at least a month old, probably a day's worth of IP edits from multiple projects of varying size, and should include a review of Commons and a review of Wikidata. Risker (talk) 04:48, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
I believe you meant to say “put into production”. Implementation is developing the functionality, and it could be real hard to figure out how something work without implementing the system.
A lot of privacy enhancements (IP-masking in particular) and abuse mitigation (karma systems, probability of detection, etc) is very well understood, yet known techniques has not been implemented at the Wikimedia projects. I find that extremely weird. — Jeblad 14:57, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

Archiving this proposal[edit]

This is a non-existing problem since a workaround exists for almost two deacdes. The easiest way to mask one's IP is to create an account. Problem solved. End of discussion proposed. --Matthiasb (talk) 01:28, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

Why should anybody administratively shut the discussion up? Pro-(unregistered privacy) activists are unable to say anything but “allocate an automatic generated username to these edits it gives us new opportunities to track vandals and bad edits”, whereas they are offered a saying for a while. It is good – Meta-wiki is visibly not under heels of any clique, even stewards (some of whom vehemently oppose this stuff). Incnis Mrsi (talk) 08:12, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
The more I think on it, the more I see Matthiasb has a point: what is the point to anonymizing IP addresses? So a user with the IP address (to pick one at random) 127.0.0.1 is now known as Anonymous Editor 666. What privacy is gained that is different from having that person create a throw-away account? Doing this work makes no sense to me. I'd like one of the people advocating for this change to explain how it is a benefit. -- Llywrch (talk) 22:09, 9 August 2019 (UTC)
You can't do a whois search on Anonymous Editor 666, whilst you can find the approx location and ISP of an IP. OxonAlex (talk) 05:25, 19 August 2019 (UTC)

Tools first[edit]

It would probably be best to improve, develop and test these new, and existing tools to deal with vandalism + abuse first, and then talk about this idea. This could be a good idea if carefully planned, with mature, tested tools in place well before implementation. SQLQuery me! 01:37, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

I was amazed that I had read as much as I had and not seen someone point this out and was thinking I'd have to do it. So I agree with SQL that the tools should be the first part of the development. Best, Barkeep49 (talk) 04:02, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
I'd like to third that. Having had more time to mull this over, I think the reason I find myself so opposed to this project, and I assume I'm not alone in this, is that I'm always wondering how much vandalism and spam we are missing. We routinely uncover things that slipped us by for years, so it could be a lot, and I don't want the foundation making it even harder for us. But if we got to a point where we could honestly say, "actually, masking IP addresses from most non-admins won't have an impact", then poof goes that opposition. I don't know how the foundation could actually get us there, but that is where we need to be. Someguy1221 (talk) 04:08, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
I also echo SQL. Tools needs to be developed first. Even with current set of tools vandalism/spam go unnoticed and having this implemented before that will make it worse. ‐‐1997kB (talk) 04:35, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
I think before a final decision is made here, it's essential that we know what tools need to be made in order to help editors and admins still identify problem editing patterns before they have to request a checkuser - and those tools should already be designed and tested on multiple projects (including large projects) to ensure they're fit for purpose. (They'll be useful regardless, even if we don't decide to mask IPs). - From my comments above. Yes, we really need to have the tools first, designed and tested. Risker (talk) 04:39, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
Develop tools before we even talk about it? Err… — Jeblad 14:50, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
I share the concern that the privacy "fix" should not be implemented without appropriate tools being introduced either before or at the very least at the same time. But the tools required will depend largely on the model used for the privacy fix. – Ajraddatz (talk) 14:58, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
@Jeblad:, Yes - once the tools are in place it should be easier to decide if this is workable. I don't really even see any cogent ideas for tools yet. Regardless of the form that this takes, there are many complex common problems that need tackled - such as the Open_proxies section above that appears to have been completely ignored. I'd be happy to help write tools (I've got some experience) if desired. SQLQuery me! 14:24, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
@SQL: You discuss ideas, prod them to find faults and alternate approaches. If you don't discuss an idea it will lead to design flaws. — Jeblad 16:11, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
Great, let's discuss ideas for tools that can support this. Let's develop them, test them, let them mature in a live environment until consensus is that we no longer need access to IP data, and then we can discuss this idea. Win-Win. SQLQuery me! 01:12, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
  • I have to agree with SQL. I have some reservations about removing the IP information, especially from vandal fighters. Supposedly we're a long way off from this, but things seem to "pop up" on wiki. IJS. Ched (talk) 17:45, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

Fails to stop governments or enterprises knowing IP[edit]

One of the stated goals of this is to prevent governments from knowing the IP number of somebody editing. However this proposal does nothing to stop that. Any government that cares already would have access to data travelling on the internet in their country and would be easily able to tell the IP address doing the actions. You may think that the contents of the session are encrypted. But the number of server requests, the size of the data and the time it happens will be easily matched to logs to see what was changed. This can be determined in the reverse direction too. So if an eavesdropper wants to know who did an edit to an article with an obscured IP address, they just need to look at the time it happened and then check if their internet traffic matched the edit to find the IP address. Then using other metadata they could track down the actual location and perhaps person. This is one of the main reasons given to obfuscate addresses but cannot achieve that purpose.

Private companies and other agencies from which people may edit internally will also have their data going through a company firewall that will be logging similar information. So those organisations, too, will be able to figure out who the internal person is that is editing Wikipedia. Obfuscation will make little difference to this. The main people that will lose access to the IP behind the editing would be the non privileged majority and the readers of Wikipedia (and those mostly don't care). I will quote Luke 8:17: "For nothing is secret, that shall not be made manifest; neither any thing hid, that shall not be known and come abroad." Graeme Bartlett (talk) 12:28, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

Use of private proxies makes the matter less obvious than explained above. I know a user from Europe who evades Wikipedia blocks via such proxy. Neither the user’s employer nor the local government may learn of the fact using such a straightforward data mining… yet some attentive and experienced Wikipedians may identify the person (with the present wiki engine) by IP information. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 13:03, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
Given that proxies are generally blocked on site at wikipedia, I'm not sure that argument holds up that well Nosebagbear (talk) 13:26, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
This is another problem, and I don't think it is within the scope of this proposal. Only real solution I know of is onion routing, aka TOR, but that comes with its own problems. — Jeblad 14:47, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
… compared against diff which blazingly falls within the scope of this page. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 16:13, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
I must say I find your way of arguing quite intriguing! Mitigations for communication introspection and man in the middle attacks is quite another thing. Especially forced use of state-issued root certificates is highly problematic. It should be done, but probably not within this project. — Jeblad 17:42, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
@Nosebagbear: the proxy from my example is not blocked and may not be blocked as such. Again, it is not an open proxy, it is a private proxy. Please, re-examine relevant policy. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 16:41, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
Graeme Bartlett: This is a relevant comment and we should be aware that there are limitations to what IP masking can do, just as registering a user won't necessary hide you from a state actor, but having worked in this sector before joining the Wikimedia Foundation, for a while with trying to keep the wrong government-owned ISPs from getting their hands on the wrong technology, I left that field with these impressions a couple of years ago:
  • There's a rather large difference in capabilities of different bad actors, including governments, even on this level. We might not be able to do anything about actor X, but the same measures could be more effective against actor Y.
  • It matters if we make something easy, or slightly more difficult. There's a cost to looking up things, and there's always a budget. If we make it more time-consuming, something that is possible can become far less likely.
  • On that topic, for example a combination of a small token of randomized size for each request together with perfect forward secrecy would make this more expensive to track, especially for single edits.
  • There's quite some difference between knowing where to look because you've got the IP address, and not knowing to look because you don't automatically know what originates from a specific ISP or within your country.
  • (And of course, not all bad actors have access to the traffic – some are outsiders, using the IP to home in a location. But that was not what you argued against, just mentioning it here as a reminder in the general discussion.)
Others – including you, most likely – are better suited to comment on the specific technical questions, but it's not just about technically possible or not technically possible. /Johan (WMF) (talk) 19:33, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

There is another aspect to governments knowing and monitoring edits that cannot be easily addressed by any of these efforts. A government willing to invest time and effort in monitoring its residents is also willing to invest time and effort infiltrating the wiki community and gaining direct access to the information this project is trying to hide. A false sense of anonymity is worse than the understanding that there is no anonymity for IP edits. -- Dave Braunschweig (talk) 23:16, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

It is possible that governments may ask those with advanced permissions for information or actions. I expect that WMF will be asked on occasion by governments too. The initiative to provide information to government entities may also go the other way. For example someone seriously threatens another person on Wikipedia and then the local police should be informed. But which ones to contact? Graeme Bartlett (talk) 00:43, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
Wikimedia Foundation: Transparency Report. — Jeblad 16:20, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

Masking of IPs[edit]

I know a lot of water has to flow to the sea before decisions will be made, but is it a possibility to "mark" masked IPs by adding a special character or symbol to the masked name? Without unveiling the IP, it can give vandal fighters a hint that this user needs some extra attention. The Banner (talk) 13:00, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

Detecting similar content[edit]

A very effective countermeasure is to reuse the techniques for fingerprinting of spam messages. Make some type of raw w:locality-sensitive hashing (LSH) over the revisions content, and subtract the raw LSH over the previous revisions content. The raw version is typically a vector. Turn that vector into a digest and store it as a value for a special tag. Make an filter option for all such tags with approx the same value. It will then be possible to filter out a lot of similar edits, even if the editing users are different.

A typical LSH is the Niilsimsa versions, but there are several other options.

Another quite promising solution is to use word embeddings instead of N-grams and let a w:recurrent neural network (RNN) learn similarity by using w:triplet loss, then test the diffs for similarity. It is virtually the same as testing for similar faces, except for strings, and it uses a RNN instead of a w:convolutional neural network.

Pretty straight forward! 😉 — Jeblad 16:04, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

Wrong approach on cookies for blocking[edit]

Lately abuse mitigation has been attempted solved by setting a cookie. This is a bad-boy cookie. When the user purges the cookies and request a new IP address he is clean. This is a slightly bad situation.

Instead of using a bad-boy cookie there should be a good-boy cookie. An anonymous user should be given a cookie and then accumulate karma. As long as he hasn't enough karma he is suspicious and should be tagged as such. The user could also be given a challenge to type a predefined text. That text could be used as a fingerprint, and if the fingerprint is found to be sufficient similar to a known good user a set level of karma can be transferred.

