Wikimedia Blog/Drafts/Heartbleed/la

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This page is a translated version of the page Wikimedia Blog/Drafts/Heartbleed and the translation is 41% complete.

This post has been published at https://blog.wikimedia.org/2014/04/10/wikimedias-response-to-the-heartbleed-security-vulnerability/ . You are welcome to add translations here.

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Wikimedia respondet novo periculo.

Die septimo mensis Aprilis detectum est novum magnum periculum contra securitatem. Cito Wikimedia effecit ut utentes rursum tuti essent.

Heartbleed permittere potuit malis ingeniis ut notitias furerent. Per aliquas horas periculum magnum fuit sed postea nulla mala acta ostendi potuerunt.

Quomodo Wikimedia egerit infra ostenditur.

Cum utentes aliquid e Wikipedia quaerunt, secretum signum mittitur. Si quis hic signum nefarie capiat, alius utens videri possit. Nova omnium utentium secreta signa beneficia magna ad securitatem conferre possunt.

Consilium, non imperium datur tesserae mutandae ad maximam securitatem consequendam.

Gratias agimus quod patientia hoc intellexistis.

Greg Grossmeier et WMF Operations and Platform teams

Quomodo Wikimedia responderit.

Horae sunt in UTC ostentae.

Die septimo Aprilis

April 8th:

April 9th:

April 10th:

Frequently Asked Questions

(This section will be expanded as needed.)

  • Why hasn't the "not valid before" date on your SSL certificate changed if you have already replaced it?
    Our SSL certificate provider keeps the original "not valid before" date (sometimes incorrectly referred to as an "issued on" date) in any replaced certificates. This is not an uncommon practice. Aside from looking at the change to the .pem files linked above in the Timeline, the other way of verifying that the replacement took place is to compare the fingerprint of our new certificate with our previous one.