It is a readers exercise to figure out why a challenge won't work together with a bad-boy cookie. — Jeblad 17:21, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

Wikipedia editors have steadfastly refused to allow the WMF to record more data on them (remember, they only formally get: an email, an IP, and a session ID). There is absolutely no chance that this would be agreed to, especially given the current Community/WMF trust levels. It also can be way to easy to lose your karma with computer switches, geographics moves and other issues making a "fingerprint" too hard to demonstrate. Nosebagbear (talk) 21:17, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
I'm not sure you understand how this work. The present partial blocks are a “bad-boy cookies”, they live as long as the user does nothing to get rid of them. A “good-boy cookie” lives because the anonymous user want it to survive. If the anonymous user don't want the cookie, then (s)he is free to remove it, but then any edits will keep being flagged as suspicious. The karma associated with the cookie is very short-lived, typically 10-15-20 edits, so whether it is lost due to computer switches does not really matter that much. Geographic moves does not matter at all. Creating fingerprints from edits are pretty well-known techniques too, and also problems associated with it. If some user tracking fails then the only problem for the anonymous user would be that (s)he is flagged as suspicious, nothing more. Hardly a critical situation. Note also that providing fingerprints by keystroke dynamics is an inherently opt-in process, building such fingerprints involuntarily is an extremely slow process. — Jeblad 22:44, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
How does one accumulate karma? Why would an anonymous user care whether their edits are flagged suspicious or not? -kyykaarme (talk) 23:02, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
Some unregistered editors are proud of the IP number and even go so far as to making sure their signature also includes a former IP number so they are connected. This is the type of person taht we would really like to have register an account, but have no wish to. But these people would have fixed IP numbers. Graeme Bartlett (talk) 11:43, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
It is darn easy to accumulate karma. Edits that does not lead to reverts will count up, edits that lead to reverts count down. We can add several additional measures. This is already done for autoconfirmed users.
The transfer from an so-called anonymous user to a pseudonym account should be easy, and edits done as anonymous user should be reassigned to the pseudonym account. — Jeblad 16:17, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
Are you familiar with ORES? Maybe it's similar to what you're suggesting, if the point is to make it easier to spot bad edits? -kyykaarme (talk) 09:29, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
Yes, I know about ORES. No it is not similar to what I describe in this thread. It can although be tweaked to do the second approach in #Detecting similar content. — Jeblad 11:13, 7 August 2019 (UTC)

Split the project[edit]

A bit of meta-discussion.

The discussion above is evidently going to nowhere. I hereby propose to split the “IP Editing: P.E. and A.M.” project (and move some of associated talk threads manually) to several pages on related, but distinct problems.

One problem: what to do with IP addresses? To show only to trusted users, to encrypt, to make rDNS and whois queries, etc.

Another problem: what to do with the unregistered users’ edit form? E.g. to disable saving until confirming a privacy disclaimer, or begin to close some sites from unregistered users altogether.

Yet another problem: supplementary tools for abuse mitigation, such as cookies or content analysis.

Let each discussion progress its way and focus on its specific topic. Incnis Mrsi (talk) 17:34, 5 August 2019 (UTC)

While the above discussion is a bit messy, and becoming difficult to follow, I think that it probably fits the purpose of an initial consultation. To the WMF folks monitoring: what do you think about breaking this out into a more structured environment? Would you want to wait until more initial input has been provided? – Ajraddatz (talk) 17:49, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
Hello - the team will be meeting to discuss next steps for this consultation in the next few days. In the meantime, we'd welcome your thoughts on how to best split or organize the discussion, for example by splitting the talk page into subpages or topic-based sections. —User:CLo (WMF) (talk) 19:59, 5 August 2019 (UTC)
Might be worth splitting into topic-based sections, or adding a summary section (and updating it) to the top of the page. Or both. – Ajraddatz (talk) 23:44, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

@Ajraddatz and CLo (WMF): how about IP Editing: Privacy Enhancement and Abuse Mitigation/header? May it be deployed or not today? Incnis Mrsi (talk) 11:44, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

@Incnis Mrsi: Hello, thank you for making that header! We've discussed it in the team, please go ahead and deploy it when you wish. —User:CLo (WMF) (talk) 15:14, 7 August 2019 (UTC)

Transparency[edit]

Generally I dislike the idea of hiding IP. What differs a wiki from another platform such as tumblr is its transparency. As remarked above, even generating a unique nickname generator based on IPs would already make it difficult to fight vandalism. A large part of vandalism fighting comes from non-privileged users reporting potential abuse which they were able to see. A few remarks below. Regards, --Gryllida 00:12, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

Evidence of concern[edit]

I would like to see evidence of users finding it worrisome that their IP is visible. They already age given a banner with invitation to register, above every edit. In my opinion this is more than enough. If registration is hard, then they can be presented with a more interactive registration wizard: above or below the edit box, anonymous users can be presented with two text boxes for creating their account and their password. Regards, --Gryllida 00:12, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

Honestly I suspect even more would be concerned if they thought their IP had been masked but then found out that basically everyone can see it. The way we have things now, it's obvious to anyone paying attention that their IP is visible. Someguy1221 (talk) 03:09, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
Yea I think so. There are other ways to authenticate though like openid though, what do you think? Gryllida 00:46, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
Using OpenID without hiding the IP address would be bad, but perhaps you would use only a federated username? There are several systems we could use for federated identities, and some of them has a lot better security than our present system. — Jeblad 00:22, 10 August 2019 (UTC)

Email verification instead of password[edit]

Another possibility is when registering users are not required to set a password, instead they are required to confirm their email to verify their edit. This is what StackOverflow does. It asks for their email and a username, and after they have submitted their edit, they send a verification email and also suggest to set an account password. When the password is not yet set the account remains attached to a cookie and to the email. Regards, --Gryllida 00:12, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

This could be a way to connect edits across IP addresses, but it must be used together with a shared secret (cookie) to make an unique id. If not used with a shared secret it could be sufficient to give someones email address if that is compromised. A sufficient implementation should be possible though. — Jeblad 00:38, 10 August 2019 (UTC)

Against separate user right[edit]

I would suggest against a separate user right to view the IPs. If to limit visibility of IP, the most I would like is to require that a user logs in and opts in for viewing IPs of others. Regards, --Gryllida 00:12, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

User rights are used for authorizing access to functionality. It should not be possible to view any information that is deemed private without being properly authorized. Access to private information must be logged and the authorized users must be identified. That is if we want to do this the right way and not just some way. — Jeblad 00:27, 10 August 2019 (UTC)

This is a problem creating solution in search of a problem[edit]

I utterly dislike this idea. I cannot foresee any easy way to rangeblock a set of IPs if we do not see the IPs. Systematic vandals (a problem that is utterly ignored by WMF for way over 10 years) will embrace this to the fullest. These systematic vandals will not have to go through the difficulty of making accounts, they can just edit using IP ranges and no-one can connect them. Especially when speed is key in protecting the encyclopedia this is giving enormous delays. A simple block of a range and you seriously prevent influx of problems. Now you CANNOT block anyone even if you would have a tool to tell you that IP-user#1 is in a /24 with IP-user#2 since you do not know whether IP-user#3 is a good editor. You cannot block IP-user#4 with account-creation disabled because that is the IP of a school. You will however block IP-user#5 who turns out to edit from the White house and should have been reported to WMF.

And I don't see what problem you want to solve.

It is simple: If you are concerned that you have your privacy invaded because you are editing Wikipedia under an IP, then a) don't edit or b) create an account.

WMF is once again seriously disconnected from the community. Your aim is to keep editors at ALL costs in here, not realizing that you then also keep all these systematic vandals in here. Do you REALLY not realize that if you don't keep the rubbish out, that then editors (newbies and long term alike) will get frustrated and walk away. And all you do is ignore the defenses further or weaken them even further.

Strong oppose --Dirk Beetstra T C (en: U, T) 06:11, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

Rangeblocks can be done by checkusers easily, it'd be a similar problem we have with logged in editors. --Martin Urbanec (talk) 09:32, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
Yes, but these editors generally chose to use IP ranges and not make accounts. If this is implemented, literally everything has to go through checkusers. Do you know what the average waiting time is at the moment at a checkuser? My last 2 CU requests had respectively 4 and 6 days waiting time before a checkuser came to it. Now you add ALL IP ranges (LiWa3 caught 4 yesterday alone, and it does not catch all and that is only spammers) .... For accounts we do not even bother to ask for checkuser, it is already impossible to do. --Dirk Beetstra T C (en: U, T) 10:14, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

I agree. I've been told that there is very little chance that this will be canceled, but I sincerely hope the WMF will listen to us. Trijnsteltalk 19:58, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

I see mixed signals here. It is called a proposal and it seems that Kudpung was given some assurance above that led him to believe that the community's will is what will be done. Can we get some clarity on this? After all, it isn't in good faith to call it a proposal if it is a done deal. So far, I'm in the strong oppose camp and wanting to see the tools first that would make such a plan viable. The narrow benefits that would be gained are perceived but not validated in any quantitative measure presented. Meanwhile, the disruption that this would cause is easy to see. Please don't fix that which isn't broken and don't break that which is working.
This is the community's decision, right? If the community's consensus is no then that is the outcome, right?
⋙–Berean–Hunter—► ((⊕)) 23:14, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
Yeah I hope consensus matters. Gryllida 00:43, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
@Berean Hunter and Gryllida: I'm afraid not. I've been told that while it technically could be possible, we shouldn't count on rejecting the project if there's no consensus. There is already money reserved for it, so it has to be done. We can only tell them how it should be done. Trijnsteltalk 22:55, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

If I don't want my ip to be known[edit]

I can create an account. So why do we need to protect IP-users? And why is that an issue, if we do not take action? Again, I see a solution looking urgently for a problem. Edoderoo (talk) 12:40, 6 August 2019 (UTC)

I would do that too (as I did). I don't understand, we warn IPs that their IP will be known once they make an edit and they actually choose to do that. I still can't understand that *why* we would need this. If someone consciously choses to expose their ip address, why should we keep them from doing that? WMF wikis have been fighting vandalism for years, and now WMF comes up with this "IP Masking" idea that has no solution for this vandal-fighting problem. I would strongly oppose this unless WMF proves that we can fight vandals (especially IP-vandals) without knowing their IP just like the way we do right now (or better). Ahmad252 (talk) 19:37, 6 August 2019 (UTC)
given the Bassel Khartabil case [4], i suspect that there are some more recent cases of editors being harmed by ip tracking. apparently the WMF feel a duty to those editors who might be killed. Slowking4 (talk) 00:06, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
I agree that people who do not want their IP to be visible can create an account.
Bassel could have created an account too, no? Gryllida 00:45, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
oh really? is the burden always on the dead? i do not have much confidence in the SUL to not logout and disclose an ip. is there no burden on the site, and the admins? Slowking4 (talk) 01:51, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

alternative proposal - have IP data of good edits expire over time[edit]

We only need to know the IP addresses of vandals and spammers. DE wiki and some others have a system of flagged revisions whereby all IP edits are flagged as accepted or rejected. If that system was changed so that all edits from "new" IP addresses had a mask ID assigned to them, then the IP address could default to being displayed to anyone looking at the contributions of that mask ID, except if all edits by that mask ID were accepted as goodfaith and the last was more than three months ago. At that point the IP address would be deleted and no longer displayed, and the next time an edit came from that IP address it would be treated as a "new" IP address and a new mask ID would be generated. On EN Wikipedia and others without flagged revisions IP addresses of "goodfaith" editors would be rather slower to expire, but if info from Pending changes and some vandalfighting tools was fed into the system it could work there too. WereSpielChequers (talk) 06:00, 7 August 2019 (UTC)

Someone could be collecting all IP addresses and their masks before the addresses are deleted. If we're concerned about the privacy of IP users, the addresses can't be public at any point. They have to be restricted, maybe only to checkusers. Restricting them to admins is better than nothing, but admins would probably have to sign an NDA, which I'd imagine many won't do. Maybe a new user group could be created, in a similar way that interface admin rights were split from admin rights. Deleting the IP addresses after 90 days might feel nice to a random IP user who gets spooked when they realize their IP is public, but that kind of a user has nothing to fear even if their IP is public forever, and those users who might have something to fear gain nothing from their IP address being deleted 90 days later, because the damage is already done. -kyykaarme (talk) 07:51, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
OK so restrict the data to only being shown to admins and rollbackers. Still far less public than at present, but workable, and if people want their IP address to be private they can always create an account. WereSpielChequers (talk) 14:23, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
I don't see how this would work when applied to smaller projects; any result we have from this would need to work everywhere. Projects with small communities which may still have serious spam/vandalism issues (and usually do) would be completely unable to manage such a process. Best regards, Vermont (talk) 03:04, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

The Anti-abuse Tools we need[edit]

From the above discussion, it is clear that this WMF project has no support from the community. Forcing such changes upon the Project without any sort of agreement with the community would just be a brutal and anti-democratic imposition. I don't think that it is part of the Foundation's principles to behave in that way... at least I hope it isn't.

From the comments above from the WMF staff, it has been said several times that alternative solutions are to be found together, in order to mitigate this imposition from above. As I wrote at the beginning of the discussion, I would like to use these exchanges as an opportunity to enhance the tools we have, in order to reduce the burden on the CUs, sysops, and patrollers. Here's my list of ideas of what we need to address before doing anything aiming to hide IPs:

  • More support for ant-abuse filters (including an easier interface for regex)
  • Filters IP and UA based
  • Automatic identification of open proxies
  • Automatic labelling (via whois maybe) of accounts/IPs from schools or other institutions
  • Automatically suggest to block the full IP range of a blocked ISP
  • Storing IP for more than 3 months (how can we fight LTA that persist over the years if we have a 3 months window?)
  • Make available the full HTTP request headers to CUs
  • Global inter-wiki CU interface
  • ...

These are some aspects that I consider necessary (also with full IP disclosure) to perform the anti-vandalism job. I invite you all to add comments, ideas for anti-vandalism tools, or to highlight more technical aspects on the matter. I strongly recommend to address such aspects before changing anything, because if these request seems absurd to you, it means that you don't know how much abusive users affect the Project, and how limited the anti-vandalism tools actually are. Thanks :) Ruthven (msg) 13:38, 7 August 2019 (UTC)

Also, making sure content filters are up to scratch, such as the spam and title blacklists and the abuse filter (they aren't). Or even just adding a simple checkbox to the delete form "delete the associated talk page". This is not hard. MER-C (talk) 13:50, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
For checkusers, it would be helpful to have specific device blocking mapped to certain pages, namespaces or categories (such as Category:The Troubles (Northern Ireland) or Category:Arab–Israeli conflict). This should be independent of IP addresses used so that it defeats IP hopping or use of VPNs/proxies.
⋙–Berean–Hunter—► ((⊕)) 14:03, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
I definitely do not agree with is clear that ... no support from the community. I find myself and many others in support, even if the majority is negatively. And if the feedback is broken up per language version, I find constructive input from dewp and other non-en versions, and am not even sure it there is a majority of negative feedback from non-en communities. Enwp is the biggest community and as always in these discussions they dominate even more than their share. But please do not see enwp a The community.Yger (talk) 15:18, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
@Yger: Small projects would suffer even more if the IPs are masked without providing efficacious tools to prevent vandalism. On small projects you have few sysops and no CUs, and the regular users are the ones that perform the rollbacks, and identify abusers by their IP range. --Ruthven (msg) 07:50, 8 August 2019 (UTC)
On small project lite svwp, we have 60 sysops quite enough. And we patrollers are able to monitor all changes being done, with or without special tools. For myself I have for five years monitor all changes being done 24/7, and check those I find strange (with big help from ORES) as an afterpatroller. And as said for me the proposal look good, as I expect the automatic Ip-number converter will be smart and help identify user using different Ip numbers, and identify suspected vandals (with identifying IP numbers doing OK edits, = being OK). And for us the most powerful trick has been to quickly find Ip number from vandal ridden schools and block them for a year or two. Just here a signal of the origin of the Ip number is needed. (whois)(Yger (talk) 09:47, 8 August 2019 (UTC)
A project with 60 sysops in NOT a small project, unless all the active users are sysop (which is still a medium project; to give you an idea, on nap.wiki there must be 500 edits/month and 2-3 sysops). Yours is a possible solution: to flag all the active users with the ability to see the IPs, leaving out only newly registered and anonymous users (or the dynamic ones). Another good point you mention, is having a system that automatically indicates the location, ISP, and all the possible socks of an anonymous user: this would be a useful tool. I reckon that we should push in that direction. --Ruthven (msg) 11:29, 8 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Just some comments. Sorry, they are all arguments against the points:-
  • More support for ant-abuse filters (including an easier interface for regex) → Can't really see how the regex can be made simpler, regexes are pretty complex and if you don't understand them you should not fiddle with them.
  • Filters IP and UA based → This will expose private info to filter editors, which is pretty bad.
  • Automatic identification of open proxies → Pretty hard to automate, but could be done in some cases. It is although not necessary to know whether it is a proxy or not, it is a single IP address. A lot of requests comes through proxies, and the difference of an open and closed proxy is extremely blurry.
  • Automatic labelling (via whois maybe) of accounts/IPs from schools or other institutions → This does not work for most of the world. It is simply not something that is advertised.
  • Automatically suggest to block the full IP range of a blocked ISP → This will be pretty bad for projects with admins that tend to block whole IP ranges of major ISPs. Often it is only a limited IP ranges available for a device, but that limited IP range can be somewhat hard to figure out.
  • Storing IP for more than 3 months (how can we fight LTA that persist over the years if we have a 3 months window?) → It does not make sense to keep the IP address for longer time than the lease time, unless the address is used for edits. Keeping IP addresses for random visits just in case someone is a vandal has far worse consequences than random vandalism. Jeblad 00:14, 10 August 2019 (UTC)
@Jeblad: Ok, so if there are no useful tools to be implemented to fight vandalism as you're saying, this proposal is only making things worse and should not be implemented. I was thinking that the proposal wanted to do both things: guaranteeing some privacy to anonymous users, and providing the necessary tools to protect the project. Btw, I don't see the point on many of your comments:
  • there are no bad consequences for the project in keeping the IP + UA + any other data of a vandal;
  • proxies' addresses appear in freely usable tools on the Net;
  • Filter editors are also admins, so they must have access to private data anyways (we were also saying of creating a special "see IP" group which could fit with this filter task)
  • Whois provides a lot of information on IPs, so automatically labelling schools or companies is easy actually;
  • etc. Ruthven (msg) 12:33, 17 August 2019 (UTC)
  • No, this is not what I'm saying: “…if there are no useful tools to be implemented to fight vandalism as you're saying…”
  • You can't claim you are only storing personal data for a vandal, when you don't know who are the vandals. To safeguard and store data for everyone is a pretty bad approach. The argument that you only store info about vandals will simply not work, but assume you can track some users as vandals, how would you make sure you have updated and correct information? An IP address is leased to someone else, and then you end up claiming that the new lender is a vandal. That is slightly problematic. We should avoid creating data sets that can be interpreted as “known vandals”. We can although track “known users” and thereby take action on “unknown users”.
  • Yes proxies are common, but vandal fighting by trying to find and block every (more or less known) proxy won't work. Mostly because it won't scale very well, but in particular because a whole lot of proxies does not advertise as proxies. It may be possible to detect proxies by timing analysis, but it is quite difficult to do it right in a production environment. Measuring and estimating how long it should take before a reply is available is non-trivial, and the slightly increase in response time is quite small.
  • Editing filters is a special right that can be assigned to any user group. Any user given this right must then sign a confidentiality agreement. Any filter using IP addresses, or any other privacy information, should be non-public with all the known problems (read abandoned filters, and filters based on crystal ball knowledge).
  • Outside the US Whois is mostly used by ISPs, that is you get information about high-level assignments of IP addresses, not who actually leases the IP address. You also get information about addresses used by public facing servers, but a lot of users will enter internet through gateways and proxies that isn't reported by whois. I should also add that regularly hammering whois for every edit will most likely get us blocked, and should not be done proactively. One of the best approaches I know of for abuse detection is to build aposterior (dis)trust in gateways on a route, and then flag edits that has sufficient low rating. That too has problems and should not be done proactively, but without being used proactively we can't build the aposterior (dis)trust metric. — Jeblad 14:07, 17 August 2019 (UTC)

Whatever you do, don't roll it out at once[edit]

No matter what solution may be implemented here (from disabling anonymous edits altogether, to creating system-generating masking IDs for each IP, to masking IP data after a certain number of months, etc.) please, pretty please don't roll it out on all projects at once! Select one or two large projects (maybe enwiki and dewiki), roll it out there and let it be for a number of months (not days, not weeks, months) and then based on the feedback from the communities as well as the technical folks, decide to expand it or modify it or ditch it altogether. Huji (talk) 14:27, 7 August 2019 (UTC)

The problem with this is, going from past practice with the WMF, this might help handle bugs, but if it's rolled out and turns out to be a disaster - they won't agree to cancel it after the sunk costs. Nosebagbear (talk) 08:38, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

Replies to some of the points raised in the discussion so far[edit]

First off, thanks to everyone who has volunteered their time and thoughts on this page and elsewhere. It is exactly the kind of feedback and discussion we (Anti-Harassment Tools team) were hoping to have. I really appreciate it. Before I reply to specific concerns being raised, I want to lay out some general principles of this project:

  • First, we will absolutely not be implementing anything without building or augmenting tools and workflows that help the community defend our projects from vandalism and abuse. It follows that improvements to anti-abuse and anti-vandalism tools will happen before masking IP addresses.That is the primary reason that the Anti-Harassment Tools team at Wikimedia Foundation is responsible for leading this project. Our first priority will be to improve existing tools and build new ones to improve the state of anti-vandalism on the wikis.
  • Second, there is a range of acceptable solutions to this problem. Nothing is pre-decided and everything is laid out on the project page. The goal of this is to figure out the best possible solution that proves a win-win for all. Any implementation will be rolled out in stages and piloted on some projects first. For instance, reducing IP visibility to logged-in users only would be a possible first step towards increasing protection for IP editors.
  • Third, as mentioned on the project page, there is no concrete timeline on this project at the moment. Our goal is to seek community feedback on all aspects of this project and coming to a collective decision about next steps.

I have tried to summarize some of the bigger concerns/questions that have come up so far and address them below. While I don’t have an answer for each of these, I have tried to answer what I can. If I missed responding to something - that is completely unintentional and I apologize in advance. If you point it out to me, I will be happy to reply to that.

1. IP addresses are currently very useful for non-CheckUsers and non-Admins to flag vandalism. Restricting IP address visibility will hamper their ability to do so.

This is a very valid concern that we have heard from more than a few users about. We’re aware of how IP addresses are critical to the workflows. We have a volunteer checkuser and admin working on the team with us to help out as well. As mentioned above, there is a range of possible solutions on the table. For example, we could have an additional user right that allows users to see IP addresses, granted to people who need access to IP addresses as part of their work on the projects, with the understanding that they will use this information responsibly.

2. IP addresses provide a variety of important information such as - whether the edit happened from a proxy, if the IP address is on a blacklist, if the owner of the IP is an institution, what’s the user’s geolocation etc. Not being able to access IP addresses will cause a loss of this information.

It is possible that we could surface the same information that is provided by the IP address without revealing the IP address itself with the help of a tool, to a trusted group of users (as defined by the communities). We can take this a step further and surface other “anonymous” users who have edited from the same geolocation/institution etc. This can help anti-vandalism efforts on the projects.

3. What about the people who don't mind seeing their IP address broadcast?

IP addresses are not well understood by a lot of people on the internet. Often people do not understand what is at stake when they choose to be “anonymous” and sign their edits with their IP addresses. We also want to protect these people, who may not be technically adept enough to know why protecting your privacy online is important but could still face very real consequences.

4. Turn off IP editing/Make registration mandatory to edit

This is a legitimate ask. As others have pointed out, it is a Founding priciple of our projects that anyone can edit without registering. However, after reading everything on this page, it is clear that we should gather some research and data about the usefulness of anonymous editing on our wikis and potential impact if we disallow IP editing. I will be talking to the Research, Growth and other teams about this. Another option, if we choose to not completely disallow IP editing, is that we can use this opportunity to better encourage users to create accounts. There is a lot of scope to make that process more seamless and easy.
Another thing that has already been mentioned is that it is not necessary that making registration mandatory will lead to a reduced workload for CheckUsers and Admins. It will potentially drive up sign-ups but that would also mean vandals create throwaway accounts to make unconstructive edits, creating an extra workload for people who have access to IPs to detect sockpuppets and block ranges.

5. If people are concerned about their privacy, they should register.

Again, a lot of people don’t really know what they are giving up when they choose to not sign up. Banner blindness has been mentioned, which is a known phenomenon. Saying that an editor who edits without logging in has taken the conscious decision to broadcast their IP address may not always be correct. As part of this project, we will be looking at making it clearer to IP editors why it is a good idea to sign up and also looking at making improvements to the sign up process. A lot of people who use the internet do not understand the ramifications of disclosing their IP address, and we fear that by showing that IP address to everyone, we’re penalizing them for their lack of technical knowledge.

Open questions:[edit]

Based on all of the above, we have some questions we'd like to get your feedback on:

  1. What tools do you use as part of your anti-vandalism workflows that could benefit from feature improvements? We have heard about CheckUser, AbuseFilter, GlobalUserContributions (guc). Are there other tools or user scripts that you use for this purpose?
  2. What potential tools can you think of, that don’t currently exist but could help with anti-vandalism efforts, especially if IPs were to be masked on the projects? Some suggestions we’ve heard include more sophisticated filters (e.g. easier regex interfaces, filtering by UA as well as IP), automatic flagging of institution type (e.g. schools, government offices), and automatic open proxy detection.
  3. What do you do right now with IP addresses? We’ve heard about whois checks and looking at that data to see who owns the IP or where it is located. Another thing that has been mentioned is using the IP to find other IPs editing in that range. Are there other ways you use IP addresses? Can some of these workflows be automated to make your work easier?

My apologies for using "I" and "we" interchangeably in the post above. The post was drafted by me on behalf of the Anti-harassment Tools team at WMF. -- NKohli (WMF) (talk) 17:03, 7 August 2019 (UTC)

  • As a volunteer admin and checkuser, I could find the following uses of IPs in my workflows:
    • Check previous edit history of an IP. Some IPs are very static, I know people who edited anonymously from the same IP for years and created dozens of articles from their IP (but also possibly violated rules). Being able to interact with such people unwilling to register is clearly useful. However, we need to keep their identifier static and not change it daily, they might well edit the same article from the same IP a few years in a row.
    • Check range contributions. If an IP is dynamic, it is very useful to know if there is any activity from a neighbouring range. For instance, if a vandal with a particularly annoying pattern (e.g. changing dates in articles) is active in a dynamic range, getting all edits from this range to check them is clearly necessary.
    • Set an abuse filter on a range. If there is a particular pattern of vandalism from a range (e.g. use of certain words that might be appropriate in some but not all articles), we might have to disallow editing with this specific pattern to this range. This is an alternative to a block of the entire, potentially large range, and to disallowing potentially useful edits to all users.
    • Check global contributions. It is extremely important to keep identifiers consistent between wikis for fighting cross-wiki vandals. This is particularly the case of cross-wiki spammers who may insert spamming links from the same IP to multiple wikis.
    • Check if an IP is a proxy, VPN or Tor node. This is usually more advanced than automatic tools can allow, particularly in cases when people use proxies or VPNs to hide links with their main accounts in an abusive way. Sometimes I literally google an IP to find if I happen to find it in some proxy or VPN list.
    • Check if users/IPs belong to same network/geography. Some providers use multiple ranges with very different IP patterns (like a 128.*.0.0/16 and a 192.*.0.0/16), and a user (both registered and anon) might move from one to another without notice. Some users (both registered and anon) use two different providers (like home and mobile) but in a very specific location, and we can link accounts by this location. For example, if two IPs from the same town but different networks in Malaysia participate in the same discussion in Ukrainian Wikipedia, they very likely belong to the same person.
    • Check location of an IP. Unlike the previous case, location can be used in a positive context. For instance, an IP adding information of some obscure politician in China is possibly a vandalism. However, a Chinese IP adding information about a Chinese politician is less likely to be reverted.
    • Check organisation of an IP. This is needed for paid editing / COI matters. For example, an edit to an article about an MP made from the Parliament's IP (be it a registered or an anon user) is very likely an undisclosed paid editing or a COI and requires relevant actions.
    • Any combination of previous factors above can be needed. For example, I had a case of a user switching between an IP of a specific provider and VPNs who had abusive anonymous edits in multiple wikis from IPs of a different provider in the same (small) location and had sockpuppets on IPs from different ranges but belonging to the same VPN network. Yes, that's hard even with current tools, I really hope it will not be way more complex once this change is public.
    I might have forgotten something but this should cover around 99% of my cases — NickK (talk) 19:03, 7 August 2019 (UTC)
  • > What tools do you use as part of your anti-vandalism workflows that could benefit from feature improvements?
    All of them. Every single one of MediaWiki's anti-abuse and admin tools is not fit for purpose and a mess code-wise.
  1. Undeletion needs to be completely rewritten - every aspect is so thoroughly broken from the UI all the way to the database tables (including deleted title search). Deleted revisions and live revisions should be indistinguishable from a feature point of view.
  2. Likewise, the spam and title blacklists are both hacks and also need to be completely rethought. Make them infinitely scaleable, add antispoof to the spam blacklist, make logging less hacky (should really be a special page)
  3. Clean up technical debt and write unit tests for the abuse filter. Add subroutines and shared variables. Find a way to properly combine AntiSpoof and regular expressions (see e.g. T147765).
  4. Fixing our goddamn CAPTCHA so that stewards don't have to deal with spambots manually (!!!)
  5. Special:Linksearch and the external links table are unfit for purpose - you know you've got problems when the way to find external links is the normal search engine. The external links table should have columns for both the protocol and the domain.
  6. Make full HTTP headers available to checkusers.
  7. Search CU records by user agent.
  8. Checkuser also needs a complete rethink as well. This is a little drastic for the features above, but it allows you to back Checkuser with a graph database.
  9. In fact, the entire anti-abuse effort needs a fully integrated graph database (with one click block/revert/delete/blacklist links) - this will be a great improvement for dealing with sophisticated abuse spanning tens, if not hundreds of accounts, titles, spam links, etc.
  10. Private long term abuse documentation - solved in general by T230668
  11. API improvements - fetching range contributions, deleted title search, Special:Recentchangeslinked, ...
  12. Notify me when this block/protection is about to expire.
  13. Give the option that when a protection expires, revert to the level it was previously.
  14. Batch deletion, undeletion, blocking, unblocking and reverting being part of core software.
  15. Minor workflow improvements - "delete talk", "delete subpages", "RevisionDelete title/creation edit summary everywhere" checkboxes on the delete form, "RevisionDelete username everywhere" on the block form, jump to the page history near this revision on the diff page and contributions page, checkboxes on Special:Contributions for bulk revision deletion, ...
  16. Impose a lower rate limit on the number of accounts created per session.
  17. [More pending]

You have also not addressed the point that the public needs to know about certain abusive IP address editing. MER-C (talk) 19:23, 7 August 2019 (UTC)

  • I will also say that despite mentioning the importance of community consultation several times, and making it clear there are no concrete plans at the moment, your every comment gives me the distinct impression that IP masking will be implemented at some point in the future, whether or not it has community support. It's distressing to see that WMF once again appears intent to force its will. But on the subject of needed tools, I would recommend the following:
1. Make it possible to search the contributions of IP ranges with prefix lengths other that what is currently supported.
2. Do something to either speed up or kill the process that tries to list the IPs that have been used from an IPv4 range, as for busy ranges this process can freeze the page. Give it a time limit or something if making it better is hard. Or just have a button to make it run, instead of automatic.
3. Make it possible to search the deleted contributions of an IP range.
4. Make it possible to search the abuse filter hits of an IP range.
5. If this hasn't been fixed already, get rid of whatever code causes the abuse filter to occasionally drop fields from log entries - that makes it very difficult to understand some false positives/negatives.
6. Generally, give us much better tools for communicating with IP users, masked or not:
a. Many ISPs now switch users to new addresses so quickly (some every few minutes), that it is basically impossible to contact them through user talk pages. It should be easy to leave a message for an IP range. For example, User_talk:127..0/16 should literally act as a talk page for that entire range. Now, especially for busy ranges we don't want to alert everyone simply reading Wikipedia from that range - we already get enough readers freaking out about warnings, sometimes years old, left on IP talk pages. Perhaps a message on a range page could send a notification only to users on the range who open the edit window or have a cookie that says they did, and could make it clear it's a message for everyone on a range ("Have you been editing Wikipedia? You may have messages: Click here", and then there is a standard banner atop the page about shared and dynamic IP ranges). It may do well to limit creating talk pages for very large ranges to admins or another group, to prevent abuse. This will unfortunately mean that a single IP could simultaneously have several talk pages that the notification thingy will need to handle, but if they don't like the confusion they can register an account.
b. Many ISPs actually have predictable behavior, and there should be a way to bake this into the IP-username-assignment system. It will not be one-size-fits-all and IP allocations can also change, so it can't be permanent either. It has to be something we could set, change, and remove. Specifically, there are ISPs, typically residential high speed internet, that assign a single /64 to each customer that is stable over months or years. Let's say we know that a certain /32 is divided up in such a manner. We should be able to make MediaWiki treat every /64 in that range as a single user. Have an option to see the full address, but everything (signature, IP as listed in recent changes and similar, talk page links, block button, etc.) should default to using and showing the /64 subnet. There are some very active anonymous users, both good faith and bad, who have gone through hundreds of addresses from one static subnet. This type of method would shrink that to behaving as just one address, and greatly decrease confusion. Setting this sort of behavior would be a powerful tool that would have to be limited to a user group, and unsetting it should be retroactive (perhaps it could just be the way links and such are displayed, but regardless, if this is implemented it will need its own consultation).
c. Other ISPs allow an absurd number of customers to freely roam a single range with no way to distinguish them (I'm looking at you, T-Mobile). These should not be treated as the previous type of ISP. However, admins and checkusers collect a lot of information about all types of ISPs. It would be helpful if that information could somehow (either in conjunction with the idea above, or independently) simply be displayed for people looking at IP contributions or other IP-related pages without making them go to WHOIS and look at the range and figure it out all over again. That is, some knowledge blurb like "this ip is in the xx/## range, shared by 20 million T-Mobile customers - individuals cannot be isolated." "This IP range is in the xx/## range, shared by 120 million Comcast home internet customers, most of whom have a stable /64 subnet." We'd be able to set it for the whole range, and the message just shows up on contributions, talk page, etc. There are admins who won't do rangeblocks because they are concerned they will mess it up, and figuring out how a network behaves is not always easy. So help us make it easy but letting us share knowledge straight to everyone who could use it, without making them look for some tool or list of information that may or may not have what they want, and may even be unaware of. This actually doesn't just help admins who are hesitant about rangeblocks - it helps every admin by saving us from having to duplicate efforts over and over again. It could also actually reduce collateral damage from rangeblocks - for example, I have seen admins block essentially entire cities because they set a range well beyond what was necessary, not realizing how the network actually behaves.
d. In light of the awful type of ISP, perhaps consider reaching out to those ISPs directly. Especially ones that have actually been blocked in their entirety because of abuse. Let them know that it is so damned impossible to single out one user on their network we routinely just prohibit all of their customers from using parts of our site. Maybe they will care and try to do something on their end. Probably not but worth a try.
At the moment that's all I can think of other that what has been mentioned already. Someguy1221 (talk) 07:16, 8 August 2019 (UTC)
  • .
    • Are there other tools or user scripts that you use for this purpose? - I hate to plug my own tool, but ipcheck. It takes data from many API-based sources, and presents them all in one place. It can also do limited portscans.
    • automatic open proxy detection - That is far more difficult than it sounds, and really needs a human a lot of the time. There are large swaths that can probably be automatically blocked based on a whois regex-search, and some based on ASN - mostly webhosts. I'm working on an Machine-Learning solution to this baked into the above mentioned tool.
    • What do you do right now with IP addresses? We’ve heard about whois checks and looking at that data to see who owns the IP or where it is located. Another thing that has been mentioned is using the IP to find other IPs editing in that range. Are there other ways you use IP addresses? - I block a LOT of open proxies, and hosting ranges. Of the ~13000 rangeblocks active on enwiki [5], ~5000 are mine [6]. Googling the IP is very helpful, running the IP over various abuse databases such as stopforumspam, and the cbl is helpful. I might do a limited portscan in some cases. I'll resolve the range around the ip to understand how the range is being used. SQLQuery me! 15:32, 8 August 2019 (UTC)
  • I perform CU and RC patrolling on it.wiki; on other smaller projects where I volunteer as sysop, it is sufficient to do retro-patrolling using Special:RecentChanges.
    • What tools do you use as part of your anti-vandalism workflows that could benefit from feature improvements? Are there other tools or user scripts that you use for this purpose?
      • For RC patrolling the 90% of the controls are done using LiveRC (a useful tool which code needs a serious refresh and update!)
    • What potential tools can you think of, that don’t currently exist but could help with anti-vandalism efforts, especially if IPs were to be masked on the projects?
      • I listed some of them above. Automated range detection for ISP and proxies could be very useful. For open proxy, they should be globally blocked, so a page where to list all of them, and the check + block is performed without robbing time to the stewards would be useful.
    • What do you do right now with IP addresses? Can some of these workflows be automated to make your work easier?
      • I check their ISP, the edits in the range, look for LTAs linked to the IP. A searchable private database of LTAs with their behaviour could be very useful to trace harassment and abuses. This means to perform radical changes to the checkuser wiki.
      • I check for open proxies using online IP checkers, and abusers/spammers on blacklists. These checks can be done automatically (even if blacklists are not to be 100% trusted).
      • I would be useful to have a direct line to abuse@ the ISPs, and have our voice be heard (because generally they ignore our messages completely).
Cheers, --Ruthven (msg) 14:19, 9 August 2019 (UTC)
  • Just to demonstrate how much of a regression this proposal is: I just blocked 194.181.146.128/27 for five years on en.wp because it was a company address range (see WHOIS) spamming said company for five years. How am I going to detect such long term abuse if this proposal is implemented? MER-C (talk) 16:19, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

Likely error in the report - the conversation around anonymous editing[edit]

The PDF report says: The IP masking project is very unlikely to change the conversation around anonymous editing. I believe that is wrong, possibly spectacularly wrong.

While the intent of the IP masking project is noble, it appears inevitable it would cause significant pain and difficulties regardless of whatever tools are provided. That will definitely shift the conversation around anonymous editing. Currently there is limited support for banning IP editing. There would certainly be wider support for banning masked editing. This project might effectively lead to a ban on unregistered edits.

If this project effectively drives a ban against unregistered edits, all of the masking software and tools for dealing with unregistered/masked editors would end up worthless and unused. If that is indeed the result, the more efficient path would be to skip all the development work and just jump right to banning unregistered edits. Alsee (talk) 00:05, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

Yes, the most predictable outcome I see from this is even more innate suspicion of anonymous editors. The threshold for running CU (or some CU-lite that only works on masked IPs) will be approximately non-existent, and volunteers will be quicker to revert and block. If access to IP data is limited to admins who sign the NDA, then I think your scenario becomes very even more likely - there is sometimes simply too much vandalism to justify waiting for someone with exclusive tools to come and take care of it. So I would anticipate some ISPs just being permanently blocked, more or less. Someguy1221 (talk) 05:26, 9 August 2019 (UTC)
This is a point that I hadn't considered but you're dead right - the Community might be in favour of the "wiki way", but the Community also voted to stop non-autoconfirmed from creating articles (3 times) after they caused too many problems to handle. I'm in favour of IP editing, but anything more than de-masking being tied to extended-confirmed rights would make the problem so big as to not be worth handling (even if I got a userright, let alone it being limited to admins/CUs) Nosebagbear (talk) 08:44, 9 August 2019 (UTC)
On the specific idea of putting the de-masking userright at extended-confirmed, that would indeed reduce the downsides of masking to a largely negligible level. However it would so thoroughly destroy the purpose of masking that masking would be nothing but worthless complexity. I therefore consider it a non-option.
I question whether masking would even make sense if we set the unmask right at admin-level. While admins are considered "trusted" to use the tools to keep the wiki running, it's not generally considered a confidential position. There are a lot of admins, and while it takes a lot of work to get admin on EnWiki it requires little more than showing up on a small wiki to get admin there. A tiny-wiki admin can unmask any global editor simply by locally pinging them with a question and managing to attract a local reply. (Actually, it's not clear that a local edit would even be necessary.)
I'd say the a choices are (1) effective-and-disruptive masking set above admin level, (2) keep the status quo, or (3) end unregistered editing which renders the issue moot. Alsee (talk) 13:44, 9 August 2019 (UTC)
@Alsee: A person who can see the IP addresses of logged-in users can unmasked any global editor in the described way, but the same isn't true for the ability to see IP addresses of users that aren't logged in.
Seeing the IP addresses of not logged-in users could be a right that's it's own special permission similar to the rollback right. That would allow any Wiki to make policy to decide for themselves how many people should have access to the IP addresses of logged-in users on the Wiki. One Wiki might keep the right only to a subset of admins while another Wiki might believe that all admin and some non-admins need the right. Then it would be on the WMF to provide tools that make it seem to the individual Wikis that it's necessary to give less people access to the right because seeing the IP addresses gets important for fewer people.
I see no good reason why the restrictions to access IP addresses on individual Wikis should have to follow a global policy.
From a usability perspective "Synthetic user names" might make looking at edit histories nicer for users who don't care for IP addresses. Having a cookie-based link to a synthetic user name could help in some cases with sending an individual user notifications. ChristianKl❫ 11:59, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

A Compromise, with some issues[edit]

While @NKohli (WMF):'s summary was decent, it still had an inclination that they're willing to bend the criteria but not ditch it, despite a good 85% of the participants stating that that is what should must happen (Nkohli has noted the issues but taken very positive outlooks towards them, which hinders it as a summary)

I think the Community as a whole would be fine with only autoconfirmed users being able to see IPs. en-Wiki could probably roll with it being tied to extended-confirmed, I don't know about the other (and smaller) Communities.

But anything that required it to be acquired as a userright would have a major hit on acceptability - remember lots of reports that use IP aren't just individuals hunting but people coming across it in their day to day activity. So asking for a advanced user to come have a look is too slow, unwieldly and irksome for it to help.

NKohli (WMF) - one issue with any internal limitation, and an issue you did miss off the summary - what about the public benefit from knowing IP-edits, such as those linked to Parliament or Congress, that has caught some public issues before? Nosebagbear (talk) 08:56, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

Comment on Foundation engagement, for editors: I have a lot of experience dealing with community-foundation issues. In the past the Foundation has had the engagement and collaboration style of a freight train. A freight train with no brakes. Once an internal plan had been set, the only way to stop the train was with a major trainwreck. However recently I've seen very real efforts by the Foundation to genuinely engage and listen to the community. There are still problem areas (a long-term strategy to effectively sabotage wikitext being one of them), but my informed !vote is that we try to allow and support more positive engagement when the Foundation opens a dialog with us.
That said, my comment to staff is that the available comments from the Foundation are ambiguous at best. Painful experiences can result in long memories. A lot of editors are still inclined suspect unfavorable interpretations of ambiguous statements. My assessment of the situation is that editors generally understand the good intent here, but the current consensus-position appears to be that even good-or-great tools to work with masked editors will make things unacceptably more difficult. We take an extraordinarily-open step of allowing unregistered/IP editing, and we have little tolerance for anything that would make it more difficult to deal with the resulting problems. It already soaks up large amounts of volunteer-time dealing with these issues. It is miserable frustrating work. Every hour of labor spent on vandals, socks, and disruptive/abusive block-evaders is an an hour we can't spend doing more rewarding work like building and improving articles. I don't think this idea is going to be accepted, not unless there is a large and unexpected shift in the conversation.
My assessment is also that the available information and comments from the Foundation seem to have a tone that this is something that the Foundation plans to do, rather than the Foundation opening a dialog on whether we want to do this. My assessment is that that perception is creating discomfort, worry, and stress. If this is a "plan", then it is best to be open and clear about that. If this is investigating whether the community is on board with the idea, it would help to make that more clear. Alsee (talk) 14:49, 9 August 2019 (UTC)
@Alsee: - From what I've heard the WMF will certainly do something in this regard; sorta the t/p consultation where it was explicitly said that status quo ain't one option. We, at best, have a chance to specify and influence the specifications of that something. Winged Blades of Godric (talk) 12:01, 10 August 2019 (UTC)
For en.Wikipedia to survive, even if anti-vandalism tools are improved beyond the point that I believe possible, at least extended confirm users need, not only to see IP history as at present, but to see talk pages as if the IPs were not masked. Otherwise, I would recommend that IP users be banned from all except a few pages to make requests. If the status quo is not an option, neither is IP editing. — Arthur Rubin T C (en: U, T) 18:42, 11 August 2019 (UTC)

Outreach[edit]

I've seen a couple of questions around what we do to let the communities know this discussion is taking place, so I thought a list might help. So far, we've

  • Included it in Tech/News
  • Reached out specifically to stewards and checkusers
  • Posted on some Village Pumps where we happened speak the language

For the next step, we'll be posting to most Village Pumps (excluding some communities we've already notified, e.g. I won't post on Swedish Wikipedia again). If you feel like helping out translating, there's a message here: User:Johan (WMF)/Tools and IP message. /Johan (WMF) (talk) 15:51, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

Very glad to see you are reaching out to the community, I will try to translate to zh (if someone else not beat me to it). These kind of communication will be very positive. One note though, when at times WMF employees posted to village pump, the account isn't locally registered, it will cause some form of confusion, please do a global SUL (Krinkle tool?) to ensure the local communities know who are you when addressing the message to them, thanks. --Cohaf (talk) 19:04, 9 August 2019 (UTC)
Thank you! And yes, I've run Krinkle's useful SUL tool. (:
(For everyone else: see m:User:Krinkle/Tools/Global SUL.) /Johan (WMF) (talk) 22:28, 9 August 2019 (UTC)
@Johan (WMF):Done zh translation, and thanks once more for taking the lead to communicate with community.--Cohaf (talk) 07:07, 10 August 2019 (UTC)
Johan (WMF) outreaching more loudly and more broadly is unhelpful if the outreach is unclear. Please clarify:
  • Is this an announcement that the Foundation is going to mask, whether we want it or not? Or;
  • Is this is this asking the community whether masking is a workable and acceptable idea?
Alsee (talk) 16:44, 10 August 2019 (UTC)
I know a lot of people would love a straight answer to this question - myself included. It should be a pretty easy one to answer. SQLQuery me! 22:35, 10 August 2019 (UTC)
I am very worried that this simple question "Is the WMF asking IF this should be implemented, or asking for opinions on HOW they will implement this?" has gone unanswered after 12 days. I understand that wikimania is going on, but unless we're worrying about a diplomatic way to say "We are going to implement this no matter what you say", it should be very easy to say something along the lines of "We're just floating an idea to see if the community is interested in this". If you're planning on implementing this no matter what, just say so. If you're asking if this should be implemented, it would turn the heat down a lot to also just say so. SQLQuery me! 03:53, 23 August 2019 (UTC)
I do not in any way speak for the WMF, but my sense is mostly that this is likely to be implemented at some point, and they're trying to figure out how to mitigate the impact. Bottom line, if our servers were in Europe, this would already have been implemented (regardless of whether or not anyone had figured out how to mitigate the impact) because of the legal changes there. My sense is also that there really is a strong willingness to work with the community to find solutions *now* and start identifying the needs, building the tools, and finding other ways to lessen the impact, because it's probably just a matter of time before external pressures come to bear that will force their hand. The fact that we have known for years that it is technically possible to do this creates a situation wherein the WMF probably doesn't have a good defense against complaints, regulations, legislation, or lawsuits.

There are a lot of very good minds and very knowledgeable and experienced people participating in this discussion. I am hoping that we get some more hard data (I was told explicitly that work has already started on this) so that we get a better sense of what kinds of tools to design, and what kinds of changes should be considered in things like user rights in order to address the issues that have been identified. I think in a couple of years, we'll be talking of the "old days" when IP addresses were visible, and we have the opportunity to actively participate in determining how we get there, so we'd better take advantage of it. I did talk to some of the team involved at Wikimania, and it was really clear that they understand how big a change this is, and that they really have to work closely with the online community to get things in order before pulling the plug. It looks like they've got some reasonable resources to work with (financial and developer) so it can be done well. Risker (talk) 04:34, 23 August 2019 (UTC)

Don't fall into the trap believing that seeing IP addresses is THE way to do abuse mitigation. It is not. It is not the only way, and it is neither the best way. — Jeblad 20:06, 23 August 2019 (UTC)

Something is certainly going to happen[edit]

in light of the recently published Working Group recommendations on Community Health and safety which mentions Anonymising of IP addresses in public domain to protect IP contributor privacy as a core objective. Winged Blades of Godric (talk) 16:50, 10 August 2019 (UTC)

Was there ever any real doubt from the moment this was floated that they intended to implement it, no matter what the community said about it? I think not. Beyond My Ken (talk) 01:11, 11 August 2019 (UTC)
That's a point, as Trijnstel alluded to :-( Winged Blades of Godric (talk) 12:48, 11 August 2019 (UTC)
  • @NKohli (WMF) and CLo (WMF): - the lack of a firm answer isn't helping. Please give a non-wordy answer, do you plan on implementing IP Masking even if the broad editor consensus on this consultation page (and its lingual equivalents) is against it? Nosebagbear (talk) 13:10, 11 August 2019 (UTC)
@Nosebagbear and SQL: My apologies - please allow me some time to respond as I am currently traveling to Wikimania. This is not one person or one team's decision to make. Hence I don't readily have an answer for you at the moment. I will get back to you on that as soon as I can. Thank you. -- NKohli (WMF) (talk) 21:59, 12 August 2019 (UTC)
I'm just going to say here that I sincerely hope nothing is done about this. I'm sure the WMF/employees are aware that barely anyone is going to see this page compared to the tens of thousands of editors whose method of work will be altered in the event it is completed. Vermont (talk) 22:24, 12 August 2019 (UTC)
Well we first need to develop tools that mostly address the issues currently addressed by access to IP addresses and this will require close collaboration between our communities and WMF to determine what else will work (especially since IP addresses are becoming less useful anyway). But we do need to at least IMO partly mask IP addresses to bring location to a country level at least. Our current practices raises reputational risks with all we have seen happen to FB. Doc James (talk · contribs · email) 09:53, 17 August 2019 (UTC)
I take that as an yes to NosebagBear's poser.
At any case, masking the IP address to bring IP-disclosure to country level is as good as masking it in entirety. At-least ~city-level disclosure is needed but then, it gets too close to where we currently stand. Any form of masking affects the scrutiny (and thus, deterring of) of inappropriate edits by the 'public' and I firmly believe that improving anonymous editor privacy without losing 'public' scrutiny are mutually exclusive.Winged Blades of Godric (talk) 13:04, 17 August 2019 (UTC)
Regarding countries: If you edit English Wikipedia from the US, you're fairly anonymous on the country level. If you edit Norwegian Wikipedia regularly from Estonia, on a specific topic, this might very well be enough to identify you. /Johan (WMF) (talk) 13:41, 21 August 2019 (UTC)
@Doc James: Let's be real here. Most of the reputational risk that exists for Wikimedia is WMF pushing things through against the wishes of the community and this resulting in bad headlines. If the WMF would actually reason well about reputational risk this proposal wouldn't look the way it does. ChristianKl❫ 11:09, 22 August 2019 (UTC)
User:ChristianKl not clear what you mean? We of course need better tools to detect problems. These tools should be build first and than IP masking is reasonable IMO. Doc James (talk · contribs · email) 12:00, 22 August 2019 (UTC)
@Doc James:The post says "we should expect a transitional period marked by reduced administrator efficacy". This suggests that the person who wrote this expects that there's a period where admins have a less efficient workflow then they have currently. This matches past efforts of the WMF to deploy software in a state where it's not as efficient as the existing methods for some tasks like the VE integration.
When it comes to a task like creating bans of IP ranges, I could imagine a new tool that provides an admin who uses it all the necessary information to make the ban without telling him any IP addresses that are involved. If the tool is well developed and an improvement in the current workflow we would expect admins to use it instead of using the existing tool. We could wait till there are a few months without any IP range bans made with the old tool (or till there's an RfC to remove the old tool). If we wait till that point till we retire the ability to see the IP addresses there would be no period of reduced administrator efficiency, so that's not what this proposal seems to intend.
Solutions that will create such a period of reduced administrator efficiency will likely lead to community backslash. ChristianKl❫ 13:43, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

Let's get some hard data to really analyse the effect of this proposal[edit]

There's a nice report that has largely been duplicated by the comments on both the content and talk pages here; that is, it seems that there's widespread acknowledgement on a number of factors that will be affected by masking IP addresses used for editing. What isn't discussed effectively in the report, and is pretty difficult to analyse, is what the *actual* data are when it comes to editing by unregistered users.

I suggest that there be a serious study of the editing of IP editors carried out in a recent month. Specifically, I recommend April 2019 because it appears to be the most recent month for which there is good solid data on Wikistats2 that can be effectively analysed. [7] There was a total of 49,415,814 edits across all wikis in that month, of which 2,087,011 edits were performed by IPs (4.2% of total edits). I would like to see a table attached as a subpage here that will provide the following data:

  • The data from Wikistats for each of the different project types for the month of April 2019, by individual wiki, specifying
    • total number of edits on each wiki that month
    • edits in both numbers and percentage by "anonymous", group bot (i.e., registered bot), "name bot" (i.e., account that has the phrase "bot" in its username) and registered users

After that, the next level would be to select examples, at least one from each project type, as well as a range of Wikipedias of various sizes that have average or greater than average IP editing, and look at all IP edits for a selected period, with a minimum of 100 IP edits per project examined. I would suggest that projects with greater than average IP editing receive particular attention.

This shouldn't be hard to do for someone who has the right accesses, which I assume at least some of the people participating in this discussion have.

When I look at the same month of edits by each project type, I find that 14% of edits on all Wikibooks, 20% of edits to all Wikiquotes, 1% of edits to all Wikisources and Wikinewses, 11% of edits to all Wikiversities, 6% of edits to all Wikivoyages, 5% of edits to all Wiktionaries, and 12% of edits to all Wikipedias were performed by IPs. Even I can see that these numbers don't make a lot of sense, if the "all wiki" IP edit percentage is only 4.2%.

We need to better understand, by looking at IP editing on a variety of projects, what happens to those edits. How many are kept? How many reverted? How many result in blocks to the IP address? What kinds of problem edits are we seeing, and how would we be able to identify patterns related to those problem edits?

We've all been talking about IP editing in the abstract, or based on certain principles or anecdotal evidence. Let's get some hard data in play so that we can really figure out what we're dealing with. It's all guesswork at this point, because the last time anyone seems to have done even small-sample work on this was better than 10 years ago. If the WMF has done more in-depth study of this, then they need to publish this data and provide the links. Frankly, I'm kind of surprised that this proposal was made without this really obvious information already published and available for discussion purposes. Risker (talk) 23:14, 12 August 2019 (UTC)

Regarding the numbers not making sense, this is heavily distorted by a small number of projects having a huge number of bot edits. For example, Cebuano Wikipedia has about the same number of articles as the English Wikipedia, but less than 1% as many editors, and with over 99% of edits done by bots. Someguy1221 (talk) 01:09, 13 August 2019 (UTC)
Well, I went back and made up a chart. Here's the relevant table:
Project Type Total Edits

April 2019

IP Edits

April 2019

% of Edits

by IP

All Wikinews 28348 330 1.2
All Wikivoyage 41179 2652 6.4
All Wikiversity 26019 2836 10.9
All Wikisource 309,959 3470 1.1
All Wiktionary 748,925 35313 4.7
All Wikibook 30301 4274 14.1
All Wikiquote 38031 7763 20.4
All Wikipedia 15,518,067 1,894,047 12.2
SUBTOTAL 16,740,825 1,951,685 11.7 (avg)
ALL WIKIS 50,781,814 1,087,011 4.1

As can easily be seen, there's a 34,040,989-edit gap between the total of the main "content" wikis and the "all wikis" total, which I suspect is *likely* Wikidata for the most part (Meta and some other public wikis didn't have separate lookups either), and that most of the edits there would be bots, which would artificially dilute the "all projects" average percentage of IP edits. I am kind of surprised that, even almost 20 years into the project, we're still getting greater than 10% IP edits; I was guessing it would be a lot closer to 5%. It does go to show how important it is to really look closely at the numbers, and the nature of the edits being performed. Most projects can't afford to lose 10% of their edits - unless further research shows that most of those edits are "problems". Risker (talk) 02:21, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

Geolocation and blocks[edit]

(Scattered discussions above, so I'll start a dedicated thread)
I often identify rogue users based on editing behavior and similiar geolocation, so hopefully that functionality remains (mostly) intact if IPs are masked. Editors these days go from home/business IPs to mobile to public wifi, and it'd be a huge impact for admins to be able to detect that. We dont want to create a CU bureaucracy. It seems that grouping users on related IPv6 /64 ranges should be a requirement as well. Bagumba (talk) 04:52, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

i feel like this will make the IP problem even worse[edit]

the anonymous thing shouldn't be assigned by a cookie first of all IMO. that makes it way too easy to get a new one. it should just be a representation of your ip address. also, why are you going to take away checkusers ip access? that makes it nearly impossible to detect accounts abuse.

ip's already have too much ability to wreck a wiki with little to no repurcussions. and this is just going to make it even worse. i strongly oppose this. Computer Fizz (talk) 18:19, 13 August 2019 (UTC)

Hi Computer Fizz, there's no plan to remove IP access for checkusers? /Johan (WMF) (talk) 13:35, 21 August 2019 (UTC)
@Johan (WMF): Thank you for the reply. I was under the impression that no one would be able to see ip's. either way i still think that as a consensus driven project you should not implement this because of the almost unanimous consensus on this page. If you're looking to prevent the whole "oh crap, this shows my ip?" thing, maybe for their first edit they have to tick a box saying "i acknowledge this will display my ip address publicly", and it'll place a cookie until it expires? Computer Fizz (talk) 15:28, 21 August 2019 (UTC)
Checkboxing and session cookie would be the logical route. It causes some minor issues but so much less than the masking proposal Nosebagbear (talk) 15:31, 21 August 2019 (UTC)
Given that there's a proposal about limiting the amount of time IP data is stored, that would affect CheckUsers if they can access less IP history. ChristianKl❫ 15:58, 21 August 2019 (UTC)
It seems like people in the discussion believe that because IP addresses are something they usually don't see, it must be like a magic number that never fails, and uniquely stick to the users. It is not. An IP address can be shared and it is short lived. Static IP addresses are often shared through a proxy or gateway, and dynamic IP addresses are leased for a rather short time. Most users/admins have no idea whether the IP address is static or dynamic (leased), and if it is leased for how long time. When the lease time is out, then you can't say anything about who was the user (vandal) behind it. Repeated activity within the timeframe of a typical lease is a strong indication that the ID is static, but random activity over months or years are not. As most of the world uses dynamic allocation it simply make no sense to store the information for longer time than strictly necessary. — Jeblad 09:49, 22 August 2019 (UTC)
Your argument is a bit self-defeating. Essentially you argue that there are no privacy implication of long-term data storage because long-term storage of the data can't be used to make decisions that are linked to an individual user and at the same time you argue that it's important to remove the information.
It's not a requirement for an IP address to stick to an user to be useful information. Knowing how many edits where done from a specific IP address range in the last years is useful information when thinking about whether or not to ban that IP address range.
It's okay when most user/admins don't understand IP addresses. Checkusers on the other hand should understand how they work. Finding sock-puppets is a task that requires pattern matching where having more data allows you to see patterns better. I used to do moderation on a forum outside the Wikisphere and the ability to look at IP addresses was very valuable even when it comes to users who don't have a static IP. ChristianKl❫ 11:33, 22 August 2019 (UTC)
I have no idea how you came up with this; “Essentially you argue that there are no privacy implication of long-term data storage”. There are a lot of problems with storage of IP addresses, but far worse implications when publishing them. Read my answer in #Complete anonymous editing is not a right.
If you find vandalism from an IP address range over years, then you have an atypical situation where schools have assigned whole IP ranges. Schools in most of the world are behind a single static or dynamic address, and if that IP address is blocked then they are gone. You don't need to know the address, you need to know whether an edit is vandalism.
I heard the claim “Finding sock-puppets is a task that requires pattern matching where having more data allows you to see patterns better.” but knowing a bit about fancy pattern matching I still haven't found anyone that can describe a working algorithm to find a sock-puppet by “pattern matching”. The assumption that some specific articles are vandalized by a single vandal over several years is simply invalid. Even when a returning anonymous user does the exact same thing in the same article from the same IP address ten minutes later you can't be sure it is the same vandal. When the time goes by it become less and less likely to be the same vandal. When you are outside normal lease time it starts to become unlikely.
Stop fighting an imaginary vandal, and figure out how you can create a system your opponent (a badly behaving user) can't bypass. It is often called a physical countermeasure as it has some physical properties that can't be bypassed. The badly behaving user should not be able to define or redefine those properties. The IP address is something (s)he can redefine (ie. cycle the power switch on the router) so using the IP address as a means for abuse mitigation is wrong. — Jeblad 20:46, 23 August 2019 (UTC)

┌────────────────┘
This has gone off on a tangent. I can't even tell which of you is supporting what. Either way I think the main point here is that different IP address can be useful information not just randomized strings and that the "Anonymous user blablabla", while a proposal in good faith, should not be implemented in the opinion of myself and a lot of other people as well, as there are lots of major problems with it and the original problem it's trying to solve can be solved in different and better ways. Computer Fizz (talk) 05:30, 24 August 2019 (UTC)

Impact on non-Wikimedia wikis[edit]

From this proposal, it would seem that the reduction in IP visibility will become part of MediaWiki core. This raises several concerns with non-Wikimedia projects which may operate in different environments. I shouldn't need to apologize for not reading thoroughly the entire discussion above and potentially making points duplicating those already raised.

  1. Will the IP-masking functionality become a part of MediaWiki core enabled by default, meaning that non-WMF wikis wishing to use some newer versions of MW will need to address the change in configuration?
  2. If (1) is true, will be there a setting or other form of uncomplicated configuration which allows to completely revert to the old functionality (where IPs display unmasked to everyone)?
  3. If (1) is true, how will the new system work for wikis or wiki farms with no or nearly no user groups between admins and staff members? For example, on one wiki/wiki farm, bureaucrats are almost nonexistent, and there are no checkusers or any other special groups available to regular users.

If non-WMF wikis will be unable to configure the abuse mitigation part of the new system to work better (or at all acceptably) with their environment, they will have to choose between:

  1. upgrading MW as is, while potentially causing a substantial net negative for their users due to their inability to properly re-equip their problem user fighters;
  2. indefinitely stopping updates to MW at the version before the one introducing the changes, meaning that users will have no access to any newer features and possibly security enhancements;
  3. forking MW and modifying the code as necessary; this requires a substantial one-time effort and complicates any further updates, meaning that some non-WMF wikis will be unable to take this option.

In other words, if the new system doesn't allow non-WMF wikis to customize it as necessary (up to the ability to disable the new system entirely), these non-WMF wikis will have to choose between reducing their ability to combat problematic behavior, stopping to provide security updates, or allocating developer resources to maintaining custom code. Any option has substantial negative impact on users of affected wikis or wiki farms.

P. S. At the moment, given some other interactions I am aware of, it seems that non-WMF wikis are at best second-class citizens when it comes to MediaWiki development. It remains to be seen how far they will drop after IP masking is introduced. --AttemptToCallNil (talk) 10:46, 14 August 2019 (UTC)

AttemptToCallNil: I'm pretty sure this can be made a configuration option, so it shouldn't be a primary concern when it comes to decide on adoption of the feature for Wikimedia projects. --MarioGom (talk) 12:22, 16 August 2019 (UTC)

WMF Enactment[edit]

Well we first need to develop tools that mostly address the issues currently addressed by access to IP addresses and this will require close collaboration between our communities and WMF to determine what else will work (especially since IP addresses are becoming less useful anyway). But we do need to at least IMO partly mask IP addresses to bring location to a country level at least. Our current practices raises reputational risks with all we have seen happen to FB.

-Doc James

So taking Doc James' statement as a "yes" to will it be implemented top-down, we seem to have some key questions. Obviously the WMF team is very distracted by Wikimania atm, but on their return, pending questions both above and below need to be considered and answered.

I've just made a bit of a summary of the above (removing pure support/opposes for now) - please feel free to add major areas I've missed. Thank you for reading Nosebagbear (talk)

Why Exactly are they doing this?[edit]

Doc James says it's because of the reputational risks a la facebook - but why is the IP addresses not being masked being compared to facebook? As far as I know all of fb's issues are due to concealed privacy subversions, whereas ours is admitted and actively stated. Why are they equivalent? Have we been getting significant numbers of data protection complaints?

Research Report/WG Recommendation Non-Covered Aspects[edit]

The report/WG states that it is aware of significant admin handicaps, at least in the short term. However, why does the report not consider the issues of non-admins not being able to provide IP issues to admins and checkusers, as there are a significant number? Is there a long-term consideration (as since mitigation tools would logically be fully ready before any implementation was even carried out, short and long term should be similar)?

What is an acceptable loss of time for the limited number of admins and checkusers/acceptable increase in vandalism/disruption?[edit]

A question for both communities and the WMF - a change at all, let along something in line with the rough recommendations in the report, would cause significant delays in combating vandalism (meaning more edits make it through) and draw Admin/CU time aways from their current roles. This stands like however good the adaptation tools are. How much should be accepted for a change (or prohibiting all IPs?)

Third-Party Issues[edit]

Various widerscale issues have been seen with political bodies being tagged to IPs and biased reporting discovered by 3rd parties, if this is being dropped as a possibility, should they be notified? Will other users of the mediawiki software be able to disable any new settings as part of their configuration

Who can see - other options[edit]

A specific question by the WG, which is fundamental - who will see. It suggests that it's possible not even all admins will be able to see "We hope to restrict IP address exposure to only those users who need to see it." - if individuals at a non-admin level who hunt rotating IPs actively need to see it, would they be able?

Effective Tools, more ideas needed for consideration[edit]

Currently the earliest of ideas for tools, such as cookie/session tracking, increased admin intuition (raised in the report), linking to a /64 cluster (insufficient masking?) have all had fairly significant issues raised with them. Either those concerns need to all be handled or more ideas need to be suggested (either by the WMF team or by our more technical community editors) for thought.

Some of the questions have public answers, WMF needs to answer the rest.
  • Data protection complaints, based on the Right to be forgotten, from EU alone from July to December 2018 where 11 and none where granted. (source: transperancy.wikimedia.org/content.html). More detailed answer from WMF would be nice though.
  • Wikis with few or no local admins are managed by the groups global sysop and global rollbacker. There are over 300 WMF content wikis (excluding wikimania, anniversary, foundationwiki etc.) with no local admins at all. These wikis are managed by 19 global sysops and 83 global rollbackers.
  • Wikis without checkuser use stewards instead. According to CheckUser policy there are 36 CheckUser wikis. So, a vast majority of WMF content wikis do not have local checkusers, 785 wikis. That is 95% of WMF content wikis. There are 36 stewards managing this group.
Content wikis with no local admins.
Here are estimates of wikis with no admins. The real number is higher. For example, it is missing Icelandic wikis on wikisource and wikiquote - which have two abuse filter accounts as admins.
Wikipedia 76
Wikibooks 75
Wikinews 8
Wikiquote 43
Wikisource 14
Wiktionary 87
Wikiversity 1
Wikivoyage 5
Total 309
--Snaevar (talk) 17:54, 18 August 2019 (UTC)

Replies[edit]

Thank you for your patience, folks. The team working on this has been at Wikimania and then travelling back, thus the lack of replies. We'll get back to you soon, and update you on our conversations. /Johan (WMF) (talk) 13:42, 21 August 2019 (UTC)

how is it alligned with opposite recommendations from diversity groups from strategy process? (which I strongly disapprove). They are thinking about identify personal traits and you about increasing privacy.--Barcelona (talk) 09:12, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

Communication[edit]

The draft pdf report suggests the "guest user" accounts would be easier to communicate with. This seems like a strong positive aspect of the proposal, but I'd like to see more detail about how that might work. Would we be able to "ping" these accounts, and they would receive notifications? Presumably edits on their talk page would be highlighted for them. If a "guest user" changed IP and was using a different browser (no cookie continuity) would there be a way for them to continue using the same account, or link the two accounts? ArthurPSmith (talk) 17:43, 21 August 2019 (UTC)

Hate it[edit]

Hate it. I think this change will inadvertently promote vandalism, thanks to the extra privacy it affords. I am in favor of grouping IP accounts using cookies though -- that would be fantastic! --Victar (talk) 18:22, 21 August 2019 (UTC)

I'm not entirely sure "inadvertently" is correct. — Arthur Rubin T C (en: U, T) 04:56, 22 August 2019 (UTC)
It is though, unless you're saying WMF wants pages vandalized. Computer Fizz (talk) 06:20, 24 August 2019 (UTC)

Provide new tools before taking away capabilities[edit]

I see no reason why new tools should be introduced in a way that temporarily takes away admin efficiency. First introduce your new tools as an alternative to the status quo. If you manage to provide tools that provide better information then the existing tools and admins are using them as a replacement for the existing tools, then there's the time to discuss getting rid of the old tools and ability to view IP addresses. ChristianKl❫ 09:04, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

+1. If adequate tools are not provided, I will certainly recommend that "anonymous" editors be made unable to edit en.Wikipedia articles. We might negotiate as to whether they will be allowed to edit talk pages. — Arthur Rubin T C (en: U, T) 23:22, 22 August 2019 (UTC)
Absolutely. As I said above, let's get this to the point where we truly no longer need the IP's, and at that time, let's start the conversation about masking them. SQLQuery me! 03:48, 23 August 2019 (UTC)
Exactly. I mean, we've been seeing IPs for more than 15 years. Yes, I deeply understand WMF's concern about privacy, and I want to say that we do care about privacy, but there is something more important: We must ensure that our projects, massive efforts that we've made over years, will remain safe under any circumstances. That's why we block an IP range that affects thousands of users for one day, because we need to do it in order to keep our community safe. Tell me then, how can we find out the range of an IP that is masked? And if we do (indirectly), how can we estimate the damage that blocking it will cause?
I think you are going way too fast. Take it easy, give us those tools, let us see how they work and do it in a "win-win" way. Ahmad252 (talk) 10:13, 23 August 2019 (UTC)
This is the only way to do things. Any other approach deliberately compromises the integrity of our content, is contrary to your team's purpose (anti-harassment) and risks destroying what little confidence the community now has in the WMF. MER-C (talk) 14:47, 23 August 2019 (UTC)

In Czech language[edit]

Please use https://translate.google.cz/ or I'll translate it later. --OJJ (talk) 11:27, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

S prominutím, tohle je idiocie na druhou. Vlastně jsem do teď nepochopil, proč by se (zase) mělo upravovat něco, co funguje dobře skoro dvacet let a vyvíjet na to jistě nemalé finanční prostředky, které lze použít jinak? Nestačí pouze jisté vyloučení zodpovědnosti, které na mě koneckonců vyběhne kdykoli edituji nepřihlášený? Tento styl se mi zdá jako přílišná starostlivost o něco, co běžně myslící uživatel pochopí a zařídí se podle toho, a celkem mi připomíná slavný příběh, kdy ženská sušila kočku v mikrovlnce (RIP kočka).

Vezmu jen školní IP adresy, když to poberu velmi jednoduše; tak se nám (správcům, patrolářům?) budou zobrazovat adresy škol. Nehledě k dalšímu plýtvání daty jde zase o plevelení stránek posledních změn. Ha, a když budu chtít do té školy napsat, tak jak to pozná ředitelka?

Další věc. Článek jako [1]. Jsou prostě kolegové, kteří se neregistrovali, nechtějí se registrovat (z nějakého důvodu) nebo na přihlášení opomenou. Takže já když si otevřu takovou historii stránky, s trochou štěstí se mi podaří toho editora kontaktovat a opravit v článku chybu. Pokud tam budu mít Editor123 a po čase už vůbec nic (co autorská práva!), k čemu mi to bude dobré?

Další inteligence je pronásledování ze stran vlády, to jsem se zasmál. :) Tak ať ta hrstka editorů, co chce editovat (Odkud? Je nějaký alespoň jeden takový případ, kdy byl editor pronásledován, stal se, nebo tady táhneme do boje proti nějakému neznámému třídnímu nepříteli?) si buď založí účet nebo ať prostě needituje a hotovo. I pokud jeho IP adresu skryjeme pod účet, nepředstavuje to zřejmě velkou ochranu. Jistou anonymitu na internetu představuje tak možná Tor (sieť a ten je zase blokován na Wiki obecně. Pokud už má někdo inteligenci na to editovat tam, kde nemůže, rozhodně má inteligenci i na to umět se registrovat a vždy přihlásit.

Zkrátka v tom vidím jenom další otravování správců, otravování checkuserů, pozitivní přínos malý až žádný. --OJJ (talk) 11:27, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

Další problém: rangeblock.OJJ (talk) 13:15, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

From google translate:

Excuse me, this is idiocy. In fact, I have not yet understood why there should be (again) something that has worked well for nearly twenty years, and certainly to develop considerable funds that can be used differently? Isn't it just a certain exclusion of responsibility that ultimately runs out on me whenever I edit an unsigned? This style seems to me to be overly caring for something a normal thinking user understands and handles accordingly, and reminds me altogether of the famous story of a woman drying a cat in a microwave (RIP cat).

I'll just take school IP addresses if I take it very simply; we will see school addresses for us (administrators, patrolmen?). Regardless of further waste of data, it is again a weed of recent changes. Ha, and if I want to write to the school, how does the headmaster know?

Another thing. Article as [1]. They are simply colleagues who have not registered, do not want to register (for some reason) or forget about logging in. So when I open such a page history, with some luck, I manage to contact the editor and fix the error in the article. If I have Editor123 there and after a while nothing at all (what a copyright!), What good would I do?

Another intelligence is the persecution by the government, I laughed. So let the handful of editors want to edit (Where? Is there at least one case where the editor has been persecuted, has happened, or are we dragging into an unknown class enemy here?) Either creating an account or just needing to edit and done. Even if we hide his IP address under an account, it does not seem to be a big protection. A bit of anonymity on the Internet is perhaps Tor (network and it is blocked on the Wiki in general. If someone already has the intelligence to edit where he can not, he certainly has the intelligence to be able to register and always log on.

In short, I see only another annoying of administrators, annoying checkusers, a positive contribution little to no. --OJJ (talk) 11:27, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

Next issue: rangeblock.OJJ (talk) 13:15, 22 August 2019 (UTC)

I hope that was reasonably accurate, OJJ. If the translation was unwelcome, or inaccurate - please remove it. SQLQuery me! 20:44, 23 August 2019 (UTC)

Abkhazian wikipedia[edit]

Hi! In abkhazian wikipedia I had two problem with unregistered users. One (in my opinion) person whose IP address location is from Kazakhstan (example). He from the beginning was using different and different IP-addresses (why? I don't know!). Later he decided talk with me about life and something unnecessary and unencyclopedic therms and gave me jobs, like do this, do that, later that (like he was sysop)... There was some moments when he was right. I told him lets start work as registered member that I will write letter directly one place. He didn't register and continue change his IP-address on every edition, saying you cant catch me and because I am untouchable and will do whenever I will decide. Then I start block his IP-addresses but those which Kazakhstan IP-addresses I could identify as his (because he writes to me like my manager). I blocked about 20 entity, but twice more I left. His work mostly was useful for abkhazian wikipedia and I didn't reject all changes, just those which was not grammatically incorrect.

For example, IP-addresses of this person I blocked forever. I don't know possible I am wrong. If so please contact to me and If I will agree I will change my decisions!

Second unregistered person, whose IP-address location was from USA added BC years. He start from zero and wanted to continue to dinosaur era but I stopped him on BC 2000 year. He tried to continue his "job" but I stopped him, blocking, grouping deleted, IP-blocking. At the end he tired and stopped.

At the and about unregistered users I can say only that, every situation is uniq and sysop should decide what to do. For example, if user can changes his IP-address every time and totally have around 100 new created IP's, it isn't possible to catch him. I think that better way to use this persons behalf of wikipedia. Some day they will recognize that they are instrument who spent time in wikipedia. possible some day they become good wikipedians. God knows!

But main question for me is following - ware that parsons from Kazakhstan and USA or they was one person from one some other country. Really I don't know!--Surprizi (talk) 08:41, 23 August 2019 (UTC)

It is possible to do timing analysis to locate devices on internet. I don't know what kind of resolution is possible in Abkhazia and nearby areas, but it usually is around 10-100 km. On sites like Wikipedia you will simply hash the location and put a temporary ban on a small IP range or the browser fingerprint in the hash bin. It is extremely effective, but we don't do it. — Jeblad 20:16, 23 August 2019 (UTC)
It seems like timing analysis would be pretty easy to get around. Especially if the measurements are made against only a few network locations. Even Chrome comes builtin with a tool to adjust bandwidth/latency characteristics for the purposes of testing. Bawolff (talk) 09:44, 24 August 2019 (UTC)